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ANTIETAM 

AND THE MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA CAMPAIGNS 
OF 1862. 






N 



ANTIETAM 

AND THE MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA 
CAMPAIGNS OF 1862 



FROM THE GOVERNMENT RECORDS — UNION AND 
CONFEDERATE — MOSTLY UNKNOWN AND WHICH 
HAVE NOW FIRST DISCLOSED THE TRUTH 

APPROVED BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT 

-BY 
CAPTAIN ISAAC W. HEYSINGER, M.A., M.D. 

OF THE MILITARY ORDER OF THE LOYAL LEGION, AND 

OF THE MILITARY SERVICE INSTITUTION OF THE 

UNITED STATES, GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, N. Y. 




NEW YORK 

THE NEALE PUBLISHING COMPANY 

1912 



Copyright, 1912, by 
The Neale Publishing Company 



©CI.A330448 



DEDICATION 

TO My Comrades of the Army of the Poto- 
mac ; AND TO MY Comrades of our other 
Armies, in the West ; To the survivors 
OF THE Army of Northern Virginia_, whom in 

IDLE hours we loved, AND IN BUSY HOURS WE 

fought; To the Memory of Lincoln, whose 
Great Heart was so borne upon; And of Mc- 
Clellan, who felt the same weight; And of 
Thomas Jefferson, whose brave words, "When 
two parties make a compact, there results to 
each a power of compelling the other to exe- 
cute it," led hundreds of thousands of heroes 

TO BATTLE AND VICTORY; To MILITARY STUDENTS, 

AND Teachers of the Art of War, here and 
ABROAD; To the calm judgment of the Ameri- 
can People; And to Vindication of the 
Truth of History, This Volume is inscribed. 



CONTENTS 

Chapter Page 
I. Introductory — Inaccuracy of all the Cur- 
rent Histories 19 

II. The Peninsula 26 

III. The Advent of Pope 38 

IV. The Second Manassas 50 

V. Opening of the Maryland Campaign ... 55 

VI. Reorganization on the March 64 

VII. Lee's Lost Order . 75 

VIII. McClellan's Swift Advance 87 

IX. Lee's Projected Turning Movement .... 90 

X. The Eve of Antietam 100 

XI. McClellan's Plan of Battle — Burnside . . 104 
XII. Antietam — Forces Engaged 116 

XIII. Marching — Fighting — Straggling — Losses . .130 

XIV. September, 18-19 — Ammunition 143 

XV. Lee's Flight to Virginia — McClellan's Vic- 
tory 150 

XVI. Shepherdstown — September, 20 154 

XVII. Stuart's Useless Cavalry Raids — The Raids 
of Forrest — The Union Raid from Har- 
per's Ferry, September 14, 15, 1862 . . . .159 
XVIII. McClellan's Plan to Drive Lee by a Frontal 

Attack up the Valley 169 

XIX. Doctored System of Supplies for McClellan's 

Army 173 

XX. The Great Movement on Culpeper . . . .178 
XXI. Celerity of Army's Advance — Comparison 

with Other Movements 191 

XXII. Longstreet Isolated — Jackson Cut Off — Lee 

BEWILDERED' — ThE CAMPAIGN WON — ThE 

Armies Face to Face at Culpeper, Propor- 
tion 3 TO I 201 



8 CONTENTS 

Chapter Page 

XXIII. Longstreet's Battle Order — Burnside's Re- 

treat — Lee's Great Relief 209 

XXIV. War Department Strategy, Confederate and 

Union 215 

XXV. McClellan's Strategy for Turning the Con- 
federate Positions on the Peninsula Made 
Impossible by Interference From Washing- 
ton 221 

XXVI. Position and Numbers of Confederate Forces 
When McClellan Occupied the Yorktown 
Front on the Peninsula 231 

XXVII. The Detractors of McClellan — His Friends 
and Supporters — Lincoln's Vindication of 
McClellan 235 

XXVIII. The Cause of McClellan's Removal ... .242 
XXIX. Our Gravest Peril in the Closing Year of 

THE War 253 

XXX. Grant's Picture of Secretary Stanton's Char- 
acteristics — Danger of the Reward of Mc- 
Clellan's Success — McClellan's Qualities 

AS A Commanding General 271 

XXXI. Why Was McClellan Removed and Fitz John 
Porter Court-Martialed ? — The Pope-Hal- 

leck-Stanton Dispatches 278 

XXXII. Pope's Battle and His Defeat — Second Ma- 
nassas 287 

XXXIII. Pope's Demand Which Halleck Dared Not 

Refuse — The False Dispatch of Halleck's 
Which Brought Pope and Halleck to Com- 
mand AT Washington 291 

XXXIV. McClellan — The President — The Army of 

THE Potomac — Conclusion 298 

XXXV. Some Notes of McClellan's Life and Per- 
sonality 300 

NOTES 307 

INDEX 3" 



PREFACE 

This work, while in narrative form for the 
pubHc, is based entirely upon the official records of 
the United States Government, Union and Con- 
federate ; supported, when required, by the endorse- 
ment of eminent officers of the United States War 
Department and the Army, and by evidence taken 
at the time, but not then published, before the Con- 
gressional Committee on the Conduct of the War; 
by reports of Cabinet officers of the Government; 
and by records contained in official Government 
publications, as, for example. General Upton's 
''Military Policy of the United States." 

The facts relating to the Antietam and the Vir- 
ginia and Maryland campaigns of 1862 are analo- 
gous to those in works that treat of Napoleon, of 
whom to-day no record has any value which has 
not appeared until nearly forty years after Water- 
loo, having theretofore been hidden, suppressed, or 
perverted. Since then thousands of volumes have 
appeared, and are still appearing, all of which make 
prior books a travesty on the truth of history. So, 

9 



lo PREFACE 

too, with Antietam; only latter-day investigations 
disclose the truth. 

Popular or political histories, prejudiced or pur- 
posely garbled newspaper accounts, — of which I 
have read and examined hundreds with the greatest 
care, and compared with official data, — I have been 
compelled to totally ignore, as the information was 
based on unofficial data, and was practically censored 
by other influences. The personal facts were doubt- 
less often correct, but the inferences, probably from 
lack of actual knowledge or collateral circumstances 
quite unknown to the narrator, or from other rea- 
sons, were erroneous in nearly every case, as the 
subsequent records show. To quote from Max 
Miiller, in his ^'Lectures on India," before the Uni- 
versity of Cambridge: "It is this power of dis- 
covering what is really important that distinguishes 
the true historian from the mere chronicler." 

The principal sources from which was obtained 
the material brought together in this book were, of 
course, the great series of works containing the 
original data, and known as the "War of the Re- 
bellion : Official Records of the Union and Con- 
federate Armies." This great work contains no 
comments, connections, explanations, or criticisms, 
but is confined to the literal reproduction of official 
data — chronologically arranged whenever possible — ■ 
under the direction of eminent army officers and 
experts, detailed for that purpose, during twenty 
years of study, collection, and arrangement. 



PREFACE II 

The first volume was issued in 1881, the last 
volume in 1900, and the General Index, of 1242 
pages, in 1901. The principal part of this stupen- 
dous work, as stated on pages xiii and xiv of the 
Preface to the Index, was arranged as follows : 

"Major (now Brigadier-General and Judge Ad- 
vocate General) George B. Davis, Judge Advocate, 
United States Army, was appointed military mem- 
ber and president of the board thus authorized." 

The work consists of 128 parts, arranged in 70 
volumes, comprising an aggregate of 135,579 pages, 
and a large folio atlas containing 1006 maps and 
sketches, all official. 

The publication was authorized under Act of 
Congress in 1874. The first volume was issued 
in 1 88 1, the last volume in 1900, and the general 
index in 1901. The cost of publication alone has 
been $2,858,514, besides the pay of army and Con- 
federate officers detailed or employed on this work, 
and other necessary and very large expenditures. 

The whole constitutes the most complete and 
comprehensive record of actual war that has ever 
been put forth by any government, and is a mine 
which will constitute the storehouse and basis of 
all authentic history of this war for all time to 
come. 

It may be well to note here, however, that the 
Supplemental Volume (li), in two parts, was not 
issued until late in 1898 or in 1899. The import- 
ance of this note lies in the fact that a large por- 



12 PREFACE 

tion of this supplemental volume, relating to the 
events I describe, and which should have been em- 
bodied in Volume xix, published in 1887, had been 
hidden or suppressed, so that the records were not 
available for public use until ten years or more 
later, when they appear only in a supplemental 
volume. This material comprises thousands of dis- 
patches, reports, notes, orders, and other data of 
the highest importance, and all, so far as I know, 
entirely new to the public, and which never has been 
used in any history. 

Every part, volume, and page of this great work 
has been studied, selected, arranged, and annotated 
in writing, in the preparation of this volume. From 
these records, examined and carefully annotated, — 
a work of years, — the narrative embodied in the 
following pages has been studied, compared, and 
arranged. 

I have also cited in a number of cases the auto- 
graph letters of Major-General Emory Upton 
which are found in the biography of that great sol- 
dier, by General Peter S. Michie, published by 
Appleton & Co. in 1885. 

General Michie, professor at the West Point 
Military Academy, was graduated from that insti- 
tution in 1863, standing second in his class. As- 
signed to the engineer corps, — the highest grade, — 
he was immediately made assistant, and then chief 
engineer in the operations against Charleston, and 



PREFACE 13 

then chief engineer of the Army of the James, 
where I first came to know him personally. He was 
made Brigadier-General January i, 1865, i^ 1867 
was appointed on the staff of instruction at West 
Point, and in 1871 professor of natural and experi- 
mental philosophy. In 1871 Princeton University 
gave him the degree of Ph, D., and in 1873 Dart- 
mouth the degree of M. A. He has served on Gov- 
ernment commissions in Europe, and is the author 
of several important scientific works besides his 
^'Life of General Upton.'* 

Major-General James H. Wilson, of the Army, 
wrote a twenty-page introduction to Michie's ''Life 
of Upton." General Wilson was the celebrated 
Western cavalry commander, in our army, of the 
War. He was graduated at West Point in i860; 
was assigned to the corps of topographical engi- 
neers ; served as chief topographical engineer of the 
Port Royal Expedition, then in the Department of 
the South; was an aide-de-camp to McClellan till 
October, 1862, and was at the battles of South 
Mountain and Antietam. He was appointed lieu- 
tenant-colonel of volunteers in November, 1862, 
and afterwards, in our Western Army, commanded 
a cavalry corps of fifteen thousand men. He was 
the author of several important works, among 
others his work on China, made from his own per- 
sonal observations, and was the co-author, with 
Charles A. Dana, of the "Life of General Grant." 



14 



PREFACE 



Of General Upton Wilson says: "1 have con- 
stantly maintained, since the close of the War, that 
at that time Upton was as good an artillery officer 
as could be found in any country, the equal of any 
cavalry commander of his day, and, all things con- 
sidered, was the best commander of a division of 
infantry in either the Union or Rebel army. He 
was incontestably the best tactician of either army, 
and this is true whether tested by battle or by the 
evolutions of the drill field and parade. In the ser- 
vice, it is not too much to add that he could scarcely 
have failed as a corps or an army commander had 
it been his good fortune to be called to such rank." 

In an address delivered by the Secretary of War 
at the laying of the corner-stone of the Army War 
College at Washington, February 21, 1903, the 
Secretary spoke of General Upton in the following 
terms : 

''Brevet Major-General Emory Upton, colonel of 
the Fourth Artillery, graduated from West Point 
in the year i860, became, while almost a boy, one 
of the most distinguished officers of the Civil War. 
He commanded successively a battery of artillery, 
a regiment of infantry, a brigade of artillery, and 
a division of cavalry. Constantly in the field, he 
exhibited in camp and march and in scores of 
battles dauntless and brilliant courage, strict and 
successful discipline, and the highest qualities of 
command." 



PREFACE 



15 



I cite the above — which could be greatly ampli- 
fied — to show that in relying, as I have done, on 
the official statements and letters of General Upton, 
I am supported by an authority as competent and 
valid as any of those cited directly from the Offi- 
cial War Records, especially so since his great 
work, "The Military Policy of the United States," 
from which I have freely quoted, has been officially 
published by the United States, "Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1904." 

Of the Battle of Antietam, which constitutes the 
central axis, as it were, of the present work, and 
which battle purposely was so greatly minimized 
and depreciated by political officialdom at the time. 
President Roosevelt more than forty years after- 
ward, at the dedication of the New Jersey Soldiers' 
Monument on that battle-field September 17, 1903, 
placed it in its full light and proper perspective in 
his own vivid and incisive way : 

"We meet to-day upon one of the great battle- 
fields of the Civil War. No other battle of the 
Civil War lasting but one day shows as great a per- 
centage of loss as that which occurred here upon 
the day on which Antietam was fought. Moreover, 
in its ultimate effects this battle was of momentous 
and even decisive importance. 

"If the issue of Antietam had been other than it 
was, it is probable that at least two great European 
Powers would have recognized the independence of 
the Confederacy, so that you who fought here 



i6 PREFACE 

forty-one years ago have the profound satisfaction 
of feeling that you played well your part in one of 
those great crises big with the fate of all mankind. 

"The great American Republic would have be- 
come a memory of derision; and the failure of the 
experiment of self-government by a great people on 
a great scale would have delighted the heart of 
every foe of republican institutions." 

It seems almost a coincidence that Napoleon, too, 
subjected to similar malign influences, had to wait 
for his vindication and fame till forty years after 
Waterloo, which now the whole world, including 
his opposing enemies, fully and grandly acclaims. 

Based, as the following work is, strictly on offi- 
cial records, many of which were long suppressed, 
I can appeal with confidence to the United States 
War Department for its correctness, as has al- 
ready been done. 

Of a somewhat similar case, in American his- 
tory, Parkman says: "Some of the results here 
reached are of a character which I regret, since 
they cannot be agreeable to persons for whom I 
have a very cordial regard. The conclusions drawn 
from the facts may be matter of opinion : but it will 
be remembered that the facts themselves can be 
overthrown only by overthrowing the evidence on 
which they rest, or bringing forward counter-evi- 
dence of equal or greater strength; and neither 
task will be found an easy one." 

This work is a simple, straightforward, and dis- 



PREFACE 17 

passionate record of the truth, and its statistics, all 
new, and its stragetical movements, which to the 
civilian may appear dry reading, to the old soldiers 
will be bread and meat, for they understand them 
like the multiplication table, and have always longed 
to learn just what they were "up against." 

THE AUTHOR. 



ANTIETAM 

AND THE MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA 
CAMPAIGNS OF 1862 



I 



INTRODUCTORY INACCURACY OF ALL THE 

CURRENT HISTORIES 

In order to fully understand the Maryland cam- 
paign of 1862 it is necessary to consider the events 
which immediately preceded, and of which this 
momentous chapter in the War of the Rebellion 
was the consequence. 

Full significance, and the high importance of the 
military operations of this epoch have never, for 
many reasons, been found in the ordinary histories 
of this period. There is, indeed, no campaign of 
the war so little understood in its military and 
national aspects as this, which had for its central 
feature the battle of Antietam, but which bristles 
from end to end, at every point, with questions 
which never have been answered, and never could 
have been answered, until the Government, with a 
care and cost which must extort the heartfelt grati- 
tude of every patriot and soldier, has placed in our 

19 



20 ANTIETAM 

hands the whole original record, without blot or 
emendation, and without the possibility of ques- 
tion, and has made for us and for the historian 
of the future all these events so clear and startling 
that no student of war or of his country need 
longer doubt or hesitate. I will endeavor to briefly 
depict the facts. I cannot in this brief presentation 
cite all the authorities at length by page and date, but 
in a case of this kind every statement made must 
be reenforced by unimpeachable original authority, 
and these I have included in the text as references 
in corroboration of the various facts hitherto 
doubtful or ignored. 

I trust that in presenting these facts entirely 
without prejudice, and in vindication of historic 
truth and of the noble army which did such glori- 
ous service in these campaigns, the writer may ask 
for that consideration which long and faithful 
study of the records contained in many volumes, 
and a personal participation in the events them- 
selves, as well as a perfect familiarity from boy- 
hood with the whole country covered by these 
operations, may appear to deserve. Forty-nine 
years is full long enough to enable the calm light 
of history to displace the temporary and partial 
views of the great events with which I shall so 
briefly undertake, in outline at least, to deal. 

When General Emory Upton had written his 
great work, "The Military Policy of the United 
States," published by the United States Govern- 



INTRODUCTORY 2i 

merit, up to the campaigns of 1862 he had found 
during all the preceding military operations of our 
country no especial difficulty; but he now encoun- 
tered problems impossible of solution on any mili- 
tary principles. He found defeats and disasters, 
movements and disco-ordinations, and a labyrinth 
of incompatibilities which could not be accounted 
for with the ordinary historical data at hand. 

To Colonel DuPont, his classmate at West Point 
and life-long friend, he writes in 1879: "To- 
morrow I shall finish the original draft of the cam- 
paign of 1862. Its volume is startling. Twice I 
destroyed all that I had finished, because it fell 
short of carrying conviction. . . . The Mc- 
Clellan question has run the manuscript up by 
nearly four hundred pages. The campaign of 
1862, the most critical of the war, is hardly in 
shape for your painstaking revision. I fear I 
have made too many quotations, and yet nothing 
will be received as condemnatory of Stanton^s 
interference unless substantiated by documentary 
proof." He continues: "The campaign of 1862 
is very difficult. If I make it short, the reader may 
doubt my facts and conclusions. If too long, he 
may weary of the subject. If you want to know 
who was the cause of a three years' war after we 
created a disciplined army of six hundred thousand 
men, it was Stanton. But Stanton did not create 
the system — the system created Stanton." 

In a letter to General, — afterwards President, — 



22 ANTIETAM 

Garfield, in 1879, he says: "When in 1862 Gen- 
eral McClellan, after being relieved from command, 
rode the lines of his army, neither my regiment 
nor myself joined in the demonstrations of affec- 
tion and applause which nearly everywhere greeted 
his appearance. . . . The son of an Aboli- 
tionist, an Abolitionist myself, both as a cadet and 
an officer, my s)rmpathies were strongly on the side 
of the Administration in its effort to abolish 
slavery, and I could not therefore even indirectly 
participate in an ovation which might be construed 
as a censure on either the civil or military policy 
of the Government. With these views you will 
naturally infer that I have always been anti- 
McClellan, anti-Fitz-John Porter, and such is the 
fact. 

"Up to a few months ago, when I began our mili- 
tary policy during the Rebellion, I believed that 
these officers, differing in policy from the Adminis- 
tration, had not done their whole duty to the coun- 
try. But in the process of this investigation I have 
been compelled to change my mind. Like many 
millions of our people, my opinions were vague and 
shadowy; they had no foundation in fact. 

"You will remember that from the nth of 
March till the nth of July, 1862, we had no gen- 
eral-in-chief. Our armies, numbering more than 
six hundred thousand men, were commanded by 
the President and the Secretary of War. Could I 
lay before you all the facts that have come under 



INTRODUCTORY 23 

my observation, I believe you would be convinced 
that the causes of a four instead of a one year's 
war can all be traced to this brief but disastrous 
period. 

"It was during this time that the troops east of 
the Alleghanies were divided up into six inde- 
pendent commands. It was during the same period 
that the great army concentrated at Corinth, and 
which might have made a summer excursion to 
Vicksburg and Jackson, was dispersed from 
Memphis to Cumberland Gap, a distance of nearly 
three hundred miles. In both cases the result was 
the same. The Army of the Potomac was called 
back to the Potomac; the Army of the Ohio was 
called back to the Ohio. It may be added, as a 
further coincidence, that the commanders of the 
two armies, against whose protests the division of 
our forces was made, were relieved from their 
command." 

It may be added further, that when Halleck was 
brought east as general-in-chief, in July, 1862, he 
came with a handicap known to Stanton, but un- 
known to the country, which General Pope used 
against him to force the removal of McClellan, 
saying, "The circumstances under which you came 
to Washington and I undertook the campaign in 
Virginia are well-known to one-half of Congress.'* 

With this bomb-shell — to which I shall again 
refer — in the hands of Pope and Stanton, and 
ready to be exploded under him, Halleck became a 



24 ANTIETAM 

mere agency in carrying, out the military projects 
of the civilians who had so long dominated and 
directed the operations of the army. 

Says General Michie, the biographer of Upton: 
"The great War Secretary, Stanton, a man of im- 
perious will, became the supreme and controlling 
spirit in every military movement, and in the con- 
duct of military affairs, and to his interference all 
our military disasters of that year may be traced.'* 

And we shall find that these disasters did not 
cease with the second Bull Run campaign, but that 
Fredericksburg and Chancellors ville are a part of 
the same, in the midst of which McClellan's inter- 
regnum, enforced by the personal orders and right- 
eous wrath of the President, who took the bit be- 
tween his teeth and rose to an almost unapproach- 
able majesty in this great emergency, shines out 
like a glorious star. 

Referring to this "War Department strategy," 
as General Upton designates it, he demonstrates 
that It was a clear usurpation, saying : "Neither by 
the Constitution nor the laws is the Secretary of 
War entitled to exercise command. Whenever he 
departs from the sphere of administration to con- 
trol military operations he is nothing more or less 
than a usurper. The Constitution, laws, decisions 
of the Supreme Court, and of the Attorney-Gen- 
eral, nowhere give him the authority to command." 

In other words, the Secretary's duties were those 
of administration, and the President is made, by 



INTRODUCTORY 25 

the Constitution, the commander-in-chief, and the 
commander-in-chief has no more power to delegate 
his command than the President has to delegate his 
veto. 

Just on the eve of McClellan's movement by- 
water to the Peninsula, in March, 1862, his posi- 
tion as general-in-chief was taken away from him, 
and he commanded, henceforth, only the ground 
which his army covered and only the troops which 
covered it. 

Says General Michie: "By thus assuming the 
direction of military affairs both the Secretary and 
the President became from this moment as much 
responsible for whatever of disaster might befall 
the army as if they had actually taken command in 
the field. No sooner had the commander of the 
army of the Potomac sailed for Fortress Monroe 
than the disintegration of the forces which he had 
relied upon for his purpose, and which had been 
promised him, began to take place." 



II 



THE PENINSULA 



We know the result. When the Army of the 
Potomac had reached the front of Richmond its 
line of supply was by the York River, on the left 
bank of the Chickahominy, while Richmond, the 
objective, was miles away on the right bank of the 
Chickahominy. This uncanny stream thus of 
necessity divided our army. As soon as the James 
River had become free, by the destruction of the 
Merrimac, and with the ascent of our war vessels 
to the Chickahominy and above, correct military 
principles required that our base should be changed 
to the James. 

But this was forbidden by two circumstances. 
By Stanton's order of May i8 McClellan was 
directed to extend his right wing so as to effect a 
junction with McDowell's left wing advancing 
from Falmouth, and to establish this connection as 
soon as possible, by extending McClellan's right 
wing to the north of Richmond; and Stanton's 
orders to McDowell of June 8 directed that officer 
to move his command immediately in the direction 

26 



THE PENINSULA 27 

of Richmond, to cooperate with McClellan. Wrote 
McDowell, to McClellan: "For the third time I 
am ordered to join you, and this time I hope to get 
through." (See War Records, vol. xi.) 

But he didn't, and McDowell was tied fast, and 
Stonewall Jackson was turned loose. Then came 
the heroic Seven Days' battles, when McClellan, 
having no hope from McDowell, but altogether 
the reverse, made that remarkable change of base 
to the James River, at almost precisely the spot 
where Grant, two years later, did the same, after 
sacrificing more men overland than his antagonist 
had with which to oppose him, and finally opened 
the door to Richmond and brought about the end 
of the war. McClellan's plan was outlined in his 
correspondence with Commodore Rodgers, — who 
commanded the fleet in the James River, — under 
dates June 24 and 25, and with Woodruff and 
Felton, June 20. (War Records, vol. xi, part 3, 
page 220.) 

McClellan's plan, in brief, was to hold the Con- 
federate army in front of his heavy works on the 
right bank of the Chickahominy and throw the bulk 
of his army across to, and over, the James River, 
attacking Richmond from the south and west. He 
had had all the roads through this wilderness al- 
ready surveyed and mapped for this purpose (See 
"W. R." vol, xi; vol. xi, part i, pp. 37, 152, 264, 
270, 998; part 3, pp. 24, 226, 229, 236, 246, 250, 
251, 255, 256, 258, 262, 265, 272.) Confirmatory 



28 ANTIETAM 

of the above is the statement of Lieutenant-General 
Dick Taylor (son of President Taylor), who com- 
manded a division in Lee's army in the battles from 
Gaines' Mill to Malvern Hill, ("Destruction and 
Reconstruction," page 87), ''The Confederate com- 
manders knew no more about the topography of the 
country than they did about Central Africa. . . . 
McClellan was as superior to us in knowledge of 
our own land as were the Germans to the French 
in their late war." But the junction of Jackson 
with Lee — directly due to the authorities at Wash- 
ington — and their combined attack on McClellan's 
right, at Gaines' Mill, disarranged these plans, and 
compelled him to do, in the midst of open battle, 
what he had intended to do in advance by secret 
movements. 

And now we come to the question of forces en- 
gaged on each side, and this question will dominate 
the entire Maryland campaign as well. It is need- 
less to say that the Confederate force was pur- 
posely minimized, and McClellan's exaggerated, in 
both cases, in all the War Department figures, at 
Washington. 

The regimental organization in both armies was 
identical. The very day McClellan had landed on 
the Peninsula, and when about going into a 
long, exhaustive, and depleting campaign. Secretary 
Stanton issued his general order of the War De- 
partment April 3, 1862 : "The recruiting service 
for volunteers will be discontinued in every State 



THE PENINSULA 29 

from this date. The officers detailed on Volunteer 
Recruiting Service will join their regiments with- 
out delay. . . . The public property belong- 
ing to Volunteer Recruiting Service will be sold to 
the best possible advantage." (See Official Orders, 
War Department, 1862.) 

As stated in Lee's letter of August 16, 1862, and 
Jefferson Davis's "History of the Confederacy," 
the Confederates immediately countered on this 
order, April 13, ten days afterward, by the first 
general conscription of "All white men resident of 
the Confederate States, between the ages of eigh- 
teen and thirty-five years, and to continue those al- 
ready in the field until three years from the date of 
their enlistment." Those under eighteen and over 
thirty-five were required to remain ninety days. 
And as a counter to the President's War Order No. 
3, of March 11, just before the Peninsula cam- 
paign began, relieving General McClellan from the 
control of our armed forces as a whole, General 
R. E. Lee, by General Orders No. 14, dated Rich- 
mond, March 13 (only two days afterward), was 
"assigned to duty at the seat of government, and 
was charged (directly under the President) with 
the conduct of military operations in the armies of 
the Confederacy." 

The above general conscription alone should have 
given the Confederate armies more than 800,000 
men, in addition to the forces already in the field ; 
the entire Union armies at this time, East and 



30 -^.^^ ANTIETAM 

West, did not number, even on paper, more than 
600,000 men. (See General Michie's "Biography 
of Emory Upton," p. 459-) The results of this 
suicidal policy at Washington, and of this magnifi- 
cent counter-stroke at Richmond, were soon ap- 
parent. In war, military principles as contrasted 
with political practices will win in every case. 

It will be necessary for the purposes of this his- 
tory to determine the actual numbers of the oppos- 
ing forces during the Seven Days, as this will give 
us a standard of comparison for the succeeding 
campaigns. 

It is well known that for purposes of com- 
parison, the Union official figures are worthless, as 
our generals were obliged to report the "ration 
strength," while the Confederate forces reported 
only the "fighting strength." 

The reports of a great many regimental and 
other organizations engaged in the Seven Days* 
battles, on both sides, give the number of their men 
taken into action. These came from all parts of 
each army, and are a fair index of the average 
strength, conforming also to the ratio of officers 
and the system of organization, which was alike 
in both armies. The average strength of the Con- 
federate infantry was 542 officers and men for 
each regiment. For the Union army the average 
was 487 per regiment. (See vol. xi, "War 
Records.") 

As the conscription had brought in its men 



THE PENINSULA 31 

freely, during the previous two and one-half months, 
and recruiting had brought none at all to the Army 
of the Potomac, we may be sure that if there be 
any error it must be in underestimating the Con- 
federates. 

It may be well to pursue this question some- 
what further. In vol. xi, part 3, p. 615, W. 
R., is given the "present" on June 23, 1862, 
of twenty- four Virginia regiments, — which (see 
Longstreet's letter on page 614, ibid.), are really 
present for duty in battle, — as "7000 are at times 
absent from their posts." Excluding these, the 
total is 11,380; but in the letter Longstreet sums 
up the whole (including officers) at 13,000. This 
gives an average regimental strength of 542. As 
the 6813 others are only "absent at times," the ef- 
fective strength in battle would be considerably 
greater. On the same page the average battery 
strength of thirteen batteries is given as present 
for duty in battle 76 men, besides officers, per 
battery. The total per battery may be put at a 
minimum of 80. 

Lee's published field return for July 20, 1862, 
gives as present for duty, exclusive of Jackson and 
Ewell, 69,732. This includes Holmes's division; 
but this division was present and engaged in the 
Seven Days' battles. (See volume xi, part 2, p. 
906.) Lee, in his letter to Jackson of July 27 (see 
War Records, vol. xii, part 3, p. 918), gives the ef- 
fective strength of Jackson and Ewell at 18,000 



32 ANTIETAM 

men. Adding officers in the proportion of Lee's 
army — 1200 — would make this force 19,200. The 
Confederate losses in the Seven Days, which are 
much underestimated in the returns, since there are 
large discrepancies in their own accounts (com- 
pare volume xi, part 2, pp. 973-984 with p. 502), 
were not less than 20,077. 

Aggregating these items, we have a Confederate 
total taken into action in the Seven Days' battles 
of 108,899, which is less than the true aggregate. 

Comparing Lee's field return of officers present 
for duty July 20, and adding the officers of Jack- 
son and Ewell, 1200, we have a total of 5533 com- 
missioned officers left in Lee's army after the Seven 
Days' battles. 

McClellan's field return of July 10, after deduct- 
ing Dix's command, which had remained at Fort 
Monroe and was not under McClellan's command, 
gives an aggregate of 3834 commissioned officers 
present for duty with McClellan's entire army after 
the Seven Days. 

McClellan made no complaint of his army being 
under-officered. 

Lee (see vol. xi, War Records, part 3, pp. 669 and 
671), wrote urgently and repeatedly to the Rich- 
mond authorities about his shortage of officers. He 
says : "The want of officers of proper rank renders 
many regiments and companies inefficient ; regiments 
being in some cases under the command of captains 
and many companies without their proper comple- 



THE PENINSULA 33 

ment of officers." Again, later, he writes: "I am 
very anxious that the vacancies among the regi- 
mental officers should be filled as soon as possible," 
etc., etc. 

As Lee's losses in the Seven Days' battles were 
at least one-third greater than those of McClellan, 
after making due allowance for this casualty defi- 
ciency of officers in Lee's army, we still see that his 
force after the battles must have been decidedly in 
excess of that of McClellan. So much so, in fact, 
that one might suppose that the Confederate 
strength in the Seven Days was really much greater 
than the estimated regimental strengths would ag- 
gregate, since Lee had one-third more officers after 
the battle than McClellan had, and was nevertheless 
urging the Richmond authorities that his shortage 
of officers rendered many of his organizations inef- 
ficient. 

It is needless to repeat, of course, that the system 
of organization was the same in both armies. 

At the end of July Lee sent to Jackson A. P. 
Hill's division and two Louisiana regiments, the 
latter to be brigaded with those already in Jackson's 
force. These numbered altogether thirty regiments. 
(See War Records, vol. xi, part 3, p. 648, and vol. 
xii, part 3, p. 918.) Lee says: 'These troops will 
exceed 18,000 men." Adding their officers, we have 
19,200 at least, and dividing by thirty we have 
an aggregate regimental strength of 640 each, offi- 
cers and men. 



34 ,^^ ANTIETAM 

It should be noted that the Confederates did not 
multiply new regiments as we did, but kept filling up 
their old regiments. Very few of the Confederate 
States show regimental numbers exceeding 50 or 60. 
The highest regimental number in Virginia was 61, 
and this number appears in the Seven Days. So also 
of Georgia and the other States. This system, of 
course, added enormously to the value and efficiency 
of these organizations. 

Coming directly now to the numbers engaged on 
each side in the Seven Days' battles, we find, 
from the Confederate roster (vol. xi, part 2, pp. 
483-489) that General Lee had under his direct 
command, and actually engaged in these battles, 182 
regiments of infantry, 1 1 regiments of cavalry, and 
87 batteries of field artillery, — besides the heavy 
guns in the works, — making a total battle-field 
strength of 110,802, which is a minimum. 

McClellan had under his command at the same 
time 143 regiments of infantry, 6 regiments of 
cavalry, and 57 batteries of artillery, making a total 
battle-field strength of 81,797, which is a maximum. 

The Confederates had an excess over the Army 
of the Potomac of 44 regiments of infantry, 5 regi- 
ments of cavalry, and 30 batteries of field artillery, 
making an aggregate excess in numbers of, at least, 
29,000 men. 

At the battle of Gaines' Mill, June 27, when the 
combined divisions of Stonewall Jackson, Ewell, 
A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, and Longstreet, with Stuart's 



THE PENINSULA 35 

cavalry, made a concerted attack on three sides, the 
Confederates had enga,2^ed 124 regiments of infan- 
try, 8 regiments of cavalry, and 27 batteries of 
artillery; while the Union forces comprised only 
49 regiments of infantry, 3 regiments of cavalry, 
and 21 batteries of artillery. fSee casualty returns 
of opposing armies in vol. xi, W. R.) 

The strength of the Confederates in this battle 
was nearly in the proportion of three to one, yet 
under McClellan's eve. and with Fitz-John Porter in 
immediate command, our troops inflicted far greater 
losses than they sustained, and at nightfall crossed 
the Chickahominy with all their force intact and 
ready for the battles yet to follow, which battles 
concluded with that astonishing and overwhelming 
victory over all Lee\s army at Malvern Hill, which 
perhaps gave the highest example of what artillery 
can do when properly handled, to be found in all 
history, unless Antietam may furnish another 
instance. 

The obvious course for the Union army, now, was 
to do as we did two years later, for the James and 
the York rivers, the Peninsula and the Appomattox, 
were all in our possession, and the vast defensive 
works in front of Petersburg and Richmond had 
been as yet barely begun. (See Confederate engi- 
neers' reports, W. R.) 

McClellan, perfectly secure in his magnificent 
position at Harrison's Landing, with tidewater sup- 
plies open from every quarter, and with natural de- 



36 ANTIETAM 

fenses all around, and almost under the shadow of 
Malvern Hill, of unsavory memory to the Con- 
federates, awaited support from Washington, as 
Grant did two years later, to complete his work. 

The editors of Upton's United States Govern- 
ment publication, "The Military Policy," in a note, 
describe Harrison's Landings as one of the best on 
the James River. It was twenty-five miles below 
Richmond, with a high and open country between, 
and guarded by water on both flanks and in front. 
It was, in fact, immediately across the James River 
from, and less than four miles below, City Point; 
whence Grant carried on his final campaign, in 1864 
and 1865. I" ^^ct, McClellan occupied both sides 
of the James River, as the War Records (vol. xi) 
show. '■ ^^ 

But other counsels prevailed. 

Concerning the operations from Harrison's Land- 
ing, including General Sumner's report of the cap- 
ture of Malvern Hill, August 5, see War Records, 
vol. xi, part 3, p. 356; of McClellan's urgent ap- 
peals for ferry-boats to cross the James River in 
force, August 3, see same volume and part, p. 351 ; 
of Averell's cavalry action south of the James, Au- 
gust 9, see same volume, part 2, pp. 946-948, and D. 
H. Hill's report of same, p. 948; and of other occu- 
pations of the southern side, pp. 949, 950. See also 
Fitz-John Porter's letter to McClellan of August 5, 
to push over to the Suffolk Railroad, destroying all 
bridges over the Blackwater River, etc., etc. 



THE PENINSULA 37 

The protest of Commodore Wilkes to Secretary 
of the Navy Welles, of August 5, 1862, against the 
removal of the army from the front of Richmond to 
Washington is an important and elaborate statement 
of the facts, on the spot and at the time, and will be 
found at length in the War Records, vol. xi, part 2, 
pp. 356-358. He concludes: "I trust in God this 
direful act will not be carried out ; our noble cause 
will be ruined if it is. General McClellan is con- 
fident as I am in the result, if left here, the capture 
of the Rebel capital, and of maintaining the honor, 
safety, and glory of the Union and its army." 



Ill 

THE ADVENT OF POPE 

Pope had been brought to Washington and been 
given command of a new army, the Army of Vir- 
ginia, made up of the scattered forces of Fremont, 
Banks, McDowell, and the garrisons at Washing- 
ton, with comprehensive orders from the civilians at 
Washington to ''operate in such manner as, while 
protecting Western Virginia and the national capital 
from danger or insult, it shall in the speediest 
manner attack and overcome the Rebel forces under 
Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the direc- 
tion of Charlottesville, and render the most effective 
aid to relieve General McClellan and capture Rich- 
mond." 

Surely it was a task worthy of those fabled an- 
cient heroes, and we need not wonder that General 
Pope, in command of this "one army," should in his 
published address "To the Officers and Soldiers of 
the Army of Virginia," tell them what manner of 
man he was. "Let us understand each other," he 
said. "I have come to you from the West, where we 
have always seen the backs of our enemies; from 
an army whose business it has been to seek the ad- 

38 



THE ADVENT OF POPE 39 

versary and beat him when he was found; whose 
policy has been attack and not defense. In but one 
instance has the enemy been able to place our West- 
ern armies in defensive attitude. I presume I have 
been called here to pursue the same system, and to 
lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do 
so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an op- 
portunity to win the distinction you are capable of 
achieving. That opportunity I shall endeavor to 
give you. Meantime, I desire you to dismiss from 
your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to hear 
so much in vogue among you. I hear constantly of 
'taking strong positions and holding them,' of 'lines 
of retreat,' and of 'bases of supplies.' Let us dis- 
card such ideas." 

But he might have been more modest ; for an 
analysis of his returns from the ofificial War 
Records, for the nine months up to April 8, 1862, 
while in the West, when his force was 25,000 men, 
shows that his entire losses were only 11 men killed 
and 3S wounded; while during the so-called siege 
of Corinth his entire losses aggregated only about 
20 killed and 180 wounded and missing. 

Those were the trophies which he brought East, 
besides Halleck's false despatch of June 4 (which, 
after the war, Pope repudiated), purporting that the 
latter was pushing the enemy with all his might and 
had already captured 10,000 prisoners, 15,000 stand 
of arms, etc., etc., and on which report Stanton tele- 
graphed, "Your glorious despatch has just been re- 



40 ANTIETAM 

ceived, and I have sent it into every State. The 
whole land will soon ring with applause at the 
achievement of your gallant army and its able and 
victorious commander." And on which the Presi- 
dent sent his message, "Your despatch of to-day to 
the Secretary of War received. Thanks for the 
good news it brings." And on which, also, as I 
shall show, later on, both Pope and Halleck came 
to Washington to command. Well might General 
Upton say, of Pope, that "he now labors under the 
imputation of not having understood his own plans." 
(See "Military Policy.") 

When this despatch was sent, as General Pope 
afterward testified before the Congressional Com- 
mittee on the Conduct of the War, he was lying sick 
in his own quarters, not four miles from Halleck, 
and Halleck knew it. No wonder General Halleck, 
who had been a canny lawyer in San Francisco, had 
caused "that portion of the despatches and reports 
concerning the operations around Corinth which 
bore upon this question to be cut out of the official 
books and brought with you" (as says General Pope 
in his letter to Halleck of July 5, 1865), "to Wash- 
ington, leaving the official records mutilated and in- 
complete." We can see here already that Halleck 
did not intend that Pope, or the Washington 
authorities, should be able to prove that his glowing 
despatch of June 4 was not based on any report 
from Pope or from anyone else. But Pope proved 



THE ADVENT OF POPE 41 

that it was not, nevertheless, but at a time when it 
was useless to the country. 

These questions are all related to the Maryland 
campaign, and must be understood in order to cor- 
rectly understand that campaign. 

After the Seven Days' battles the armies lay con- 
fronting each other below Richmond. July 13 
Jackson's force, with Ewell, which did not belong 
to Lee's own army, had been sent up to Louisa 
Court House, and to Gordonsville — but still within 
reach of Lee — toward the Valley, where it properly 
belonged. 

Burnside's force was now coming up from North 
Carolina, and Lee anxiously watched to see whether 
it would come up the James River or go on to 
Aquia Creek, and to Pope. In the former case the 
Army of the Potomac was to be reinforced and 
Jackson and his other outlying troops were to be 
within call from Richmond; if the latter, then the 
Army of the Potomac was to be moved, also, to 
Aquia Creek and up the Rappahannock. Lee writes 
Jackson, July 27: ''I want Pope to be suppressed; 
strike your blow, and be prepared to return to me 
when done, if necessary. I will endeavor to keep 
General McClellan quiet till it is over, if rapidly 
executed." 

For this expedition he reinforced Jackson with 
A. P. Hill's division and one extra brigade, number- 
ing, in all, thirty-three regiments, "which will ex- 
ceed 18,000 men," said General Lee, giving an aver- 



42 ANTIETAM 

age regimental strength of about 580 officers and 
men. The bulk of Lee's army still lay in front of 
McClellan. 

Burnside's force went in driblets to Fredericks- 
burg, but still Lee lingered. McClellan asked what 
was to be done with the army, and urged an imme- 
diate reply. August 3 came the order, which by its 
very terms precluded swift and open movements. 
Halleck's order stated that it was determined to 
withdraw the Army of the Potomac from the Penin- 
sula to Aquia Creek, but that it was to be done in 
secret. "Its real object and withdrawal should be 
concealed even from your own officers. Your 
material and transportation should be removed 
first." 

The work was pushed on with the greatest ce- 
lerity, but it involved the removal of the sick and 
stores, and of the troops by land to Fortress 
Monroe. 

Fitz-John Porter's 5th corps were sent ahead, and 
obtained transports and sailed at once. But as the 
reports show, transports were wanting at the time 
for the others, due to further blundering at Wash- 
ington. 

McClellan was acused of slowness; but General 
Upton has entirely vindicated him. Indeed, both 
the President's order appointing Pope and Halleck's 
letter to McClellan of August 7, stated that Mc- 
Clellan would have command of all the forces of 
both Pope and Burnside, as well as his own (see 



THE ADVENT OF POPE 43 

War Records, vol. xi, part 3, p. 360; vol. xii, part 
3, p. 435), so that the change offered a larger in- 
stead of a smaller field to McClellan. 

And the charge of slowness is fully refuted by 
both General Pope and President Lincoln. (See 
vol. xi, War Records, part 3, p. 269.) Says Presi- 
dent Lincoln : "We protected Washington and the 
enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped 
Washington, he would have been upon us before 
the troops could have been gotten to you." Page 
297, Pope writes, July 4: "If my command be em- 
barked and sent to you by James River the enemy 
would be in Washington before it had half accom- 
plished the journey." As the distance and diffi- 
culties are the same one way as back the same way, 
it will be seen that McClellan was twice as swift as 
Pope supposed he could be; for the bulk of Pope's 
army in the battles at the second Bull Run was from 
the Army of the Potomac, just returned from Rich- 
mond. (See General Upton's "Military Policy," 

P- 370.) 

As soon as McClellan started for Fort Monroe, 
Lee started for the Rapidan. (See War Records, 
vol. xi, part 3, pp. 634, 647, 675-6, 676, 677, 680.) 
All that had been keeping Lee at Richmond was 
McClellan, and, as General Upton says, "The fact 
should not be overlooked that the misguided advisers 
of the President and the Confederate commander 
were aiming at the same object." 

Had it been even possible for McClellan to have 



44 ANTIETAM 

started on the 3d or 4th of August, it would have 
been all the same, as General Upton demonstrates, 
since Lee would have started the next day, and 
would have caught Pope in a still worse position 
than he subsequently did, and further from relief. 
For Jackson and A. P. Hill had been sent up to 
Louisa Court House some weeks before, and had 
fought Pope at Cedar Mountain, away out near 
Culpeper. As McClellan's army would have had to 
march sixty miles to Fort Monroe, and from thirty 
to fifty more at least from Aquia Creek or Fal- 
mouth, making ninety or one hundred in all, besides 
the water transport, while Lee had at most only 
seventy to march, it offered Lee a fine chance to 
cut in behind Pope, drive him west to the moun- 
tains, and then turn on the detachments of the arriv- 
ing Army of the Potomac and drive them back to 
Washington. 

The troops from the Army of the Potomac came 
on as rapidly as possible. Colonel Ingalls, the chief 
quartermaster, reported to General Meigs, August 
15 • "Up to this moment the thing could not have 
been done faster." There were delays, from 
Fortress Monroe to Washington, but these were due 
to Washington and not to the army. Transports 
went helter-skelter, some were drafted away to New 
York, and there was a great storm. McClellan had 
nothing to do with all this — all he could do was to 
urge and strive. 

August 12 Halleck ordered Bumside, then at Pal- 



THE ADVENT OF POPE 45 

mouth, to divide his forces and send the bulk of 
them up the river to Pope. August 13 the move- 
ment began, by McClellan and Burnside, and the 
march of troops proceeded ; "not an hour has been 
lost un to this time." (Colonel Tngalls.) 

August 13 Lee first gave his orders to move 
Longstreet's whole force, together with Hood's, to 
the RaDDahannock front, saying : "From everv indi- 
cation it appears [August 14! that McClellan's 
forces are being withdrawn and sent to reinforce 
Pope." Lee was now turned loose, and McClellan 
tied fast. 

August 24 Lee reports the capture of a letter from 
Pope to Halleck. dated August 20, reporting his 
force for duty at 4^,000, independent of Burnside, 
and not including any part of the Army of the 
Potomac. Meantime the movement of the latter 
army by water from the Peninsula continued. 

McClellan thus came with his armv directlv into 
the territory occupied bv General Pope. Li the 
President's order, dated June 26. appointing Pope 
to the command of the Army of Virginia, it was 
stated that when the latter and the Army of the 
Potomac were in position to communicate and di- 
rectly cooperate, the chief command "shall be gov- 
erned, as in like cases, by the Rules and Articles of 
War." August 7 Halleck wrote McClellan : "As I 
told you when at your camp, it is my intention that 
you shall command all the troops in Virginia as soon 
as we can get them together ; and with the army thus 



46 ANTIETAM 

concentrated I am certain that you can take Rich- 
mond." Halleck declared that he staked his reputa- 
tion on it. So the charge that McClellan was 
actuated by personal motives to oppose the removal 
is not true ; for he would command a much larger 
army, more directly under the eyes of the nation, 
and with results more theatrically effective, by com- 
ing north than by remaining in the Peninsula. But 
he would not be doing so much to end the war, and 
this he well knew. 

Halleck, afterward, in endeavoring to soothe the 
ruffled feelings of General Pope, then an exile, as 
he called it, in Minnesota, wrote him October lo, 
1862 : **You complain that I acted unfriendly to 
you in giving the command to General McClellan. 
On the contrary, I advised against it. The facts do 
not sustain your assertion. As General McClellan's 
army arrived here by detachments, every man I 
could move was, against his protest, sent to your 
command. He claimed that when the two armies 
began to unite, he, as ranking officer, had a right 
to command both. His claim was not admitted, 
and he remained in command only of the defenses 
of Washington." 

This statement contains three errors of fact: 
I — McClellan did not protest against his organiza- 
tions being sent forward; he objected to sending 
forward Franklin's corps in a rush without artillery, 
without horses, without wagons, without supplies, 
and without ammunition excepting what the men 



THE ADVENT OF POPE 47 

had in their cartridge-boxes. And the corps was 
sent as soon as these supplies were received, even in 
part. Pleasonton's cavalry was detained on the 
Peninsula for want of transports, which had been 
sent elsewhere by orders from Washington. 2 — 
McClellan did not claim the command specifically 
by rank, though he was the ranking general, but 
by the orders of the President and the letter of the 
general-in-chief, Halleck himself. 3 — He did not 
"remain in command of the defenses in Washing- 
ton" (as Halleck stated), for he had not been given 
the command of these at all. General Barnard, by 
special orders of the Secretary of War, No. 190, 
dated August 14, 1862, was ''assigned to the com- 
mand of the fortifications surrounding Washing- 
ton." He retained this place until September i, and 
only relinquished his command by a letter and order 
September 2, after Pope's defeat. 

Pope's army was defeated and flying back to 
Washington. In the midst of this awful cataclysm 
McClellan, who had seen his forces ordered away 
from him until he had only his personal staff, about 
one hundred men, under his command, and had to 
send out to learn the countersign, was thus addressed 
by Halleck, September i : ''General Pope was 
ordered this morning to fall back to line of fortifi- 
cations, and has been moving all day in this direc- 
tion." But Pope was then acting under orders of 
General Lee, and not of General Halleck, and the 
President demanded that McClellan be sent for. 



48 ANTIETAM 

The whole story is told by Secretary Welles, of 
Lincoln's Cabinet, who did not especially love Mc- 
Clellan, but who did love truth and decency. I refer 
to his book, ''Lincoln and Seward." He says : ''But 
Pope was defeated, and the army, sadly demoral- 
ized, came retreating to the Potomac. The War 
Department, and especially Stanton and Halleck, 
became greatly alarmed." A paper was brought to 
Secretary Welles, in the handwriting of the Secre- 
tary of War, demanding McClellan's immediate dis- 
missal. Four members of the Cabinet were ready 
to sign it, but Seward and Welles were not, on the 
ground that "the combination was improper and dis- 
respectful to the President, who had selected his 
Cabinet to consult and advise with, not to conspire 
against him." 

Secretary Welles adds that he had doubted the 
wisdom of recalling the Army of the Potomac from 
Richmond. "The object of bringing that army 
back to Washington," he says, "in order to start 
anew, march overland, and regain the abandoned 
position I did not understand, unless it was to get 
rid of McClellan; and if that was the object, it 
would have been much better to place another gen- 
eral at the head of the army while it was yet on the 
James." 

A cabinet council was being held, September i. 
Mr. Lincoln had not yet arrived when Stanton en- 
tered the room and said, with great excitement, that 
he had just learned from General Halleck that the 



THE ADVENT OF POPE 49 

President had placed General McClellan in com- 
mand of the forces in Washington. The President 
arrived; "and Stanton, with some feeling/' says 
Secretary Welles, "remarked that no order to that 
effect had issued from the War Department. The 
President calmly, with some emphasis, said the 
order was his, and he would be responsible for it to 
the country." 

Here spoke the real Lincoln, the great Lincoln, 
the Lincoln of history, and of a loving and glorify- 
ing country! And what a weight of suffering he 
bore ! How pathetic his complaint, "I am so borne 
upon." 

Not daring to remove McClellan from the Army 
of the Potomac, as that required the direct order 
of the President, it still had seemed possible to re- 
move the Army of the Potomac from McClellan, 
for that was a detail of the "War Department 
strategy" which General Upton so graphically char- 
acterizes as being operated by the civilians in their 
offices. 

And now this hope was gone, for Lincoln in his 
majesty and power had opened wide the arms of 
the "old commander" to receive the disjecta membra 
of three defeated armies, now pouring back into 
Alexandria and Washington.^ 

^See note pp. 309-310. 



IV 



THE SECOND MANASSAS 

Such a defeat ought not to have occurred. The 
same critical examination of the forces at the second 
Manassas as I have applied to the Seven Days' 
battles will show us what forces General Pope, who 
was on the defensive, had under his command on 
the field of battle, and which regiments, as the 
casualty reports show, all suffered actual losses in 
battle, and not trifling losses either. These include 
the army corps of Sigel, Banks, and McDowell, 
Reynolds's division, Heintbleman's corps, Fitz John 
Porter's corps, Taylor's brigade of the sixth corps, 
and Burnside's Ninth army corps. These forces ag- 
gregated on the field of battle 167 regiments of in- 
fantry, 14 of cavalry, one regiment of heavy artil- 
lery, and 43 batteries. 

The Confederate forces opposed numbered 134^ 
regiments of infantry, 14^4 regiments of cavalry, 
and 61 batteries of artillery. But not all these were 
actively engaged; only 120 regiments of infantry re- 
ported losses. The disproportion in favor of Pope, 

50 



THE SECOND MANASSAS 51 

in this battle, was almost the same as the dispropor- 
tion against McClellan in the Seven Days. 

The crisis was now upon the country. McClellan, 
by the mandate of the President, was now in com- 
mand of the forces as they poured back, and of the 
fortifications as they surrounded Washington; but 
all the rest of the country was open to the Con- 
federate army. 

Lincoln excused himself, says Secretary Welles, 
for appointing McClellan to command the fortifica- 
tions, by saying "he was a defensive man, and could 
reorganize the army better than anyone else," which 
was true, for he had created it out of the ruins of 
the First Bull Run and the panic of the preceding 
summer. But he now cast a doubt on Welles's 
memory by appointing McClellan to do the most 
critical act in the whole history of the War of the 
Rebellion ; that is to say, to take this "defeated and 
shattered army, this retreating and demoralized 
army," as the President called it, and reorganize it 
indeed; but reorganize it upon the march, with 
a victorious army sweeping across his front, — not 
yet organized, — north to Maryland and Pennsyl- 
vania, not with the Confederate force merely which 
had met and defeated Pope and driven him into 
Washington, but with all these and more than fifty 
new and fresh veteran regiments directly from Rich- 
mond added to the invading force. And all this 
must be done inside of two weeks, for in two weeks 
Lee's armies would have been in Pennsylvania and 



52 ANTIETAM 

marchin^^ up the Cumberland Valley, or else to York 
and the Susquehanna River, as they did a year later 
under almost similar circumstances, and with an 
army no larger, and no better, to break in a surge, 
scattered into bloody spray on the impregnable 
heights of Gettysburg, ''the high-water mark of the 
Rebellion" ; while now, with McClellan's remnants, 
he Avas to do all this, reinforced by twenty-nine regi- 
ments of raw recruits, who never had seen any 
enemy and never fired a shot, and with as many 
other hacked-up veteran regiments left behind, with 
many thousands of others also left behind, to still 
guard "from insult" that ever-imperiled capital. 
Napoleon well said that "to defend a capital 
you must make such war, and at such distance, that 
the capital cannot be attacked; if fully invested it is 
already lost." But civilians do not understand these 
things — they would keep out an invasion as they^ 
would keep out a freshet in a mill-race. 

General Grant, in his "Memoirs," amusingly re- 
lates how Mr. Lincoln, when he (Grant) was about 
to take command of the armies in the spring of 
1864, g^ave him a plan for a campaign of his own. 
"He pointed out," says Grant, "on the map two 
streams which empty into the Potomac, and sug- 
gested that the army might be moved on boats and 
landed between the mouths of these streams. We 
would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies, 
and the tributaries would protect our flanks while 
we moved out. I listened respectfully, but did not 



THE SECOND MANASSAS 53 

suggest that the same streams would protect Lee's 
flanks while he was shutting us up." 

General Grant significantly adds : "I did not 
communicate my plans to the President, nor did I 
to the Secretary of War or to General Halleck." 

Wasn't this splendid? I have often envied, as it 
were, Grant's magnificent opportunity, which time 
and the trend of events had given him, so that he 
could act according to military principles and 
achieve military results in defiance of those malevo- 
lent civilian forces which had bound hard and fast 
the military hands and feet, and crushed the mili- 
tary mind, and blinded the military eye, during all 
those long, weary, hapless months while the nation 
groaned in spirit and the great heart of Lincoln was 
wrung with unutterable woe ! 

And now, for ten weeks, this great curtain of 
darkness was to be lifted from the tragedy of the 
spring and summer, and McClellan was to be sent 
forward to do that work for which he was the best 
fitted, — that swift marching and fierce attack which 
other interests had denied him, for alas! in those 
earlier days our people at home did not know that 
an army was an article of manufacture and not a 
mob organized on paper. Napoleon said that it took 
ten months' drill and several campaigns to make an 
army. McClellan made his in half the time. Grant 
never made an army; he never had to; they were 
made for him by others, as Sheridan's were. Sher- 



54 ANTIETAM 

man, Thomas, Buell, Meade, and McClellan, these 
made armies, for they were all with McClellan in 
1861-1862, and they learned how to do it under 
McClellan. McClellan had learned it in Europe, 
where the Government had sent him, and improved 
on his teachers. 



OPENING OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 

And now the Maryland campaign opens, and 
what we have been considering will be found to be 
the key to these wonderful ten weeks, commencing 
in the suburbs of Washington and ending in front 
of Culpeper, with Longstreet's vain orders for a 
battle which was destined never to be fought, but 
which, if McClellan had fought it, would have led 
practically to the destruction of the Confederate 
armies, to the elimination at one blow of all Vir- 
ginia from the Confederacy, and to the ending of 
the war in 1862. 

As McClellan came in on the heels of Pope's 
worst defeat, he was destined to go out in the face, 
and on the eve, of his own greatest victory. 

What was this Maryland invasion of Lee? Did 
it contemplate a rapid circling around from Point 
of Rocks to Williamsport, and then back up the 
Shenandoah Valley again? Who is so ignorant as 
to believe that Lee did not know better ? When Lee 
entered Maryland he meant business ; and what he 
did in 1863 showed what he meant to do in 1862 

55 



56 ANTIETAM 

had McClellan permitted him. But we are not with- 
out positive evidence that Lee's invasion was an in- 
vasion of Pennsylvania, and not of Maryland ; and 
that Maryland was crossed over simply because 
Pennsylvania lay beyond Maryland. 

The evidence that the invasion was of Pennsyl- 
vania, and not of Maryland, is conclusive ; but the 
same policy which sought to belittle the great work 
of the Army of the Potomac in this supreme crisis 
of the nation's life ignored this evidence, thereby 
belittling the Battle of Antietam and needlessly de- 
priving its gallant and triumphant soldiers of their 
just meed of valor and success. 

Lee reported to President Davis, on September 7, 
that "all divisions of the army have crossed the 
Potomac, unless it be General Walker's, from whom 
I have had no report since the 5th." 

But, three days before, from his camp at Lees- 
burg, Va., Lee wrote Davis, September 4: "Should 
the results of the expedition justify it, I propose to 
enter Pennsylvania, unless you should deem it inad- 
visable upon political or other grounds." 

On the contrary, Davis heartily approved it, and 
immediately sent Lee the draft of a proclamation, 
with the place for the name of the State left blank, 
so as to be available in both Pennsylvania and 
Maryland, and using this language: "We are 
driven to protect our own country by transferring 
the seat of war to that of an enemy who pursues us 
with a relentless and apparently aimless hostility; 



MARYLAND CAMPAIGN 57 

our fields have been laid waste, our people killed, 
many homes made desolate, and rapine and murder 
have ravaged our frontiers ; the sacred right of self- 
defense demands that, if such a war is to continue, 
its consequences shall fall on those who persist in 
their refusal to make peace. The Confederate army 
therefore comes to occupy the territory of their 
enemies and to make it the theater of hostilities." 

That was not Mar3^1and, but Pennsylvania; Lee 
had many troops in his own army from Maryland, 
and many splendid officers. 

September 9 Lee again wrote Davis, from his 
camp at Frederick, Md. : "I shall move in the direc- 
tion I orginally intended, toward Hagerstown and 
Chambersburg." And even after the battle of Antie- 
tam he wrote to General Loring, commanding in the 
Kanawha Valley, in Western Virginia : "Probably 
a combined movement into Pennsylvania may be 
concerted." 

Doctor Lewis H. Steiner, a surgeon and inspector 
of the United States Sanitary Commission, who 
spent the whole five days of the Confederate occupa- 
tion of Frederick among the Rebel soldiers and of- 
ficers, says in his diary, under date September 8-9 : 
"Their army is plainly intended for an advance into 
Pennsylvania, and they speak freely of their inten- 
tion to treat Pennsylvania very diflferently from 
Maryland. I fear there will be great destruction of 
property as they move forward. Many a citizen will 
lose his all of this world's goods in this raid, for 



58 ANTIETAM 

devastation is meant to be the order or disorder of 
their march when they cross the border." 

When Lee's army left Frederick, Longstreet's 
whole force moved directly northwest through the 
South Mountain to Hagerstown, near the Pennsyl- 
vania border. The army reached and held Hagers- 
town until the battle of South Mountain occurred 
and the passes were forced (thus imperiling Lee's 
detached commands, across the Potomac from 
Harper's Ferry), when Longstreet was suddenly 
halted and brought back to Rohrersville, and then 
deflected south to Antietam. The Confederate 
army within the next four days bade farewell to 
Pennsylvania for this year — as it did a year later — 
along the same reach of the Potomac River, after 
the battle of Gettysburg. 

Following the affair at Chantilly and McClellan's 
reorganization of the routed fragments of Pope's 
army behind the defenses of Washington, of which 
he had been put in command by the President per- 
sonally, as stated, the Confederate army turned its 
head to the north and concentrated around Lees- 
burg. On the 5th, 6th and 7th of September it 
forded the Potomac River near Point of Rocks, 
the river being little more than knee deep. 

As a personal reminiscence I may mention that 
from the rough look-out on the summit of Mary- 
land Heights, opposite Harper's Ferry, which over- 
looked the country for many miles, for three days 
we could watch the long thread unwinding across 



MARYLAND CAMPAIGN 59 

the river, and with glasses distinguish the guns, 
wagons, even the regiments, with their flashing 
battle-flags. It was a glorious, and albeit a peaceful, 
yet a terrible sight ; it was the unfolding panorama 
of a great war, displayed as though it were on ex- 
hibition. The cavalry to which I belonged had re- 
treated — under orders of Halleck dated September 
2, 1862 — from the Upper Shenandoah at and be- 
yond Winchester, and had just reached Harper's 
Ferry, where, incredible as it may seem, it was sent 
over to assist in garrisoning the summit of Mary- 
land Heights — the cavalry! with thousands of in- 
fantry in Harper's Ferry. 

General Wool, in whose department Harper's 
Ferry then was, and who, together with Stanton and 
Halleck, was trying to take care of it, reports a des- 
patch from Colonel Miles, commanding at Harper's 
Ferry, under date 11 a. m., September 7, stating 
that Lee's army ''has crossed and is still crossing 
into Maryland, below Point of Rocks. I will send 
up to the observatory to look out for dust, and I 
will inform you." There was plenty of dust. 

After crossing, the Confederate army moved di- 
rectly up to Frederick, where it concentrated, 
September 9. Meantime, what was McClellan 
doing, for he was the only one at Washington ap- 
parently capable of doing anything for the country? 

September 2, i p. m., McClellan writes the gen- 
eral-in-chief (and we can see what sort of a general- 
in-chief Halleck was willing to be) as follows: 



6o ANTIETAM 

"My Dear Halleck: My ordnance officer in- 
forms me that General Ripley says that he has just 
received an order from the Secretary of War to ship 
everything from this arsenal to New York. I had 
sent to General Ripley to learn what small anns 
were here, so that I might be prepared to arm 
stragglers, &c. I do not think this order ought to 
be carried out so promptly. I do not despair of 
saving the capital. Better destroy all there is at the 
eleventh hour than to send them off now." 

What had the Secretary of War to do with this 
sort of work, anyhow? But Halleck replied, not 
repudiating the order, but saying that ''at least 
50,000 or 60,000 arms will be kept, and a large 
number of pieces of artillery." Doubtless, had Lee 
reached as far as New York City, he would have 
found it thus made impregnable; and the way for 
hira to reach New York City was for us to ship 
Washington's defenses thither and remove Mc- 
Clellan from any marching command, if not alto- 
gether. 

But Lincoln again rose in his majesty and power. 
He sent for McClellan, and Secretary Seward was 
present, who told the story, afterward corroborated 
by Welles and McClellan. Lincoln begged Mc- 
Clellan to take the army. McClellan feared the 
cabal; but at length patriotism, sense of duty, 
loyalty, and love for the President — whom he never 
ceased to honor and believe in — prevailed, and he 



MARYLAND CAMPAIGN 6i 

took this, as it were, back-door responsibility, for 
there was no official order. 

Halleck's order of September 2, "Major-General 
McClellan will have command of the fortifications 
of Washington and of all the troops for the de- 
fense of the capital," was issued, and yon will find 
no other official order. 

Had McClellan failed, he would have been liable 
to court-martial for taking "the troops for the de- 
fense of the capital" a hundred miles away from the 
capital. Yet that was the only way to save Penn- 
sylvania, to save the country, and to save the capital 
itself. But, as has been said, he fought this cam- 
paign with a rope about his neck. 

Could Lincoln have saved him? Did he save 
him, afterward, when he confronted Longstreet at 
Culpeper, and when to lose him cost the country 
nearly ever^rthing then worth having? 

Halleck's position was officiallv strong. Septem- 
ber 3 he wrote General Pope : "Reorganization of 
an army for the field will be immediately made. 
Till then. General McClellan, as senior (he was 
senior still) and as commanding the defenses of 
Washington, must exercise general authority." 

Till then? 

From September 3 to September 7 McClellan 
was frequently directed as to the sending out of 
various forces from Washington; sending cavalry 
to Edward's Ferry; changing corps commanders; 
dispatching troops, Sumner, etc. ; letting troops 



62 ANTIETAM 

move; moving McDoweirs corps; danger of strip- 
ping Washington forts on the Virginia side; but 
nothing at all about McClellan himself moving. 
(War Records, vol. xii, part 3, pp. 787-791, 802- 
810, 811-812, 812-813; vol. xix, part 2, pp. 169 to 
209, and McClellan's letter to Halleck, Sept. 8, p. 209. 
Also McClellan's letter to Lincoln, from Rockville, 
where he had just joined the army, Sept. 8, page 210.) 
September 8 he seems to have gotten away entirely, 
and writes to Halleck from near Rockville : *'Frank- 
lin has reached Muddy Branch; Sykes. Sumner, and 
Banks near here. Burnside and Hooker move to- 
day to Brookville, Pleasonton will advance his cav- 
alry to Barnesville, &c. We have cavalry at Pooles- 
ville. No enemy at Edward's Ferry; I think they 
are beyond the Monocacy. Couch will remain at 
Offutt's until I ascertain whether there is any large 
force at Dranesville, which I hope to know any 
moment." 

McClellan was certainly in command. The orders 
have the genuine ring for the first time for many 
weeks, and the President telegraphed him in the 
evening, '^How does it look now?" 

We could answer, to-day, that it looked very well, 
very well indeed. 

Yet all this, and all that McClellan did afterward, 
was done only on the private, personal, and verbal 
order of the President. Quoting from General Up- 
ton, in his "Military Policy," p. 376, who cites the 
"Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of 



MARYLAND CAMPAIGN 63 

the War," vol. i, pp. 451-452: "To reinstate the 
deposed commander was to confess that the whole 
campaign was a failure; yet something had to be 
done. Bragg, in the West, had begun his march to- 
ward the Ohio River, while Lee, with renewed con- 
fidence, was crossing into Maryland. For two or 
three days the President consulted his advisers, but 
with no satisfactory results. At last, assuming all 
the responsibility, he took the general-in-chief with 
him, turned his back on the War Department, and, 
without disclosing his purpose, proceeded to the 
house of General McClellan, where, for the moment, 
he brought the long controversy to a close by say- 
ing, "General, you will take command of the forces 
in the field." . . . He at once, like a faithful 
and subordinate soldier, crossed the Potomac to 
make dispositions against attack. The moment he 
appeared, the acclamations of the troops could be 
heard for miles, throughout the whole extent of 
the long columns" (p. 377). 



VI 

REORGANIZATION ON THE MARCH 

McClellan thus had three broken and disorgan- 
ized armies consolidated in the field and under his 
command — the Army of Virginia, the Army of 
North Carolina, and the Army of the Potomac, ex- 
cepting the 52,000 troops still left, September 10, in 
Washington for its further defense, and increased 
ten days later to more than 80,000. But these three 
disorganized armies were now being welded by Mc- 
Clellan, for all time, into that one glorious army of 
the Potomac, never more to be divided — for the 
shadow of Grant was already looming up, far away. 

Halleck says in his report: "General McClellan 
was directed to pursue Lee with all the troops which 
were not required for the defense of Washington." 

This is true; but he was not so directed by Hal- 
leck, or by the Secretary of War, but by a greater 
one, and verbally only. 

As an example of this War Department strategy, 
Harper's Ferry, a key-point position, was not put 
under McClellan's command till September 11, — 
while it was being invested, — and then only when 

64 



REORGANIZATION, ETC. 65 

McClellan should be able to open communication 
with it. For this it was now too late, although 
McClellan repeatedly attempted to do so. Prior to 
this, the position was under the joint command, 
apparently, of Wool and Halleck; and General Wool 
had thus directed poor Miles on September 5 : "You 
will not abandon Harper's Ferry without defending 
it to the last extremity." 

This, poor Miles — who was afterward killed in 
Harper's Ferry — tried to do, for I was there. It 
could have been done only by throwing his whole 
force over to Maryland Heights, for Harper's Ferry 
was merely the bottom of a bowl, with Maryland 
Heights, Loudon Heights, and the Bolivar Virginia 
Heights surrounding it on every side. Now, how- 
ever, on Maryland Heights already were the Con- 
federate divisions of McLaws and Anderson, with 
sixteen brigades ; on Loudon Heights Walker's divi- 
sion of two brigades, and on the Virginia Heights 
Stonewall Jackson's whole force, with A. P. Hill 
and Ewell. Had McClellan had possession of it in 
time no such nonsense would have occurred. Sup- 
pose Miles had used common sense, — for he was a 
good regular army officer, — and had retired to 
Maryland Heights; and Harper's Ferry had been 
raided — as it would have been — by Jackson, and all 
its stores destroyed : where would poor Miles have 
been in the coming day of judgment? So Harper's 
Ferry, Maryland Heights, and Loudon Heights 
were all lost before McClellan got within communi- 



66 ANTIETAM 

eating distance. He had absolutely no chance to 
save them. 

Now a word about the topography of Harper's 
Ferry and its surroundings. Franklin and Couch 
have been blamed for not relieving Harper's Ferry 
when they were so near and were firing guns to let 
the garrison know that they were so near. 

This was on Sunday, September 14, the day of 
the battle of South Mountain, through which moun- 
tain range, but further south, Crampton's Gap 
passes. With Turner's Gap — where the battle of 
South Mountain occurred — still in Confederate 
hands and being contested for; with Longstreet 
foot- free beyond it, so that any move down Pleasant 
Valley would have been into a cul-de-sac; with Mc- 
Laws and Anderson stretched across the Valley and 
with Maryland Heights already two days in their 
possession, and overlooking Pleasant Valley for 
four miles, within easy cannon range ; with Loudon 
Heights directly in Franklin's front across the river ; 
with Walker in position there already, for two days, 
and with Longstreet's whole force moving down 
from its position at the head of Pleasant Valley, 
in Franklin's rear — it is a great mistake to suppose 
that any force marching down Pleasant Valley to 
the Potomac would reach or come near to Harper's 
Ferry. The South Mountain, coming down from 
Pennsylvania, crosses the Potomac at the east of 
Weverton, about four miles east of Harper's Ferry. 
It reappears beyond the Potomac as a series of scat- 



REORGANIZATION, ETC. 67 

tered hills, called the Short Hills, which disappear 
three or four miles south of the river. 

The Blue Ridge, coming up from Virginia, 
crosses the Potomac immediately east of Harper's 
Ferry and west of Pleasant Valley, across the river, 
and continues on as the Maryland Heights, or Elk 
Ridge, for about eight miles north of the river, 
when this also disappears. It makes a sort of two- 
ply parallel arrangement, so that a force moving 
down Pleasant Vallev — which is east of Maryland 
Heights — will find itself also east of Loudon 
Heights. The latter separate Harper's Ferry and 
the Shenandoah river from the north and south 
line of advance of such an advancing force. You 
could not even see Harper's Ferry — which lies be- 
hind the mountains — during all this march. To reach 
Harper's Ferry it would be necessary to go down 
the eastern side of Pleasant Valley, — which is about 
two and one-half miles wide, — for there is no access 
along the western side to the Potomac, and debouche 
on a shelf scooped out from the rocks, along the 
river, and just wide enough for a road, the railroad, 
and the canal. These triple passageways are bor- 
dered, along the river bank behind them, by a rocky 
precipice from twenty to thirty feet high, extending 
from Sandy Hook under the Maryland Heights up 
to Harper's Ferry. Then by marching up this nar- 
row road along the river bank, and passing directly 
between the lofty Maryland Heights on the northern 
bank and the less lofty Loudon Heights on the 



68 ANTIETAM 

southern bank, you would finally come opposite 
Harper's Ferry. Here a single pontoon bridge only, 
under the guns on each side of the river, and hun- 
dreds of feet above, would have allowed you to 
cross the Potomac to Harper's Ferry — if you be- 
haved yourself. 

Between Maryland Heights and the Antietam 
Creek there is nothing but almost roadless moun- 
tains. South of the Potomac there are no passes in 
the Blue Ridge for miles, and Harper's Ferry, in- 
vested as it was, was as hopeless of relief from the 
north or east as if it were on the planet Mars. The 
miscalculation was not McClellan's — it was before 
McClellan. 

The best maps to illustrate the topography of 
Harper's Ferry and its surroundings are "Harper's 
Ferr}^" sheet xlii, part 9, Atlas to Accompany the 
Official War Records, which also shows the preci- 
pice under which the only road of access passes from 
Sandy Hook, under Maryland Heights, across the 
river to the Ferry; No. 12, on sheet lxxxii, part 
17, of said Atlas, which shows Maryland Heights, 
Loudon Heights, and Bolivar Heights, with the 
town of Harper's Ferry as in the bottom of a bowl, 
in the middle; and the Harper's Ferry battle-field 
map of the operations of this campaign, on sheet 
XXIX, part 6, of the same atlas. It will be clearly 
seen that, with the Confederates within easy cannon 
range on the precipitous Maryland Heights, any 
force approaching from the east or the northeast 



REORGANIZATION, ETC. 69 

would be compelled to advance by the flank for two 
miles or more along the front of a perfectly pro- 
tected and strongly occupied mountain — a mountain 
totally inaccessible from the east even to a climber. 
Further, the advance would be in the face of heavy 
guns and infantry along the southern bank and on 
Loudon Heights across the river, and directly in 
front at less than a mile distance. Only a narrow 
roadway ran along the river from Sandy Hook, — 
hemmed in by a precipice on the north, — and fully 
exposed to rifle and cannon fire from the south 
across the river, with a single narrow pontoon at the 
Ferry as the only means of crossing the river, even 
if undefended. Therefore it can plainly be seen 
that the approach to Harper's Ferry was impossible 
for any relieving force approaching from that direc- 
tion. 

There were two men in the opposing armies who 
understood this topography; the one was General 
Lee, who had occupied Harper's Ferry during the 
John Brown troubles, and the other was General 
McClellan, who had worked this whole ground over 
when operating up the Potomac the preceding fall. 
I often think, when reading current history, that 
those are the only people who ever knew of that 
topography, even up to this day — and they are both 
dead. 

So the advance of McClellan continued. There 
were troubles with the trains. They got balled up, 
and stalled, and blockaded, as we know. But 



70 



ANTIETAM 



General Ingalls investigated the troubles, and found 
that they were all due to Pope's Army of Virginia 
transportation ; the administration of the old Army 
of the Potomac went on like clock-work; and when 
McClellan started south at the beginning of Novem- 
ber the administration of all parts went on like 
clock-work. He was a member of that firm which 
is styled, "We know how." 

As showing how the army was reorganized on 
the march, General Crawford, writing September 
8 from Rockville, Md., describes the condition of 
his brigade, which had suffered severely at Cedar 
Mountain. "No time or opportunity has been al- 
lowed," he says, "either to rest the men or to re- 
organize the companies and regiments, which have 
lost field and staff and company officers, both com- 
missioned and non-commissioned, and I am now in 
command of a brigade which, consisting nominally 
of four regiments, numbers at this moment, in the 
rank drawn up in the advance line to meet the enemy, 
but six hundred and twenty-nine effective men." 

In consequence, the Fifth Connecticut was de- 
tached by McClellan September 9, and three new 
nine-months Pennsylvania regiments, just com- 
pleted, were added, and in the ensuing actions these 
three regiments lost 327 men. 

New regiments, in like manner, were incorpo- 
rated with old brigades on the march in other cases ; 
and General Humphreys, in his application, on 



REORGANIZATION, ETC. 71 

March 28, 1863, ^o^ ^ court of inquiry, details his 
experiences with his division composed altogether 
of new troops, 7000 in number. Halleck had threat- 
ened him with arrest, September 13, if he did not 
immediately join his division. He left Washing- 
ton on the twelfth. He had no staff officers, one of 
his brigades had no rations, all its arms were un- 
serviceable, and had to be exchanged en route, and 
Humphreys himself forced the exchange. The divi- 
sion had no ammunition wagons, and no supply 
train. It had only one ambulance to a regiment, 
and no shelter tents. It marched September 14, 
halted by orders at Frederick, left Frederick and 
marched all day and all night and most of the fore- 
noon of next day, reaching the field of Antietam the 
morning of September 18, the day after the princi- 
pal battle, after a continuous march of 23 miles. 

Any one familiar with military matters and with 
the state of the army on the 2d and 3rd of Septem- 
ber when streaming back to Washington, disorgan- 
ized (as President Lincoln said), with the enormous 
losses of baggage and transportation of that ill- 
starred campaign, will know that the army which 
began fighting only ten days later, September 14, 
eighty miles away from Washington, mM.9( have been 
reorganized on the march, if much of it was not to 
fight as a mob. That army did as good work at 
South Mountain and Antietam as any American 
army ever did anywhere. 



^2 ANTIETAM 

Lee's army encamped around Frederick until Sep- 
tember lo and II, when Jackson and A. P. Hill 
marched by way of Martinsburg, Va., crossing the 
Potomac near Williamsport, and thence down the 
river to Harper's Ferry. Walker's division marched 
due south from Frederick, crossing the Potomac 
near Point of Rocks and occupying Loudon Heights, 
which commanded Harper's Ferry on the east. The 
divisions of McLaws and R. H. Anderson marched 
down Pleasant Valley to seize Maryland Heights 
and prevent attack from the north, while Long- 
street, Hood, and D. H. Hill moved forward di- 
rectly. Hill halting in Turner's Gap to prevent 
pursuit and Longstreet advancing to Hagerstown. 
The cavalry covered the rear. (See Dr. Steiner's 
diary. ) 

McClellan's advance entered Frederick late in the 
day of September 12 (see diary). On the 13th the 
army entered, and closed up, and passed through 
Frederick in pursuit, and next day was fought the 
successful battle of South Mountain. Franklin had 
been sent south, and the same day successfully en- 
gaged McLaws and forced Crampton's Gap. Mary- 
land Heights being already in possession of the 
enemy, and Walker in front across the river, it was 
impossible to drive the enemy to the Potomac, as 
Longstreet had already sent a part of his force in 
behind Franklin to Keedysville, so as to close upon 
Franklin's rear should he advance further than the 
eastern gaps. 



REORGANIZATION, ETC. 73 

The next morning, Monday, September 15, Har- 
per's Ferry was surrendered. 

While at Frederick, on the afternoon of Septem- 
ber 13, an order of Lee was picked up, which de- 
scribed Lee's contemplated movements. To deter- 
mine if the order was {genuine, at 3 p. m., Septem- 
ber 13, McClellan immediately directed General 
Pleasonton, commanding the cavalry, "to ascertain 
whether this order of march has thus far been fol- 
lowed by the enemy." (War Records, vol. xix, 
part I, pp. 47, 48, 209; part 2, pp. 281-282; and 
especially vol. li, part i, for McClellan's order to 
Pleasonton of Sept. 13, 3 p. m. (page 829), "Gen- 
eral McClellan desires you to ascertain whether this 
order of march has thus far been followed by the 
enemy," &c.) It was this information which de- 
termined his movements, or rather confirmed 
them; for before he reached Frederick, and before 
Lee's order was discovered, he had written 
Halleck from Clarksburg, fifteen miles southeast 
of Frederick, at 10 a. m., September 12: "My 
columns are pushing on rapidly to Frederick. I 
feel perfectly confident that the enemy has aban- 
doned Frederick, moving in two directions, viz., on 
the Hagerstoivn and Harper's Ferry roads." This 
information was precisely correct, and was to the 
same effect as that embodied in Lee's orders, which 
more than twenty-four hours subsequentlv were 
picked up in Frederick and fell into McClellan's 
hands. The separation and divergence of these 



74 ANTIETAM 

separated parts of Lee's army along lines almost at 
right angles to each other constituted the entire 
key to the situation ; and McClellan had this infor- 
mation, and from it divined the whole campaign a 
day before Lee's order was heard of; but not be- 
fore it was being executed in all its details. 



VII 



I HAVE recently been asked a curious question 
by one who ought to have known better. It re- 
veals the existence, even at this late day, of two 
theories entirely incompatible with each other. Both 
originated from Washington, and both were in- 
tended to exploit McClellan's alleged inactivity. His 
inactivity, whenever it at all existed, had, by a long 
course of dominating "War Department strategy" — 
as General Upton calls it — been forced upon Mc- 
Clellan against every fiber of his nature. 

The question asked me was why, when Lee's 
orders revealing his whole course, and all his plans, 
had fallen into McClellan's hands he paid no atten- 
tion to them, instead of circumventing them at once 
with his whole army, "as he could have done." Lee's 
order was dated September 9, and was directed to 
General D. H. Hill. A soldier found it wrapped 
around a bunch of cigars, and it came into McClel- 
lan's possession late on the 13th of September. 
When Hill received the order on the 9th, McClellan, 
who had just joined his army, was concentrating it 
at Brookville, Middlebrook, Darnestown, Seneca 

75 



76 ANTIETAM 

Creek, and Rockville, near Washington. He had, 
in fact, just been put in command, while Lee had 
already cut across the Potomac directly south of 
Frederick, but twenty miles distant, and marched 
on that place. McClellan did not see the order until 
four days after it had been issued. 

These "Special Orders, No. 191, September 9th, 
1862," provided that Lee's army should resume its 
march the next day (the loth), taking the Hagers- 
town Road from Frederick. Jackson, in the advance, 
would push on ahead, turn south, cross the Poto- 
mac, and march down the Virginia side and seal 
up Harper's Ferry. This was to be accomplished by 
the nth, two days before Lee's order was found. 
Longstreet was to march to Boonsborough, on the 
Hagerstown Road, and there halt. The divisions 
of McLaws and Anderson, sixteen brigades, under 
McLaws, were to leave the column at Middletown, 
turn south, and by Friday morning (more than 
twenty- four hours before Lee's order was found) 
"possess himself of Maryland Heights." General 
Walker at the same time was to march south, back 
to the Potomac by the same road he had come up, 
cross the river into Virginia and take possession 
of Loudon Heights, on the Virginia side, just across 
the Shenandoah River from Harper's Ferry. 

The reserve artillery, ordnance, supply trai uis>, 
etc., were to precede D. H. Hill, whose divi{ sion 
would form the rear guard of the army thrc ugh 
the South Mountain, by Turner's Gap. StViart's 



LEE'S LOST ORDER yy 

cavalry was to cover the route of the army and 
bring up all stragglers. 

Now we not only know from the reports of these 
officers that Lee's army did so move, but from the 
independent testimony of Surgeon Steiner of the 
Sanitary Commission (who was in Frederick), that 
"Wednesday, September tenth, at four o'clock this 
morning the Rebel army began to move from our 
town, Jackson's force taking the advance. The 
movement continued until 8 o'clock p. m., occupying 
sixteen hours." D. H. Hill's division could not get 
away on the loth, but marched on the morning of 
September ii. Friday, September 12, Stuart's 
cavalry passed through Frederick, to the west, fol- 
lowing Lee's army. Two companies were left in the 
town to observe the Union advance. 

Buring the 12th, "cannonading was heard in the 
distance." The advance Union cavalry charged 
into town, and were met by a counter-charge of 
Stuart's men. The latter fell back, "carrying with 
them seven of our men as prisoners, and leaving 
many of their own men wounded on the ground." 
Then came a regiment of Ohio men, and then Burn- 
side's corps of the Army of the Potomac. Septem- 
ber 13, about nine o'clock, McClellan with his staff 
rode through the town and encamped with a large 
portion of his army on Dr. Steiner's own farm, west 
of Frederick. The writer says : "The nature of 
the camp and its arrangements prevented one form- 
ing any other conclusion than that it was a bivotiac, 



y8 ANTIETAM 

and only intended for temporary occupation. Some 
onward movement of the army was evidently al- 
ready in contemplation." Now this was not earlier 
than noon, and while bivouacking here McClellan 
got hold of Lee's orders, on the 13th of September, 
between that hour and 3 p. m. 

If Lee's orders had been carried out before this 
time, — already by two days, — Jackson, with his 
force and Ewell's and that of A. P. Hill, was in- 
vesting Harper's Ferry on the southwest and 
west, on the Virginia side, Walker was invest- 
ing it on the east, on the Virginia side, and McLaws 
and Anderson had captured Maryland Heights and 
were then investing it on the north and northeast. 

All these events had so occurred. Jackson had 
crossed the Potomac, near Williamsport, on the 
nth, into Virginia, and had left all of Lee's army 
and thirty miles of distance, and the Potomac river, 
between himself and McClellan; on the night of 
September 10 and the morning of the nth Walker 
had crossed the Potomac at Point of Rocks, east 
of the South Mountains and opposite Harper's 
Ferry, into Virginia; September 11 McLaws, with 
his own and Anderson's divisions, had reached and 
occupied Pleasant Valley, beyond Maryland Heights, 
on the east, and between them and the South Moun- 
tains, and had sent Kershaw's and Barksdale's 
brigades up through Solomon's Gap, on the north, 
with other brigades in support, to move down the 
summit of the ridge toward Harper's Ferry and 



LEE'S LOST ORDER 79 

carry Maryland Heights, immediately opposite and 
overhanging. Another brigade, with artillery, was 
sent up the South Mountain, on the east, across 
Pleasant Valley, to close the gaps, and the main 
force then, having invested Harper's Ferry securely, 
fronted north against McClellan's approach and 
guarded the eastern passes in the mountains. The 
next morning, the 13th, McLaws assaulted Mary- 
land Heights, commanding Harper's Ferry, and, 
as his report says, after a very sharp and spirited 
engagement, through the dense woods and over a 
very broken surface, ''carried the main ridge," and 
by 4 p. M. had possession of the entire heights over- 
looking by a thousand feet Pleasant Valley and 
Harper's Ferry. It will therefore be seen that by 
the time McClellan had obtained Lee's order all the 
movements embraced in that order had already been 
made one or more days before, and all the results 
provided for in that order had already been secured 
while Harper's Ferry was not in McClellan's com- 
mand or control. McClellan was in bivouac west 
of Frederick, on the 13th, which was Saturday. 
When Surgeon Steiner saw him, "in the afternoon," 
not all of McClellan's army had yet arrived. The 
Twelfth corps did not pass through Frederick, 
Steiner says, till Sunday morning, September 14. 
General Humphreys's division did not reach Fred- 
erick till September 17, and on the 13th he was 
still at Washington, trying to beat the authorities 
into giving them muskets which could be fired. 



8o ANTIETAM 

So we find McClellan west of Frederick on the 
afternoon of Saturday, September 13, with Lee's 
orders in his possession. We can now settle the 
activity question very easily. The complete invest- 
ment of Harper's Ferry was already accomplished. 
If Maryland Heights and Loudon Heights were 
held in force by the enemy, its fate was sealed. If 
the garrison had abandoned the town and planted 
itself on Maryland Heights, McLaws and Anderson 
could not have carried these heights from the north 
or from the east, the latter almost too precipitous 
for nearly a thousand feet of elevation, for an un- 
armed man even to climb. The former, — and the 
spine of the ridge itself, — was open only from Solo- 
mon's Gap, four miles up the range to the north, 
and could be held by a very moderate force for days 
against any enemy; could have been so held by 
Miles, had he been there. 

The whole question, then, turned on whether 
Miles, at Harper's Ferry, had employed decent com- 
mon-sense and got out of the bottom of the soup- 
tureen and up on to the rim — or had not. Mc- 
Clellan had no notion that the War Department 
strategists at Washington (for Harper's Ferry was 
then, and had been, out of McClellan's jurisdiction) 
could possibly have sent him the absurd order to 
hold on to the town of Harper's Ferry, with its pots 
and kettles and the old John Brown engine-house, 
to the last extremity, while the only possible mean? 
of holding anything at all lay outside the town, 



LEE'S LOST ORDER 8i 

across the river, and on the top of a lofty range of 
mountains easily accessible to him, but totally in- 
accessible, if so held, to the enemy. But Mr.ryland 
Heights had already been captured and occupied 
before McClellan reached Frederick or saw Lee's 
order. 

Turning to the orders in Supplemental Volume 
LI, of the Official Records, we find that September 
1 1 McClellan ordered Burnside to push on to Fred- 
erick, if the enemy had marched toward Hagers- 
town. Sumner was ordered to Urbana, and on the 
1 2th to Frederick, with Banks's corps to follow; 
Franklin to Buckeystown, there to await orders to 
move either on Harper's Ferry or Frederick ; Porter 
to push forward with his reorganized Fifth corps; 
and Couch to follow Franklin. On the night of the 
1 2th, at II p. M., Burnside was ordered to advance 
with his whole command from Frederick to the 
Catoctin Valley, opening the way to Pleasonton's 
cavalry, which was to scout up to Pennsylvania, and 
also to learn the condition of affairs at Harper's 
Ferry. Pleasonton was to co-operate with Burnside 
in his operation. "If the enemy has marched by the 
National road the Pass must be taken; but the at- 
tack upon it must only be made with a sufficiency 
of troops." wSeptember 13, Sumner was ordered to 
move punctually at seven next morning, ammunition 
wagons to move with the troops, ambulances in rear 
of all the troops, in order of corps. Franklin was 
ordered at 6.30 p. m., September 13, "to move south 



82 ANTIETAM 

at daybreak next morning by Jefferson and Burkitts- 
ville, upon the road to Rohrersville, and down into 
Pleasant, Valley, to seize the passes, and cut off, 
destroy, or capture McLaws' command, and relieve 
Colonel Miles." Couch was ordered to join Frank- 
lin as soon as possible. 

At the same time "a, division of Burnside's com- 
mand started several hours ago to support Pleason- 
ton, and the whole of Burnside's command, includ- 
ing Hooker's corps, march this evening [13th] and 
early to-morrow morning, followed by the two 
corps of Sumner and Banks, and Sykes' division, 
upon Boonsborough, beyond Turner's Gap, to carry 
that position." 

Franklin was ordered to attack "a half-hour after 
you hear severe firing at the pass on the Hagerstown 
pike, where the main body will attack." This was 
the scene of the Battle of South Mountain, on Sun- 
day. 

This latter direction, a high evidence of Mc- 
Clellan's sagacity and military genius, was also (as 
usual) tortured against him, — and received public 
credence because the public knew nothing of the 
topography of the country. 

Anyone who consults the map of Harper's Ferry, 
sheet XLii, Atlas of Official War Records, or the 
admirable official maps in the great Government 
Atlas, of "Military Maps, Armies of the Potomac 
and James" (1867), will see at a glance why it was 
necessary for Franklin to await the attack at Tur- 



LEE'S LOST ORDER 83 

ner's Gap above, after he had passed Rohrersville 
and moved down Pleasant Valley, which opened, as 
I have shown, not on Harper's Ferry at all, but on 
the Potomac east of the mountains behind which 
Harper's Ferry lay ensconced. 

Lee's orders had now told McClellan what force 
it was which Franklin was moving against in his 
advance down Pleasant Valley. This valley was 
two miles wide, and girt on the east by the rugged 
South Mountains, one thousand feet high, and on 
the west by Maryland Heights, still more lofty. The 
railroad from Weverton to Rohrersville runs up 
this valley now, and the traveler can enjoy the wild 
and rugged scenery on each side. 

McLaws and Anderson had ten brigades, com- 
prising forty-two veteran regiments of infantry and 
nine batteries of artillery, of which force the six- 
teen regiments of McLaws had not drawn a trigger 
since the Seven Days before Richmond, two and a 
half months before. 

Franklin's two divisions numbered six brigades, 
consisting of twenty-seven regiments of infantry 
and seven batteries of artillery; and Couch, not yet 
up, added three brigades, consisting of fifteen regi- 
ments and four batteries ; the forces would then have 
been equal. 

D. H. Hill's division and the Confederate cavalry 
were in Turner's Gap to bar the way to the west, 
and Longstreet between Turner's Gap and Boons- 
borough and up to Hagerstown and Pennsylvania. 



84 ANTIETAM 

At any time before McClellan had attacked and 
held fast the enemy at Turner's Gap (South Moun- 
tain) and fully occupied their attention, it was 
easily possible for a Confederate force (Long- 
street's) to move down Pleasant Valley from the 
north, covered by D. H. Hill, and in rear of Frank- 
lin, shut him up in a cul-de-sac and crush him be- 
tween Longstreet in his rear and McLaws in his 
front, each superior in force and position. It was 
a neat trap. McClellan did not direct Franklin to 
wait till the pass was carried, but only till the firing 
became heavy. After that, McClellan intended to 
take care of Hill and Longstreet himself, and also, 
after that, if either of these had ventured down 
Pleasant Valley in Franklin's rear, we would have 
had a sort of four-ply arrangement, for McClellan 
would have followed down and in turn shut these 
forces up between Franklin now in their front and 
himself in their rear. 

As a matter of fact, Longstreet (see his Official 
Report) did march his whole force back nearly or 
quite into Turner's Gap, to D. H. Hill's support, in 
the afternoon. He could just as easily have de- 
flected it down behind Franklin had he not been 
kept busy above, and afterward forced to retreat, — 
to save himself, — back part way to Hagerstown, 
and then to Sharpsburg for a final stand. 

In fact, Lee wrote McLaws, then in Pleasant Val- 
ley, early on the morning of the 14th, and before he 
knew that Longstreet was needed at Turner's Gap : 



LEE'S LOST ORDER ^5 

"General Longstreet moves down this morning to 
occupy the Boonsborough Valley (which town is at 
the head of Pleasant Valley), so as to protect your 
flank from attacks from forces coming from Fred- 
erick until the operations at Harper's Ferry are 
completed." But Longstreet did not occupy that 
Boonsborough, or Upper Pleasant, Valley; as Ten- 
nyson says, 

"He saw the snare, and he retired." 

Had Miles held Maryland Heights in force, noth- 
ing could have saved McLaws' whole command, 
consisting of forty-two regiments and nine batteries. 
They could not have reached the Potomac, en- 
filaded by all the guns which would then, under 
Miles, have crowned Maryland Heights for three 
miles, and a strong infantry force in the only access 
thereto, Solomon's Gap, the well-protected Solo- 
mon's Gap, and, with Franklin and Couch driving 
them on. The Potomac being unfordable there by 
reason of its rocky bottom, there was no possible 
egress to the east; so that while Harper's Ferry 
might have been gutted by Jackson at night, all its 
men, all its artillery, and all its horses and wagons 
and movable property would have been saved, and 
the 20,000 men of McLaws and Anderson would 
have been inevitably taken, while the three Fates, 
Stanton, Wool, and Halleck, down at Washington 
and Baltimore, sat and span. And then Miles would 
have been court-martialed and shot, for abandoning 



S6 ANTIETAM 

what he was ordered to hold "to the last extremity." 
Well, he was shot, anyhow, but that was in battle, 
before he surrendered. 

What McClellan got out of Lee's order was no- 
tice that Lee had actually embarked on a side enter- 
prise full of peril for himself, which would require 
five days to accomplish and wasn't worth a picayune 
to him afterward ( for the prisoners he took at Har- 
per's Ferry were in large part short-term men, and 
they were all paroled at once), excepting that it 
opened a back-door road which would have enabled 
him to reach McClellan's rear, and threaten or cap- 
ture Washington, and which McClellan himself took 
care of very promptly. McClellan saw, therefore, 
that this loss of five days would enable him to at- 
tack Lee in Maryland, instead of following and 
fighting him up through Pennsylvania, and would 
preserve our own State from the desolation and 
horror of invasion, to which McClellan's subsequent 
removal subjected it the next year. 



VIII 

m'clellan's swift advance 

McClellan read Lee's order on the afternoon 
of September 13. That forenoon he had already 
ordered Pleasonton and Burnside to the Catoctin 
passes and the Catoctin Valley, seven miles on the 
way from Frederick to Boonsborough. That same 
evening and night he ordered his v/hole force, which 
was at or nearing Frederick, forward; ordered 
Franklin to Pleasant Valley, and Couch to follow, 
and on the 14th, next day, fought and won the bat- 
tle of South Mountain and the battle of Crampton's 
Gap, and forced down McLaws, Hill, and Long- 
street against the Potomac, with Walker and Jack- 
son on the opposite side. McClellan's army now 
passed through Turner's Gap on the night of the 
14th and morning of the 15th, brought its trains 
through the mountains, and on the i6th, in a fog, 
closed up on Sharpsburg. McClellan reconnoitered 
the ground, established his lines, planted his bat- 
teries, supplied his troops from his trains, and 
opened the battle of Antietam by a fierce infantry 
attack for position in the afternoon of the i6th, on 
the right, and a heavy bombardment from estab- 

87 



88 ANTIETAM 

lished positions all along the line, the same positions, 
in fact, which the artillery occupied during the bat- 
tle of the next day. Next morning at daybreak he 
attacked along his whole front, drove back Lee's 
left and center, and killed, wounded, scattered, and 
captured more than 25,000 of the enemy. Next 
day, while Couch and Humphreys were coming up, 
and while McClellan's nearly fifty heavy guns were 
able only to "fire blank cartridges to draw the 
enemy's fire from the infantry," (see vol. xix, 
part I, page 436), and were waiting in a feverish 
suspense for the heavy ammunition which had 
been ordered and sent, and should have been 
there early in the morning, but did not (for rea- 
sons known at Washington; see Wilson's book, 
cited later) arrive till the afternoon ; and while Lee's 
broken, dispirited, and defeated men in groups and 
squads, men and officers (see Lee's reports, cited 
later), were sneaking away across the river and fly- 
ing far, far up the Shenandoah Valley, up beyond 
Winchester, many thousand of them throwing away 
their shoes, as General Jones reported, lest they be 
sent back into that hell again, the i8th passed. Lee 
in the silence of the night gathered his shattered and 
defeated remnants about him, and ere the morning 
star had arisen on that field the invaders found 
themselves driven ofiF Northern soil, out of Mary- 
land, and far away from Pennsylvania; and the 
greatest battle of the war had been fought, and the 
grandest victory of the war had been won. McClel- 



McCLELLAN'S SWIFT ADVANCE 89 

Ian, the patriot and victor, the savior of his country, 
now awaited his crown of martyrdom. All this was 
within less than ten days after the time when Lin- 
coln ordered and McClellan took command. 

And that is the story of Lee's lost order, and of 
what McClellan did about it; but not, alas! of what 
the War Department strategists did about it. That, 
as Kipling says, "is another story." Meade was 
pretty nearly served the same way after Gettysburg, 
and Grant, also, before Vicksburg. 



IX 

lee's projected turning movement 

When Harper's Ferry had fallen, a new and most 
serious problem presented itself, and one which Mc- 
Clellan's orders show that he very fully appreciated, 
and met at once, but which the historians have 
strangely overlooked. I would like to say that much 
of the data relating to these events will be found 
only in the Supplemental Volume u, published in 
1897, 1898, and 1899, of the Official War Records, 
and not at all in Volume xix, to which they properly 
belong. I shall refer again to these concealments, 
mutilations, or omissions, (much like those which 
Pope charged on Halleck), in examining McClellan's 
subsequent advance to Culpeper; but I cannot ex- 
plain why they had been removed from their proper 
files in the War Department, and why they were not 
discovered until ten years afterward. Where, and 
by whom, were they suppressed and hidden? 

Why did McClellan, early on the morning of Sep- 
tember 15, and before Harper's Ferry had been sur- 
rendered, order Franklin, then in Pleasant Valley, 
to "push on with your whole command to Sharps- 
burg," and in the evening of the same day, when the 

90 



LEE'S PROJECTED MOVEMENT 91 

ominous silence at Harper's Ferry (see McClel- 
lan's Report) had told him that that place had sur- 
rendered, countermand this order and direct Frank- 
lin to ''keep the enemy in your front without any- 
thing decisive until the Sharpsburg affair is set- 
tled" ? McClellan's report says : "The cessation of 
the firing at Harper's Ferry indicated [on the morn- 
ing of the 15th] the surrender of that place." And 
at once all three roads from the Confederate rear 
at Sharpsburg were opened for a great turning 
movement down along the Potomac, through Vir- 
ginia to Harper's Ferry, and thence still down along 
the Potomac, and up through Maryland, directly to 
McClellan's rear, so as to plant Lee in the mountain 
passes, squarely on McClellan's communications, 
and bar the way between the Army of the Potomac 
and Washington, with Washington at his mercy. 

And this is why, September 16, when a scout 
brought McClellan direct word of the surrender, 
McClellan cautioned Franklin again "to watch 
Knoxville and Berlin, so that no enemy can get in 
your rear." Franklin's rear was now on the Poto- 
mac; he was fronting north to McClellan. 

Knoxville and Berlin are on the great Potomac 
River road, along its northern bank, which follows 
the railroad and canal down across the mountains 
to eastern Maryland, sending great arteries up 
through the State all along its course. No enemy 
could have gotten in Franklin's rear unless he had 
come down the river from Harper's Ferry. Had 



92 ANTIETAM 

an enemy, however, gotten there, he would not only 
have been in Franklin's rear, but in the rear of Mc- 
Clellan's whole army, with not a Union division be- 
tween him and Washington, and planted directly 
across McClellan's communications and lines of sup- 
ply. With the gaps of the South Mountain then 
closed by the enemy from the east in the rear of 
McClellan, with Maryland Heights in possession of 
the Confederates, and with a Confederate force any- 
where between Frederick and the mountains to hold 
these gaps, McClellan's only supplies must have 
come down from Harrisburg, and his retirement 
north, into Pennsylvania, would have been inevita- 
ble, thus opening Washington and Baltimore to cap- 
ture, and eastern Maryland and all Virginia to per- 
manent Confederate occupation. These States 
would both have been lost for the time at least. 
Nay, the Northern Central railroad, from Harris- 
burg to Baltimore, would have also gone in the 
wreck. 

Stonewall Jackson's route map for the Gettysburg 
campaign was prepared by that great soldier in the 
following winter, 1862, and shows the topography 
and roads of this region very well. It is sheet cxvi, 
part 24, of the Atlas to the Official Records. From 
Knoxville, just below Pleasant Valley, a splendid 
paved turnpike sweeps up from the Potomac 
through Petersville and Jefferson to Frederick City. 
I know this road, because while Lee occupied Fred- 
erick myself and a comrade were sent on a cavalry 



LEFS PROJECTED MOVEMENT 93 

scout to the hills just overlooking Frederick, and 
within rifle-shot of Lee's pickets, whence, from the 
gable window of a barn, we observed the whole 
Confederate army spread out before us, and indeed 
on the march. Had it not been that Walker's 
movement from and to Point of Rocks cut us off 
on the east, we could then have communicated di- 
rectly with McClellan. We returned by night, run- 
ning the gauntlet of Walker's men, then across the 
river, and reported at daybreak to Colonel Miles 
what we had discovered. 

From Berlin, Knoxville, Weverton, and Sandy 
Hook, on the Potomac, fine roads also run up north 
through Catoctin Valley and Pleasant Valley, to 
Middletown, Burkittsville, Turner's Gap, Cramp - 
ton's Gap, and Rohrersville. In fact, merely re- 
versing the direction of the march. Walker could 
have marched back toward Frederick just as he 
marched down to Loudon Heights from Frederick; 
McLaws and Anderson could have marched up 
Pleasant Valley, or, east of the South Mountain, 
up the Catoctin Valley, just as they marched south 
to Maryland Heights from Frederick; and the 
same route that afterward took Jackson, A. P. Hill, 
Ewell, Walker, McLaws, and Anderson from Har- 
per's Ferry up to Shepherdstown and Antietam, 
would have brought them down to and through 
Harper's Ferry from the Shepherdstown Ford. 
These routes were not only feasible, but they were 
actually marched over by the bulk of Lefe's army 



94 ANTIETAM 

in this campaign, but only in the opposite direc- 
tion. 

From Boteler's Ford, below Shepherdstown, to 
Harper's Ferry, by the Virginia road, is 14 miles; 
from Harper's Ferry to Burkittsville, screened from 
McClellan's anny behind Maryland Heights, is 12 
miles further; and from Burkittsville to Turner's 
Gap, on McClellan's line of supply, is 10 miles more. 
This march would have closed from the rear every 
practical pass for McClellan from the Pennsylvania 
line, 40 miles above, far down into Virginia, and 
McClellan would have had to force the passage 
from the west against Lee's whole army on the east, 
instead of against one or two divisions. Lee's com- 
munications with Virginia would have been intact, 
nay, even improved (since he had come up from 
Leesburg), while McClellan's would have been 
severed, towards the east, from below the line of 
the Potomac River along the mountains nearly or 
quite up to Harrisburg, Penn., a distance of 150 
miles. 

Now, let us suppose that McClellan, without sup- 
plies or reconnaissance, on Monday, September 15, 
had rushed his whole force forward (had it been, 
possible, which it was not) upon such parts of Lee's 
army as had fallen back to the heights at Sharps- 
burg, and this part of Lee's army, comprising the 
divisions of Longstreet, Hood, Jones, and D. H. 
Hill, with the cavalry and reserve artillery, as a for- 



LEE'S PROJECTED MOVEMENT 95 

lorn hope, had withstood McClellan's attack for but a 
few hours even, and then been driven in more or less 
disorder across the river, which was barely knee 
deep ; and suppose then that McClellan had pursued 
them rapidly across the river, leaving his trains scat- 
tered along from Middletown, and across the moun- 
tains, and leaving Sharpsburg directly in his rear, 
and across the Potomac. Simultaneously with this 
we may be sure that McLaws, Anderson, Walker, 
Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, comprising twenty- 
two brigades, one hundred regiments of infantry, be- 
sides the heavy artillery for the reduction of Har- 
per's Ferry, would have rapidly marched down the 
river road to Knoxville, Sandy Hook, and Berlin, 
and thence up by a number of excellent roads to 
the north, sealing the whole South Mountain range 
on the east against McClellan's army. With Long- 
street, Hood, D. H. Hill, Jones, and Lee's other 
fragments following Jackson down to the Potomac, 
and with Harper's Ferry and Maryland Heights 
firmly held by the Confederates against pursuit, 
what would have been the certain fate of Washing- 
ton, what the state of the army of the Potomac, and 
what the just fate of McClellan? 

This was the great turning movement which Lee 
had so successfully used on Pope a month 
previously, and on Hooker at Chancellorsville, and 
again on the march to Gettysburg the next spring 
and summer; but it didn't work on McClellan; he 
wasn't that kind of a commander. 



96 ANTIETAM 

Yet this is what we are asked to believe it was 
McClellan's bounden duty to have done; and we 
are told that he was slow and negligent in not 
doing it. 

Lee understood this problem perfectly well. He 
had no reason in the world excepting this to turn 
two-thirds of his army out of its way and spend 
priceless days in reducing Harper's Ferry, for Har- 
per's Ferry would have done him no harm. It was 
utterly useless for any purpose of aggression. The 
next year he marched by it, on his way to Gettys- 
burg, in disdain. 

But it was necessary now for Lee to have the 
river road, and Harper's Ferry barred the river 
road right across its middle. Lee didn't want to 
besiege and capture Harper's Ferry. He says in 
his report : *'It had been supposed that the advance 
upon Fredericktown would lead to the evacuation 
of Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, thus opening 
the line of communication through the valley. This 
not having occurred, it became necessary to dislodge 
the enemy from those positions before concentrating 
the army west of the mountains." This line of com- 
munication through the valley was from east of the 
mountains, not from west of them, for Shepherds- 
town, Sharpsburg, and Williamsport are the actual 
gateways to the Shenandoah, which is a mere south- 
ern extension of the Cumberland Valley of Pennsyl- 
vania, and about twenty-five miles wide. Before 
Antietam Lee had sent his trains across the river, 



LEE'S PROJECTED MOVEMENT 97 

where they would have been at hand and in proper 
position for the great turning movement described, 
and could have proceeded without the knowledge of 
our forces, which were on the north bank of the 
river and out of sight behind the mountains below 
the Antietam creek. 

General Wool reported to Halleck, September 
5 : "Reliable persons say the Potomac can be forded 
at almost every point." 

Captain VVinslow, September 24, reported that his 
regiment, the Fifth New York, on Saturday, Sep- 
tember 20, "crossed the river in line of battle at 10 
A, M., and took up position on top of bluff." (See 
War Records, vol. xix, part i, p. 367.) 

So we need not feel surprised that at 7.30 p. m. on 
September 16, the very eve of the battle of Antie- 
tam, the following order was sent to Franklin: 
"General McClellan directs me to say that he still de- 
sires you to occupy Maryland Heights. If, however, 
this should prove impracticable, he thinks you had 
better leave a small force at your present position 
and join him with the remainder of your com- 
mand." 

In General Franklin's official report he says: 
"During the night of the i6th I received orders to 
move toward Keedysville in the morning [the 
17th], with two divisions, and to dispatch General 
Couch's division to occupy Maryland Heights." 
Couch's splendid veteran division, of fifteen regi- 



98 ANTIETAM 

merits of infantry and four batteries, remained in 
Pleasant Valley facing the south, through the great 
battle, and at midnight, after the battle and when 
Lee, broken and shattered, had more than he could 
do to even take care of himself. Couch received the 
following order : "General McClellan desires you to 
march with your whole command to-morrow morn- 
ing [September i8] in time to report with it to 
Major General Franklin as soon after daylight as 
you can possibly do so. Franklin is on the left of 
General Sumner." 

Yet this, historians tell us, was one of McClellan's 
errors; although Couch's division alone stood be- 
tween Lee's army, McClellan's army supply, and 
Washington. 

But even afterward McClellan kept his eye on 
these open roads. September i8 he ordered 
Pleasonton to scout, with his cavalry, down each side 
of Elk Mountain (Maryland Heights) from 
Rohrersville to the Potomac. On the 19th he or- 
dered Sumner to send Banks' whole corps ''by way 
of Rohrersville and Brownsville toward Harper's 
Ferry, with instructions to occupy Maryland 
Heights." 

McClellan was then satisfied; the door had been 
closed and barred, but the Washington authorities 
were not, for when his chief quartermaster asked 
that small supply steamers then at hand should be 
sent up the canal, Quartermaster General Meigs 



LEE'S PROJECTED MOVEMENT 99 

(whose record it would repay anyone to look up) re- 
plied by "raising objections on the score of want of 
protection to the canal" between Washington and 
Harper's Ferry. 

McClellan replied : "I do not require suggestions 
of this kind. I shall be responsible that full pro- 
tection is afforded it." 



X 

THE EVE OF ANTIETAM 

September i6 was a day of fog. McClellan 
writes Franklin on that day: "I think the enemy 
has abandoned the position in front of us, but the 
fog is so dense that I have not yet been able to 
determine/* 

To Halleck, same date: "This morning a heavy 
fog has thus far prevented us from doing more than 
to ascertain that some of the enemy are still there. 
Do not know in what force. Will attack as soon 
as situation of enemy is developed. I learn Miles 
surrendered 8 a. m. yesterday, unconditionally. 
Had he held the Maryland Heights he 
would inevitably have been saved. The time lost 
on account of the fog is being occupied in getting 
up supplies, for the want of which many of our men 
are suffering." 

Same date, Seth Williams writes McClellan: 
"Lieutenant Shunk has gone back to hurry up 
ordnance supplies of ammunition, &c. He in- 
formed me that he had no supply of musket ammu- 
nition, but that there was plenty throughout the 
various division trains." 

lOO 



THE EVE OF ANTIETAM loi 

The afternoon of September i6 McClellan had 
completed the examination of the enemy's position 
and his arrangements for battle, and his troops were 
generally in their assigned position for attack at 
daybreak. 

The Confederate line extended from a prominent 
hill abutting on the Potomac, a half mile south of 
Mercersville, down the line of bluffs on which 
Sharpsburg stands overlooking the Antietam Valley, 
which then was bent around in a sort of hook on the 
enemy's right, the hook following down behind the 
right bank of the Antietam Creek, but not entirely 
to the river. The Confederates' only available line 
of retreat was by way of Boteler's Ford, below 
Shepherdstown, where the river, from the wash of 
the dam above, was broad, sandy, and shallow, and 
was directly in the rear of the Confederate right. 
By this ford his troops coming up from Harper's 
Ferry crossed the river to take their places in the 
line of battle, and by it Lee's whole army retreated 
the night of the i8th. The Potomac was three hun- 
dred yards wide and three feet deep. (See General 
Griffin's Report, War Records, vol. xix, part i, p. 

350.) 

When Lee took position, September 15, in front 
of Sharpsburg, he had with him the infantry divi- 
sions of Hood, Longstreet, Jones, and D. H. Hill, 
with Stuart's cavalry, and nearly all his artillery, 
numbering eighty regiments, with forty batteries. 
Jackson and Walker came up from Harper's Ferry 



102 ANTIETAM 

and took position during the i6th. The divisions of 
McLaws and Anderson arrived early in the morn- 
ing of the 17th, but A. P. Hill did not reach the 
field of battle until late in the afternoon of that day. 
Hill says the head of his column arrived at 2:30, 
but his brigade and regimental commanders fixed 
their arrival in the presence of the enemy variously 
at about 3, 3 140, and 4. ( See reports. ) 

September 16 was not passed in quietness by Mc- 
Clellan. Lee says, in his report: "On the i6th the 
artillery fire became warmer, and continued through- 
out the day. The enemy crossed the Antietam be- 
yond the reach of our batteries and menaced our 
left. ... As evening approached, the enemy 
opened more vigorously with his artillery, and bore 
down heavily with his infantry upon Hood, but 
the attack was gallantly repelled." 

McClellan's plan was, in his own words, and 
which are fully corroborated by the field orders and 
reports of that day, "to attack the enemy's left with 
the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by 
Sumner's, and, if necessary, by Franklin's, and as 
soon as matters looked favorably there to move the 
corps of Burnside against the enemy's extreme 
right, upon the ridge running to the south and rear 
of Sharpsburg; and having carried their position. 
to press along the crest toward our right, and when- 
ever either of these flank movements should be suc- 
cessful, to advance our center with all the forces 
then disposable." 



THE EVE OF ANTIETAM 103 

At daylight, the 17th, Hooker's First corps at- 
tacked the Confederate left; Mansfield's Twelfth 
corps was then ordered in and became engaged at 
7 A. M. This was followed by Sumner's Second 
corps, which became engaged at nine o'clock. 

By comparing the four maps, on sheets xxviii 
and XXIX, part 6, Atlas to the Official War Records, 
the plan and execution can be clearly understood. 
The Confederate map shows the routes followed by 
the troops coming up from Harper's Ferry, and also 
the hooking backward of the Confederate right, op- 
posite what has become known as the Burnside 
Bridge across the Antietam. 



XI 



M CLELLAN S PLAN OF BATTLE BURNSIDE 

McClellan's tactical plan, in brief, was to throw 
a series of very heavy attacks on the Confederate 
left, extending down nearly one-half Lee's line, 
and thus draw heavily from Lee's right to sustain 
his overwhelmed left. When Lee's right had been 
thus denuded, Burnside, on McClellan's extreme 
left, and directly opposite Lee's deflected right, was 
to cross the Antietam Creek, by the different fords 
and by the bridge, and drive his attack along Lee's 
right rear, between the Confederate line and 
Boteler's Ford and the Potomac. When Lee had 
thus been cut off from his line of retreat, Fitz John 
Porter's Fifth corps, supported by such parts of 
Franklin's Sixth corps as were not engaged else- 
where, and by Pleasonton's cavalry, were to strike 
the Confederate center directly in front, crossing 
the Antietam in front of Sharpsburg. Pleasonton 
was already across. Had these operations been 
successfully carried out, Lee would have been forced 
north, along the Potomac, and by way of Mercers- 
ville up toward Falling Waters. By Burnside's 
movement, between Lee's rear and Boteler's Ford, 

104 



McCLELLAN'S PLAN OF BATTLE 105 

any belated troops coming up from Harper's Ferry 
would have been prevented from crossing, or even 
approaching, the river. As events transpired, A. P. 
Hill's division of twenty-three regiments of infan- 
try, — two having been left at Harper's Ferry, — 
and seven batteries of artillery, would thus have been 
cut off, for they did not reach the field till late in 
the afternoon, and did not reach the ford till after 
2 p. M. 

Any military man will see at a glance that, even 
without any specific orders except to attack in force, 
Burnside's duty was plain. It was not a question of 
strategy or tactics ; it was merely a headlong drive 
across the length of the creek in front, in the brief- 
est time and irrespective of loss, and by every avail- 
able ford, road, and passage, and the fate of Lee's 
army was sealed. But Burnside undertook to fight 
a strategical and tactical battle, and this, under any 
circumstances, was what Burnside was not capable 
of doing. He sent his men in by driblets, never 
went near the creek himself, never saw the ground 
except from a distance, and a few Confederate rifle- 
men, and very few, practically without any de- 
fenses, picked his men off as they maneuvered and 
deployed, and halted and marched, and counter- 
marched up and down in full view of the enemy, 
until, counting the afternoon, when A. P. Hill, who 
was not across the river then, attacked him, he lost 
more than 2000 men. It is a solemn fact that every 
Confederate on Burnside's front bagged, that day, 



io6 ANTIETAM 

three, or perhaps four, of these, and then they them- 
selves walked off, more than half of them, when 
their ammunition ran out, as the reports show. 

General Hooker, in an impassioned letter to Stan- 
ton, April 23, 1863, speaks of Burnside's ''blunder- 
ing sacrifice of life at the bridge at Antietam." In 
the recently published volume, Volume li of the 
Official War Records (1897), we have for the first 
time the official reports of the Confederate brigade 
commanders, made at the time, and of the com- 
manders of all the regiments which took part in the 
Confederate defense of the line of the Antietam 
against Burnside's attack. 

Colonel Benning's brigade, or rather two regi- 
ments of his brigade, — the others having on the 
morning of the 15th been sent elsewhere, — had 
occupied the right bank of the Antietam, both above 
and below the Burnside bridge, since daylight Mon- 
day morning, September 15, and picketed this line 
and afterward defended it against Burnside's forces. 
'Tor a long distance below the bridge," Benning 
says, "and for some distance above it, the ground 
rose very steeply from the creek for fifty or sixty 
yards." This was on the Confederate side, where, 
he says, "the face of this slope was clothed with 
rather thinly scattered trees, and in one place, on the 
left, it had a sort of pit, large enough to hold 
twenty or thirty men. Behind the trees, at the top 
of the steep slope, ran a rail fence. 

"The creek was fordable everywhere above and 



McCLELLAN'S PLAN OF BATTLE 107 

below the bridge ; in most places was not more than 
knee-deep. Pickets and skirmishers were soon 
[September 15] thrown across the creek several 
hundred yards to the front," and remained there 
until driven back across the Antietam by Burnside's 
approach. Across the creek, on Burnside's side, 
about two hundred yards' distant, was a sharp ridge, 
and there were good positions for cannon at from 
five hundred to six hundred yards beyond the creek, 
and fully commanding the thinly wooded slope occu- 
pied by Benning's two regiments, the Twentieth and 
the Second Georgia. The Second Georgia was 
along the slope below the bridge and the Twentieth 
opposite and above the bridge. I know personally 
that, when the water on the bar in the river below 
Shepherdstown is not more than knee-deep, the 
Antietam above its mouth is equally shallow. The 
banks are not especially difficult. General Toombs 
described them as descending gently to the margin 
of the creek. Boys go bathing all along this part 
of the creek in summer, as I know. 

It was almost the keynote of McClellan's plan 
that, as soon as the battle on the Union right was 
under full headway, Burnside should sweep across 
the shallow creek by the various fords as well as by 
the bridge, driving everything out of his way, forc- 
ing his way behind the Confederate lines and be- 
tween them and the river. For this purpose he was 
provided with an enormous force, far in excess of 
that required to carry the passage, and with an 



io8 ANTIETAM 

undue amount of artillery, much specially provided 
and of large caliber. There was practically nothing 
in his way to stop such an advance. 

But no advance was made. Time wore on until, 
at 9:10, McClellan ordered Burnside to open his 
attack, saying that Franklin's corps was only a mile 
and a half away, and that Burnside would be sup- 
ported, "and, if necessary, on your own line of 
attack." This meant that Franklin's Sixth corps 
would be added to Burnside's Ninth corps and to 
the Kanawha division in moving along the rear of 
Lee's whole line. Benning was entirely justified in 
closing his report by saying of his two regiments: 
"The service they rendered was, I think, hardly to 
be overestimated. If General Burnside's corps 
had once got through the long gap in our line it 
would have been in the rear of our whole army, 
and that, anybody can see, would have been disas- 
trous." 

McClellan sent his 9:10 order to Burnside by 
General Sackett, afterward Inspector-General of the 
United States army, who, in a letter to McClellan 
after the war, said : "I started at once, and as fast 
as my horse could carry me." He gave Burnside 
the order "which," says General Sackett, "seemed 
to annoy him somewhat, as he said to me: 'Mc- 
Clellan appears to think I am not trying to carry 
this bridge ; you are the third or the fourth one who 
has been to me this morning with similar orders.' " 

Now what were the opposing forces contesting 



McCLELLAN'S PLAN OF BATTLE 109 

this three-quarters of a mile stretch along the creek? 
Burnside's force, consisting of the Ninth corps, 
with the independent Kanawha division attached to 
it, comprised twenty-nine regiments of infantry and 
four companies of cavalry, with seven batteries, be- 
sides a battery of boat howitzers, of which artillery 
one battery was of 20-pounder Parrotts, and an- 
other, in part at least, of the same heavy guns. 

A few of Burnside's regiments report their num- 
bers in the line of battle, indicating that the average 
strength was in excess of that of the army as a 
whole, and more than thirty per cent, above the 
average Confederate regimental strength. Every 
one of Burnside's regiments showed losses in the 
battle, so that there was no question of soldiership 
among the men. 

The troops opposing Burnside along the creek 
we are now able to determine with accuracy, and 
also their numbers and positions. A careful 
examination of all the Confederate reports — regi- 
mental, brigade, and divisional, for all Lee's army — 
shows that no other troops than those referred to 
in General D. R. Jones' report had anything to do 
with this line until A. P. Hill came up late in the 
afternoon and occupied the high plateau a mile in 
rear of the creek. Jones' division nominally con- 
sisted of six brigades, with four batteries, but, 
practically, nearly all of them had been taken away 
from him on the i6th or earlier. Four of these 
brigades composed the right of Lee's main line. 



no ANTIETAM 

and were not within reach or engaged at all in 
resisting Burnside at the creek. Of the remaining 
two brigades, that of Drayton, excepting the 
Fiftieth Georgia during a part of the forenoon, — 
as stated in the report of Jenkins' brigade, Colonel 
Walker, — was with Jones' other brigades and only 
Toombs' brigade was actually in action at the 
bridge. 

Of Toombs' brigade two regiments had been de- 
tached the morning of the 1 5th to pursue the Union 
cavalry to Williamsport and take care of the Con- 
federate train, and did not rejoin the army until the 
afternoon of the 17th, and were then placed in the 
main front line of battle in the rear of, and not 
near the bridge. 

Jones says that his entire six brigades on the 
morning of the 17th numbered only 2430 men, but 
he evidently underestimated those, for in the Con- 
federate report of losses they are credited with 1312, 
which is far more than fifty per cent. As they took 
no part in the Harper's Ferry operations, they could 
not have straggled down there, and as they had had 
two days* rest in position, before the battle, they 
must have had their men well up. 

The Second Georgia faced the Antietam to the 
right of the bridge. Its commanding officer. Cap- 
tain Lewis, states that it had in line 107 men and 
officers; Benning says, 97 men. The Twentieth 
Georgia faced the bridge and extended to the left. 
Its commander, Colonel Cummings, says it was 



McCLELLAN'S PLAN OF BATTLE iii 

about 200 strong; Benning says 250. At all events, 
both regiments together did not number 400. 

On their right was the Fiftieth Georgia, ''num- 
bering," as Benning says," scarcely 100 muskets." 

One company from Jenkins' brigade was also 
placed one-half between the Second and Fiftieth 
Georgia and the remaining half near a lower ford 
beyond the Fiftieth. The only battery on this front 
was Richardson's, back on the high ground far in 
the rear. Longstreet sent, on request, Eubank's 
battery; but, Benning says, about nine o'clock this 
battery was ordered away. He also says that he 
was thus left ''without any artillery supports what- 
ever," which indicates, as does the report of 
Toombs, that Richardson's battery was at least a 
mile in the rear, since Eubank was halfway, Toombs 
says, between Richardson and the creek. He says 
that Richardson also was too far in the rear to 
render efficient service against Burnside. 

Summing up, then, we have a Confederate force 
defending the bridge, and the ford, and the stream 
on the Antietam Creek consisting of not more than 
five hundred men at the outside, composed of three 
regiments and an extra company, with a single 
battery in the rear too distant to be of much ser- 
vice, and another battery withdrawn early in the 
day. 

These five hundred men and officers, and probably 
only four hundred of them, inflicted a loss on 
Burnside^s force of nearly two thousand men, and 



112 ANTIETAM 

most of this was accomplished by less than four 
hundred Confederates. 

It seems actually incredible, and can only be 
accounted for on the ground that Burnside had 
not looked at the stream, and fought his battle 
stragetically, and not as directed. General Sackett 
says that he remained with Burnside to see Mc- 
Clellan's last order executed, and advised Burnside, 
who was back with the heavy artillery, "to go down 
near the bridge," and he then started to do so, but 
soon returned, saying that ''the bridge had been 
carried and the troops were crossing over as rapidly 
as possible." This was at or after i o'clock p. M. 
(See Ferrero's report.) 

Benning says his troops were withdrawn by 
reason of an enfilading fire from our batteries on 
their right, and also from the exhaustion of their 
ammunition. This latter is a fact, for these two 
regiments were immediately sent back to the wagons 
for ammunition, as we see by the reports. 

That Burnside frittered away the whole forenoon 
in desultory shooting is also evidenced by the fact 
that his men were out of ammunition when the 
bridge was crossed, and the Confederates had also 
shot away all theirs, without actual contact. What 
had 10,000 or 12,000 men to do with shooting at 
400 across the creek a whole half day, with more 
than forty cannon, and many of them 20-pounders, 
firing at point-blank range, or enfilading these 400 
Confederates behind a few fence rails in a strip of 



McCLELLAN'S PLAN OF BATTLE 113 

wood not one hundred feet from the "gently-rising" 
bank of a creek fordable anywhere for infantry? 
(See General Upton's official ''Military Policy of 
the U. S.," page 389. "Before being placed in com- 
mand of the Army of the Potomac, General Burn- 
side had repeatedly informed the President and Sec- 
retary of War that he did not feel qualified for the 
position, an opinion which the battle-field of Antie- 
tam had sufficiently corroborated.") 

But the bridge was not necessary even for the 
passage of artillery. The Kanawha division had 
passed the creek in force long before the bridge 
was taken. Colonel Crook reports that he had 
received orders in the morning to cross the bridge 
after Sturgis had taken it, but, finding that Sturgis 
had not arrived, in General Crook's characteristic 
way he divided his brigade and arranged his guns 
to command the bridge, and got five companies 
across the stream. "I then intended taking the 
bridge," he says, "but soon after my battery opened 
on the bridge General Sturgis' command crossed the 
bridge." Colonel Harland, of the Eighth Con- 
necticut, also crossed by another ford. Colonel 
Curtis, of the Fourth Rhode Island, reports that his 
division, "the extreme left of the line, crossed at 
a ford under fire of the enemy's skirmishers, who 
were sheltered behind a stone wall ; one brigade then 
moved up stream to the right, the other to the left." 
Ewing's brigade "crossed the ford of the Antietam 
under a shower of grape," Colonel White, of this 



114 ANTIETAM 

brigade, describes the operation. On the morning 
of the 17th "we moved with the brigade to a ford 
about one mile down the stream. While fording the 
stream the enemy opened on the column with artil- 
lery, fortunately inflicting but little injury. After 
crossing the stream we moved up along its bank, 
to the left and front of the bridge over Antietam, 
to within supporting distance of General Rodman's 
division. While lying in this position the enemy 
shelled us severely for about two hours." 

After gaining the bridge, however, about i p. M., 
there was a long delay. During this delay the 
biographer of the Fifty-first Pennsylvania Regi- 
ment, the first to cross, says they stacked arms and 
kindled fires, which the Confederate artillery ob- 
jected to. "Regiments began pouring over the 
bridge after this," he says, "but like the two regi- 
ments that first crossed, they were all totally out 
of ammunition; but after a considerable lapse of 
time a quantity of all kinds of cartridges, both heavy 
and small, arrived and was issued." 

And during these precious but belated hours 
A. P. Hill's division was tearing its heart out, seven 
miles away, to reach the field and close this open 
door. And he closed it. Burnside must have 
thought that McClellan wanted the Antietam bridge 
for a specimen. At all events, that is all that Burn- 
side got out of it, and he nearly lost that in the ap- 
proaching dusk of the evening. 

With more than forty guns in position, many of 



McCLELLAN'S PLAN OF BATTLE 115 

them of the heaviest field calibers, fully command- 
ing the opposite creek bank and the slopes behind 
at point-blank distance, or enfilading the whole 
creek bank behind natural heights at from one-third 
to a half-mile range, and nearer, if preferred, it 
was not necessary for Burnside's infantry to have 
fired a shot; they had far better protection than 
their own rifles. With fixed bayonets they could 
have crossed where the Kanawha division had 
crossed, or anywhere else, in fact, at any time after 
eight in the morning, and in ten minutes after the 
line of assault had uncovered itself, and without 
losing 150 men, they would have sent Toombs' 400 
or 500 men whirling up the slopes. Our own 
artillery would have followed across the bridge, 
the slope in rear of Lee's fighting line would have 
been occupied, his whole right enveloped, the 
Potomac ford cut off, with A. P. Hill still ten 
miles or more away, and then the Union center 
would have struck Lee's salient in front of Sharps- 
burg, and that event would have then occurred 
which McClellan had planned should occur. Our 
army won a great victory, but Burnside's thousands, 
with all their losses and all their gallantry, did not 
help to win it. They might nearly as well have been 
back in North Carolina or out in West Virginia, 



XII 

ANTIETAM FORCES ENGAGED 

It will be found that McClellan's plan of attack 
at Antietam was closely followed by Lee at Gettys- 
burg, and this was the plan also followed by Mar- 
shal Oyama in his great battle of Mukden, which 
ended so successfully for the Japanese. 

First to assault the enemy's left with a real at- 
tack in heavy force, keeping up a heavy artillery fire 
on the center; then, when reinforcements have been 
drawn from the enemy's opposite flank and his de- 
fense weakened, to throw in another heavy attack, 
without regard to immediate cost, to envelop the 
enemy's right and threaten his rear and his com- 
munications ; and finally, by a heavy frontal attack 
by the reserve in front, to crush the enemy's center. 

This was carried out at Mukden ; but at Antietam 
Burnside failed to realize the work he had to do, 
and this prevented the frontal attack on Lee's cen- 
ter, by the Fifth and part of the Sixth corps and 
Pleasonton's massed cavalry, already across the 
Antietam. In the same manner, at Gettysburg, 
Early's sending off part of his force on a wild-goose 
chase toward York against a mythical enemy, so 

ii6 



ANTIETAM—FORCES ENGAGED 117 

broke up Lee's combinations that the attack on 
Meade's right on the evening of July 2, after Long- 
street had driven in his left, even with the aid of 
part of Hill's corps in the center, failed to achieve 
more than a partial success, the troops having been 
put in in disconnected parts. 

Lee's frontal attack at Gettysburg on the 3rd v^as 
thereby made another partial attack, and v^as re- 
pulsed. Meade's position at Gettysburg v^as also 
much like Lee's at Antietam, and, substituting the 
Battle of South Mountain for Lee's attack in front 
of Gettysburg on Re3molds on the ist, and the long 
march of the Sixth corps to Gettysburg for the cor- 
responding march of A. P. Hill from Harper's 
Ferry to Sharpsburg, the parallel becomes complete, 
excepting that Mansfield and Sumner did make 
their attack early in the morning, while Longstreet, 
at Gettysburg, dawdled away most of the day in 
keeping out of sight, and only attacked after the 
Sixth corps had reached the field. 

We now come to the question of forces engaged 
at Antietam. I have cited the regiments on both 
sides at the Seven Days, and in Pope's Second 
Manassas, and I will now give the same statistics 
for Antietam. Here also McClellan's force was 
greatly overrated and Lee's underrated, as in the 
Seven Days, while in the Pope campaign the exact 
reverse was the case; and popular histories still 
perpetuate the error. A simple comparison will at 
once demonstrate the truth. The same armies which 



ii8 ANTIETAM 

fought at the Second Manassas fought also at An- 
tietam, and the losses at Manassas were not greatly 
in excess, one with the other, on either side, the 
Union losses exceeding the Confederate, as usual 
when McClellan was not present. 

A reference to the reports in volume xix of the 
Official Records compared with volume xii, shows 
that every Confederate regiment engaged at the 
Second Bull Run was engaged at Antietam, except- 
ing one. In addition to these Lee, at Antietam, had 
received, after the Second Bull Run, forty-eight 
regiments of infantry, eighteen batteries of artil- 
lery, and five regiments of cavalry direct from 
Richmond. These regiments consisted of the divi- 
sions of McLaws, Walker, and D. H. Hill, and 
Hampton's cavalry brigade, which came up after 
the Pope battle was over. None of these are to be 
found in the Confederate roster of the Second Bull 
Run campaign, in volume xii. War Records, and 
all are found at Antietam, and the reports of cas- 
ualties at the latter battle show that all these were 
very heavily engaged against McClellan. 

In McClellan's army, at Antietam, there were 
twenty-nine new regiments, mostly of new nine 
months' infantry, just enlisted, and which had 
never fired a gun off at an enemy, or even been 
drilled or instructed. These were nearly full regi- 
ments. The old regiments were sadly depleted, for 
while Stanton's order of April 3, to close all the 
recruiting offices and sell the furniture at auction, 



ANTIETAM— FORCES ENGAGED 119 

had been rescinded June 6, yet on August 4, before 
recruiting officers had begun to bring in any con- 
siderable number of recruits, the draft for 300,000 
nine months' men had been ordered, and those who 
would have become recruits waited to become sub- 
stitutes with high bounties. The same order of 
August 4 described the States as still deficient in 
their quota of volunteers. 

These twenty-nine new regiments not only lacked 
the first elements of soldiery, but many of them had 
worthless arms. General Humphreys, referring to 
one of his brigades, 3600 strong, says "all its arms 
were unserviceable" ; the arms of another of his 
regiments were unserviceable. There were nine 
hundred stand of arms in one brigade with nipples 
or hammers broken. Humphreys wouldn't move 
from Washington until these worthless arms were 
replaced, for there were plenty of good arms there, 
by which delay he did not reach Antietam until the 
day after the battle. But Colonel Gwyn, whose 
regiment, the One Hundred and Eighteenth Penn- 
sylvania, was so badly cut up at Shepherdstown, 
reports : "Owing to the worthlessness of our pieces 
[condemned Enfield], not more than fifty per cent, 
of which could be discharged, the line began to 
waver." 

The Confederates had on the battle-field of An- 
tietam, September 17, 1862, 179 regiments of in- 
fantry, all veterans, 14^ regiments of cavalry, and 
71 batteries of artillery. 



120 ANTIETAM 

Deducting Couch's division, absent in Pleasant 
Valley, watching the Harper's Ferry outlet, and 
Humphreys' division, which did not arrive till the 
1 8th, McClellan had under his command at Antie- 
tam 184 regiments of infantry (including 21 of the 
new regiments), 15 regiments of cavalry, and 50 
batteries of artillery. It will be seen that Lee had 
21 batteries in excess of McClellan. Franklin's 
Sixth Corps did not reach the battle-field until be- 
tween nine and eleven o'clock Wednesday, and he 
had with him 27 of the above 184 infantry regi- 
ments and 7 of the above 50 batteries. 

It may be interesting, now, to compare the regi- 
ments and the numbers engaged, with those at 
Gettysburg a year later, when there was no object 
in belittling our own numbers and exaggerating 
those of the enemy. 

The marches to these battle-fields had been nearly 
the same, the marching time nearly the same, the 
same country was invaded at nearly the same time 
of the year, and, in each case the Confederate army 
came from a great victory, the Second Manassas 
and Chancellorsville, and the Union army from a 
great defeat. All historians concede that at Gettys- 
burg the opposing forces were nearly equal, with, 
if anything, a slight preponderance in favor of the 
Confederates. 

At Gettysburg Lee had 1683^ regiments of in- 
fantry (10^ less than at Antietam), 26}^ regi- 



ANTIETAM— FORCES ENGAGED 121 

ments of cavalry (12 more than at Antietam), and 
60 batteries of artillery (11 less than at Antietam). 

At Gettysburg the Union army had 228 regi- 
ments of infantry (38 more than at Antietam), 
345^ regiments of cavalry (igyi more than at 
Antietam), and 72 batteries of artillery (22 more 
than at Antietam). 

If Lee did not have his men with him at Antie- 
tam, it is difficult to discover where he had them. 
He claims to have fought the battle of Antietam 
with less than 35,000 men; but doubtless he left out 
A. P. Hill's division, which came late in the after- 
noon, but quite in time to do a great work. And he 
doubtless estimated his men after the battle. His 
first army return, dated only five days after the bat- 
tle, and described as very imperfect, gives 36,418 
officers and men present for duty (which is several 
thousand more than he claims to have had in the 
battle), besides the cavalry and reserve artillery. 
These numbered 7000. Adding these and his losses, 
not less than 25,000 men, makes a total accounted 
for of 68,418. To these must be added the fugi- 
tives from the battle-field, who never stopped after 
they had fled across the Potomac, and whom Lee 
had provost guards gathering up from the valley for 
nearly a month afterward. They figure up at least 
7000, as reported (see Jones' Report), making a 
total taken into the battle of more than 75,000 
officers and men, as battle-strength goes. 

These figures correspond very closely with a total 



122 ANTIETAM 

independent count made while the Confederates 
were marching out of Frederick, and which I have 
never heretofore seen quoted. Dr. Lewis H. Steiner, 
of Frederick, Md., was an inspector in the United 
States Sanitary Commission. He was at the Second 
Bull Run, and September 5, when the invasion of 
his home was threatened, he made his way, by per- 
mission, on the last railroad train which reached 
Frederick, where he remained until McClellan's 
army, which he accompanied, moved out of that 
city. 

During this interval he kept a diary, and this was 
afterward published in pamphlet form in the fall 
of the same year by permission of the Sanitary 
Commission. It was, by the way, from this diary 
that the poet Whittier derived his material for his 
poem of ''Barbara Fritchie." Dr. Steiner, in his 
diary, writes: ''Wednesday, September 10. — At 
four o'clock this morning the Rebel army began to 
move from our town, Jackson's force taking the 
advance. The movement continued until 8 o'clock 
p. M._, occupying sixteen hours. The most liberal 
calculation could not give them more than 64,000 
men. Over 3000 negroes must be included in this 
number. . . . Some of the Rebel regiments 
have been reduced to 150 men; none number over 
500. Their marching is very loose. They marched 
by the flank through the streets of Frederick." The 
description which follows shows that Dr. Steiner 
gave his estimate from personal inspection, and his 



ANTIETAM— FORCES ENGAGED 123 

position as inspector made such estimates a prin- 
cipal part of his duties in the Sanitary Commission. 

Dr. Steiner describes these negroes as to all in- 
tents soldiers. They were clothed and fed like the 
Confederate soldiers. Most of the negroes, he says, 
''had arms, rifles, muskets, sabers, bowie-knives, 
dirks, etc. They were supplied, in many instances, 
with knapsacks, haversacks, canteens, etc., and they 
were manifestly an integral portion of the Southern 
Confederacy army. They were seen riding on 
horses and mules, driving wagons, riding on cais- 
sons, in ambulances, with the staff of generals and 
promiscuously mixed up with all the Rebel horde. 
The fact was patent, and rather interesting, when 
considered in connection with the horror Rebels ex- 
press at the suggestion of black soldiers being em- 
ployed for national defense." 

Next day, September 11, his diary contains this 
entry: ''General Hill's division, numbering about 
8000 men, marched through the streets on their 
route westward this morning; the men marched in 
better order, had better music, and were fairly 
clothed and equipped." This was D. H. Hill's 
division, which had just come up from Richmond 
and had not been in the Second Bull Run campaign 
at all. H this force was included in his estimate 
the day before, it must have been by a subsequent 
alteration in the original entry. The same is true of 
Stuart's cavalry, which passed through Frederick 
later, and noted in his entry of September 13. 



124 ANTIEtAM 

In any case he could not have included General 
John G. Walker's division, also fresh from Rich- 
mond. — largely by rail, as was D. H. Hill's divis- 
ion, — for Walker's division did not reach Frederick 
at all, but was marched back to Point of Rocks and 
across the Potomac to seize Loudon Heights. 

As Walker's division — consisting of nine regi- 
ments of infantry and two batteries — is reported, 
in Guild's defective estimate, with losses of 1052, 
and in Lee's returns of September 22 as having 
3871 present, its strength then could not have been 
less than 5000. General Walker, with whom I be- 
came very well acquainted after the war, told me 
that it w^as considerably in excess of this figure. 

General Upton, in his ''Military Policy," p. 370, 
puts Lee's army in the Second Manassas campaign 
against Pope at 60,000. As Lee had but 134^^ 
regiments of infantry (only 120 of which were 
actually engaged), 14^ of cavalry (only 95^ of 
which were engaged), and 61 batteries of artillery 
(not all of which were in action), it wnll be seen 
that Lee's regimental strength on the field aver- 
aged (after the Seven Days' losses) more than 400. 

All the above regiments, excepting one, were pres- 
ent and engaged in the battle of Antietam; and in 
addition there were 48 regiments of infantry — con- 
sisting of McLaws's division, 16 regiments; Walk- 
er's division, 9 regiments ; and D. H. Hill's division, 
2^ regiments — which had not fired a shot since the 
Seven Days, but had been conscripted up to full 



ANTIETAM— FORCES ENGAGED 125 

strength and brought from Richmond by rail,, after 
Pope's campaign; 5 regiments of cavalr}*, Hamp- 
ton's brigade, which reached ^Manassas after the 
battle; and 10 batteries of artillery additional, be- 
sides 10 left at Leesburg. Lee's entire losses in the 
Second Manassas campaign were less than 9000, in- 
cluding killed, wounded, and missing. 

The casualties in Pope's army during the same 
campaign were 14,462, the excess of which of course 
tended relatively to weaken McClellan during the 
Antietam campaign. 

The forces opposed to McClellan, in his various 
battles, were so minimized by the authorities at 
Washington — designedly — that history even to this 
day has accepted these false statements as truth, and 
it is only by the most painstaking and careful 
analysis that an}1;hing like the exact facts can be 
obtained. Fortunately for the truth of history', 
however, this process of depreciation was not re- 
sorted to in general. — excepting in the case of Mc- 
Clellan, — so that we can, by taking the official army 
returns from the month succeeding the first Con- 
federate conscription (that is to say. April, 1862) 
up to the close of 1863, when the Confederate con- 
scription had nearly spent its force, and the process 
of consolidation of two or more Confederate regi- 
ments, especially in the West, into a single com- 
mand had become general, will accurately determine 
the facts. 

Commencing with the battle of Shiloh, April 



126 ANTIETAM 

(y-j, 1862, there were in Grant's army, prior to 
Buell's arrival after the first day's battle, 75 regi- 
ments of infantry, 5 of cavalry, and 22 batteries, a 
total present for duty, officers and men, and exclu- 
sive of the cavalry, of 32,314, making the average 
regimental strength about 400. 

On the Confederate side were 74 regiments of 
infantry, i regiment of cavalry, and 18 batteries, 
giving an effective total of officers and men of 
35,649, making an average regimental strength of 
more than 480. (See War Records, vol. x, part i.) 

The forces thus were almost equal, but Grant's 
position on the defensive gave him some advantage. 
When Buell joined Grant he brought with him 37 
regiments of infantry, 2 of cavalry, and 4 batteries, 
giving to Grant in the battle of April 7 a dispro- 
portion of 10 to 6. Grant was always fortunate in 
having superior forces, which was the exact reverse 
of McClellan's case, excepting at the great battle 
of Culpeper, in November, 1862, which was never 
fought, having only gone so far as Longstreet's 
despairing order for battle and afterward Burn- 
side's for retreat, so as to make a fresh start else- 
where. 

Fredericksburg was the next great battle succeed- 
ing the Antietam campaign. Lee's return for 
December 20, 1862 (see W. R., vol xxi), after the 
battle, gives 180 regiments of infantry; present for 
duty, officers and men, 65,970. Adding Lee's loss 
in the previous battle, 5309, his infantry strength 



ANTIETAM— FORCES ENGAGED 127 

was 71,279 officers and men present for duty. This 
gives an average regimental strength of 400. 

At the battle of Murfreesborough, or Stone 
River, December 31, 1862- January 2, 1863, the Con- 
federate force numbered 98 regiments of infantry, 
of which 16 had been consolidated into 8, making 
an actual infantry force of 90 regiments. The in- 
fantry present for duty, including artillery, num- 
bered 33,475; average per regiment, 381. 

The Union army in the same battle comprised 126 
regiments of infantry, having an average strength 
of 319 per regiment. 

The next important battle was Chancellorsville, 
at the beginning of May, 1863. In this battle Lee 
had 127 regiments of infantry. The aggregate, 
officers and men, present for duty April i, was 
52,714. This gives an average regimental strength 
of 415. 

Hooker had 177 regiments of infantry which re- 
ported losses in this batttle. 

At the battle of Gettysburg, July 1-3, 1863, Lee 
had i68j4 regiments of infantry. This was loj^ 
regiments fewer than he had at Antietam. The field 
returns for June 10, 20, and 30 are not on file, but 
by adding his losses to his present for duty on field- 
returns of July 20, and 31 — we can reach an ap- 
proximate estimate. 

The return for July 20, immediately after Lee's 
broken passage into Virginia, with many of his 
troops scattered, gave 37,103 infantry present for 



128 ANTIETAM 

duty. His losses on the field of Gettysburg (see 
addenda War Record, vol. xxvii, part 2, p. 346), 
exclusive of cavalry, were 20,211, making a total 

of 57.314. 

The next return, that of July 31, was more com- 
plete, giving, inclusive of the battle losses, 58,607. 
This would give an average regimental strength 

of 350- 

It is inconceivable that after the heavy losses at 
Antietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and the 
preliminaries of Gettysburg, Lee's strength per regi- 
ment should have been as great as on the morning 
of Antietam, before these losses occurred. It is cer- 
tain also that Lee's infantry strength at Gettysburg 
was in excess of the figures above given. 

His arniy was full of enthusiasm, after the vic- 
tories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, just 
as the year before it was, after the victory of the 
Second Manassas. 

But even taking Lee's infantry strength at An- 
tietam at 350 per regiment, which is certainly under- 
rated, as it was a year earlier than Gettysburg, we 
will have a total infantry alone opposed to McClel- 
lan at Antietam of 62,650, exclusive of cavalry and 
artillery; or a grand total of at least 75,000 en- 
gaged. 

At the battle of Gettysburg Meade had 228 regi- 
ments of infantry, 38 more than McClellan had at 
Antietam, which will indicate that the actual average 
infantry strength of McClellan's regiments at An- 



ANTIETAM— FORCES ENGAGED 129 

tietam was really much lower than that with which 
I have credited him. Meade's field return for June 
30, 1863, gives a total of infantry, officers and men, 
present for duty equipped, at Gettysburg, of 76,986. 
This makes an average regimental strength of 337. 

It is difficult to see how McClellan, only ten days 
after he took command, with constant marching and 
maneuvering, and considering the state of the 
debris which had flowed back to him from Pope's 
defeats, could in regimental strength have averaged 
much better. Whatever better it was was due alto- 
gether to the personality of McClellan. 

In the above estimates I have dealt entirely with 
the infantry, as the artillery always possessed 
enough men to work the guns, while the cavalry, 
by its functions, was a variable quantity, and not 
estimable in the direct shock of great battles. Other 
armies could be cited, but the above averages, taken 
between April i, 1862, and the fall of 1863, during 
which period the Confederate organization was at 
its best, will give the fairest results in comparison 
with McClellan and his armies during the period of 
his command. 



XIII 

MARCHING — FIGHTING — STRAGGLING LOSSES 

Taking the above summaries together, it is clear 
that Lee's army, when it left Frederick, wSeptember 
ID, II, and 12, numbered in officers and men not 
less than 75,000; and may have numbered con- 
siderably more, if statistics of other battles besides 
those of McClellan's are to be accepted as of any 
value. 

If these men were not at Antietam excepting 
those left dead or wounded at South Mountain and 
Harper's Ferry, which were relatively few, what 
had become of them? 

Lee says they straggled. There is straggling in 
all marching armies. We all know the ''coffee- 
boilers," and those who like to take a little rest; but 
before Lee's army reached Frederick, and after it 
had left Manassas, straggling was not complained 
of by "Lee, nor was Confederate straggling allowed 
for by the Washington authorities in estimating the 
enemy in Pope's campaign. 

The Confederates must have done what no coffee- 
boilers ever do — they straggled away from pro- 
visions and plenty back into a land of poverty and 

130 



MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES 131 

famine. Four armies had just marched over the 
only part of Virginia which the stragglers could 
reach if they had straggled back, while right in 
front, two days' march away, lay virgin Maryland 
and golden Pennsylvania, right after harvest, and 
with the fields rich with corn and the orchards 
filled with fruit. 

As Whittier truly says : 

"Up from the meadows rich with corn, 
Clear in the cold September morn, 
Round about them orchards sweep, 
Apple and peach tree fruited deep; 
Fair as a garden of the Lord 
To the eyes of the famished rebel horde.*' 

But Lee says they were worn out with marching. 
They marched farther next year, and in a shorter 
time, to reach Gettysburg, and in a rather worse 
marching month ; but when they passed through the 
villages of Franklin County, Pennsylvania, where 
I was born, my friends tell me that there were few, 
if any, stragglers then; those left behind were run- 
ning to catch up. 

Lee's army had from August 16 to September 17, 
1862, to go from Richmond to Antietam. Except 
Jackson's force, which had a month more to march 
in, all the Confederates went to Gordonsville by rail. 

I have made careful measurement examination 
on the maps of the number of miles actually 
marched by the different armies. Union and Con- 



132 



ANTIETAM 



federate, during the above period, excluding all rail 
and water transport, and I find that, taking all the 
different corps of McClellan's army, Burnside's 
North Carolina and West Virginia forces, and the 
different corps under Pope, the Union army 
actually marched, on foot, during the same period, 
more than twenty miles further than did Lee's army. 

So that will not account for it. Then Lee says, 
in his dispatch to Richmond, under date September 
24: "The enemy has suffered from straggling as 
well as ourselves (I believe to a greater extent), 
but his numbers are so great he can afford it; we 
cannot." (War Records, vol. xix, part 2, page 625.) 

I have already shown what the relative strengths 
were, and that the Confederate strength fully 
equaled, or even exceeded, that of McClellan. There 
was fearful straggling in our own army up from 
Washington, as there had been in Pope's army. It 
was marching after a great defeat under Pope, and 
to meet a victorious and largely reinforced enemy, 
and it included many regiments which knew noth- 
ing of marching or taking care of themselves. It 
was being reorganized, also, the broken fragments 
of three armies being consolidated into one, in ten 
days, and on the march. 

McClellan's circular of September 9 says : ''The 
general commanding entreats all general officers to 
lend every effort to the eradication of the military 
vice of straggling. He feels assured that their 
united determination can break up the practice in a 



MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES 1 33 

single week." Within that week the three battles 
were all fought. 

General Pope testified before the Committee on 
the Conduct of the War (see Upton's ''Military 
Policy") : "At least one-half of this diminution 
of our forces was occasioned by skulking and strag- 
gling from the army. . . . Thousands of 
men straggled away from their commands and were 
not in any action. I had posted several regiments 
in rear of the field of battle on the 29th of August, 
and although many thousands of stragglers and 
skulkers were arrested by them, many others passed 
around through the woods and did not rejoin their 
commands during the remainder of the campaign." 
(See Upton's U. S. Publication, ''Military Policy," 
page 370.) 

This was the material for which McClellan had 
just seven days allowed him to make over again, 
before starting for Antietam. 

Amid all the discouraging and demoralizing cir- 
cumstances which pervaded and surrounded the 
Union army, there was a single one only which 
enabled that army to do its great work ; every other 
factor had been part and parcel of the general dis- 
aster — there was but one new factor, and that was 
the heart, brain, loyalty, duty, and organizing and 
fighting power of a single individual. 

As Dr. Steiner says, in concluding his diary: 
"On Wednesday the great Battle of Antietam was 
fought, with such a display of strategy and power 



134 ANTIETAM 

on the part of our general, and of heroism and dar- 
ing from our men, that the enemy was glad to re- 
sign all hopes of entering Pennsylvania and to with- 
draw his forces across the Potomac. A great vic- 
tory had been gained ; the enemy had been driven 
from loyal soil, and McClellan had shown himself 
worthy of the love (amounting almost to adoration) 
which his troops expressed on all sides." 

There was indeed much straggling on the part 
of Lee's army; but it was not until the evening of 
September 17 had closed down, and Lee's great 
army was forced back, defeated, as every private 
soldier in that army well knew. They knew, too, 
that behind them lay a broad river, now only knee- 
deep, but which the floods usually following a great 
battle might make at once impassable, as they did a 
year later after Gettysburg. They now slunk away 
from the shattered ranks, and fled, by ones and 
twos, officers and men, across the river and back 
to Winchester — and to safety. 

Where is the proof? Lee writes, September 23, 
to the Secretary of War, asking for a law to de- 
grade regimental and company officers for bad con- 
duct m the presence of the enemy and for leaving 
their posts in time of battle. To President Davis he 
writes, the same day, that the main causes of his 
retiring from Maryland were the casualties and 
desertion and straggling connected with the battle. 

September 27 General Jones, who had been sent 
to Winchester to gather in the stragglers, reported 



MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES 135 

that he had already sent back between 5000 and 
6000, besides 1200 who had thrown away their 
shoes, and of these he says "the number of officers 
back here was most astonishing." His efforts 
created quite a stampede, he says, back to the army. 
This was after Lee's returns, already cited, had been 
made up. 

Now these stragglers were up the Shenandoah 
Valley. How did stragglers from the Bull Run, 
Leesburg, or Frederick regions get across the 
mountains, and fifty miles west, and why did they 
go there anyway? They evidently fled up the 
Shenandoah Valley after Lee had been defeated at 
Sharpsburg, for they would have shown little sense 
in running away if it were not clear to themselves 
that Lee was disastrously and hopelessly defeated. 
Victors do not run. away ; it is the vanquished who 
run. 

And so closed the full fourteen hours' battle of 
Antietam, that greatest single battle of the war — 
greatest in losses for the enemy and relatively in 
the smaller losses to ourselves. That was McClel- 
lan's way; it was because he understood artillery, 
for it will be found that in every one of McClel- 
lan's battles his own losses were far below those 
of the enemy, not only relatively but in actual num- 
bers, which quite reversed the usual rule during the 
war. This was largely due to McClellan's excellent 
tactics, which both Grant and Lee commended, and 
to his perfect mastery of artillery, which he loved 



136 ANTIETAM 

and used just as Napoleon did in his great battles. 
A battery well placed had the power of a regiment, 
but could only suffer the loss of a company. 

In General Alexander's Confederate article in 
the Century Company's "Battles and Leaders," vol. 
Ill, "The Great Charge and the Artillery Fighting 
at Gettysburg," he says the Confederates always 
called Antietam "Artillery hell." 

Major Nelson H. Davis, assistant inspector gen- 
eral, in whose charge the interments were, reported 
about 2700 Confederate dead buried by himself 
on the field of Antietam. The trophies consisted of 1 3 
cannon, 39 colors, more than 15,000 stand of arms, 
and more than 6000 prisoners. Hancock, in a let- 
ter to Adjutant-General Bowers,- September 28, 
1864, says : "I saw myself nine colors in the hands 
of one division at Antietam." 

McClellan estimates, in his letter to Halleck of 
September 29, that, including South Mountain, 
Crampton's Gap, Antietam, Shepherdstown, and 
Confederate prisoners and deserters, the total Con- 
federate loss was not less than 30,000 men. A 
careful collation of the returns of the different Con- 
federate organizations fully supports this estimate. 

The report of Medical Director Guild, in War Rec- 
ords, vol. XIX, pt 2, pp. 810-813, is grossly defective. 
He confounds all the brigades and divisions, under- 
estimates Ewell's losses by more than 300, A. P. 
Hills by more than 100, and entirely omits 16 regi- 
ments of infantry which were in the thick of the 



MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES 137 

fight, and all the cavalry and artillery losses. Many 
of Guild's other figures show large discrepancies, 
and the losses in prisoners are not included at all. 
McClellan claims to have captured more than 6000 
prisoners. I have examined the individual reports 
of all the Union commands reporting prisoners 
taken, and, omitting all duplications, I find that 
there were accounted for in these few reports 5060 
prisoners, while the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth 
corps, and one division of the Second and one of 
the Ninth, make no specific reports for prisoners 
at all, although they took many. 

Correcting the Confederate casualty returns from 
the battle-field reports, their recorded losses, all told, 
so far as definitely stated, and adding a propor- 
tionate average for the sixteen omitted regiments, 
and for the cavalry and artillery, and including the 
6000 prisoners, make a conceded aggregate, by the 
Confederates themselves, of between 20,000 and 
21,000. Adding the 6000 or 7000 who fled up the 
Valley during and on the heels of the battle and 
before Lee's retreat, and the 1200 more who, Jones 
says, threw away their shoes to avoid being sent 
back to Lee, we have an aggregate Confederate loss 
of more than 29,000. Even this is understated, 
especially in the number of the dead, since these 
Confederate reports include less than 2000 killed, 
while Inspector Nelson reported burying 2700, and 
stated that before Lee's flight the Confederates had 
buried many of their own inside their lines. "The 



138 ANTIETAM 

Medical and Surgical History of the War" reports 
3500 Confederates killed. These estimates of mine 
of Confederate losses are based on investigations of 
my own among the confused and incomplete reports 
of the different Confederate organizations which 
took part in the battle. Every one of these, from 
general to captain, has been carefully studied and 
collated, probably for the first time. General Emory 
Upton, in his ''Military Policy of the United 
States," states, on the authority of the ''Medical and 
Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion," 
Lee's losses at 3500 killed, 16,399 wounded, and 
6000 prisoners. This is undoubtedly correct. He 
says that most of these prisoners were stragglers; 
but in this he is altogether mistaken. The 5060 
prisoners I have taken from the reports filed were 
practically battle-field prisoners, and are so noted on 
my memoranda, excepting some of those gathered 
up by Pleasonton's cavalry. Hooker reported, at 
South Mountian, 1000 prisoners taken, and Burn- 
side's whole command, 1500. Hancock, at Antie- 
tam proper, 400. The Fifty-seventh New York re- 
ports : "We took the colors of the Twelfth Ala- 
bama and many prisoners. I am unable to form any 
very correct estimate of the number of the latter, 
but they considerably exceeded the number of men 
in the ranks of my regiment." This was in the 
charge through the cornfield. Colonel Brooke, 
Fifty- third Pennsylvania, commanding brigade, and 
afterward Major-General Brooke, U. S. A., says: 



MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES 139 

''About 200 stand of arms were captured, as also a 
great number of prisoners, who were sent through 
the ranks to the rear." The Sixty-sixth New York 
reports : "The battaHon pressed forward and com- 
pletely routed the enemy. It was here that we cap- 
tured a rebel lieutenant of the Fifth Florida regi- 
ment, together with his whole company and a stand 
of colors." General Kimball reports: "In this 
charge my command captured about 300 prisoners, 
the enemy leaving on the field several stand of 
colors." 

Colonel Wilcox reports of the Irish Brigade: 
"They drove the enemy from their stronghold and 
captured some 300 prisoners, including a number of 
officers, among them Lieutenant-Colonel Nisbet, of 
Macon, Ga., all of whom were sent to the rear." 
Colonel Morris, Second Brigade, French's division : 
"My brigade captured 2 stand of colors, 2 captains, 
7 lieutenants, and about 400 privates. We also took 
400 stand of arms. In front of the last position 
held by the Fourteenth Connecticut more than 1000 
of the enemy lie slain." The First Delaware re- 
ports : "We captured about 300 prisoners and sent 
them to the rear. The command continued fighting 
until their ammunition was expended." General 
Franklin reports : "Four hundred prisoners from 
17 different organizations, 700 stand of arms, one 
piece of artillery, and 3 stand of colors were cap- 
tured." 

The First Brigade of the Kanawha division sent 



I40 ANTIETAM 

to the rear a number of prisoners fully equal to its 
loss (255). Colonel Crane, commanding a brig- 
ade in Green's division, reports : **We charged them 
in a heavy piece of v^oods, driving them out of 
it, capturing a large number of prisoners [among 
them was a lieutenant-colonel and a lieutenant] , and 
made terrible havoc in their ranks, covering the 
ground v^ith slain." General Hancock reports: 
"Nine regimental colors and battle flags were taken 
from the enemy. . . . About 400 prisoners 
were captured and 4000 muskets collected on the 
field in front of the division, and piled." And such 
extracts could be multiplied. The purposed ob- 
scurity cast over these facts, which even misled so 
profound a student as General Upton, is the excuse 
for their recapitulation here. 

William Bender Wilson, the War Department 
telegrapher, who was present, says of this battle: 
"Heroism, patriotism, and valor wrote their names 
on history's page all over the sanguinary field, 
which was strewn with nearly 21,000 dead and 
wounded men — 3620 dead bodies and 17,365 
wounded men." 

The Union losses at Antietam were 12,500, and 
in all the battles, South Mountain, Crampton's Gap, 
Antietam, and Shepherdstown, 15,000. 

Of this aggregate of the four battles 11 00 were 
reported as missing. As the Confederates claimed 
no prisoners, except at Shepherdstown, September 
20, many of these missing ones were deserters from 



MARCHING— FIGHTING— LOSSES 141 

the substitutes and bounty men of the new regi- 
ments. Of these there were many, and in the gen- 
eral cleaning up after the battle — the first since 
leaving Washington — all those who had disappeared 
on the march or slipped away in the silence of the 
night were charged up to the loss account of An- 
tietam. 

For example, I find that the One Hundred and 
Eighteenth Pennsylvania (the Corn Exchange Regi- 
ment) reported losses of 269 at the Shepherdstown 
Ford, September 20, of which 105 were reported 
captured or missing. But on examining the muster- 
out roster of this celebrated regiment I find that the 
correct total was 211, instead of 269. The cap- 
tured and missing amounted to 70, instead of 105, 
and of these 70 twelve had deserted ^^/or^ the battle. 
And of the 66 unwounded men captured, 16 de- 
serted when afterward returned. Doubtless in other 
new regiments, in which there was no time to clean 
up their rolls on the march, many who were reported 
as "missing" had disappeared before the fighting 
commenced. 

To illustrate McClellan^s command of artillery, 
it may be interesting to compare the losses during 
the three days of the Battle of Gettysburg with those 
of the one-day battle of Antietam. 

At Antietam the Union losses were 2108 killed, 
9549 wounded, and 753 missing; total, 12,410. The 
Confederate losses were 3500 killed, 16,399 
^^ounded, 6000 captured; total, 25,899. 



142 ANTIETAM 

At Gettysburg the Union losses were 3155 
killed, 14,529 wounded, and 5365 captured; total, 
23,049. The Confederate losses were 2,592 killed, 
12,709 wounded, and 5150 captured; total, 20,451. 
See War Records, vol. xix, part i, p. 200; xxvii, 
part I, p. 193; part 2, p. 346; and Upton's "Mili- 
tary Policy," p. 382. 



XIV 

SEPTEMBER 18-I9 — AMMUNITION 

McClellan has been censured because "he did 
not attack early the next morning (the i8th) and 
complete the work." This "completing the work" is 
a very vague idea among civilians and new soldiers. 
Meade was nearly removed from command by the 
civilians because he did not "complete the work" 
in the Gettysburg campaign. Such men imagine 
that armies can be whirled around like a club, and 
that a hundred thousand men can be destroyed as 
Samson destroyed the three thousand Phillistines. 
And "trap" is another favorite word with the civilian 
war critics. In the examination of some such pom- 
pous officer, newly drawn into the service, and whom 
I recall as testifying in the winter of 1861 before 
the civilian Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
he filled their souls with admiration by describing 
how an army should be maneuvered and fought. 
There was to be no halting nor hesitation with him ; 
he would hurl his army right into the face of the 
enemy. But suppose, he was asked, the enemy 
should appear on your flank. "Then," he replied, 
"I would throw two or three divisions over there." 

143 



144 ANTIETXM 

"And if your rear were attacked?" "Then," he 
replied, "I should fling a few divisions back there." 
And against anything threatening his lines of com- 
munication he would whirl a sufficient number of 
divisions there, too, still keeping his army driving 
everything before him in his front. It was meat 
and drink to the civilians, and it is a pity that he 
was not promoted; but he wasn't; he disappeared. 

McClellan generally got out of a situation all 
there was in it. The Rebels used to complain of 
other Union commanders, and among them some 
subsequent ones in the same army, that "they didn't 
clean up as they went, as McClellan did." It is a 
curious fact that no ground that McClellan ever 
fought his army over and won, — in West Virginia, 
Maryland, or Virginia proper, — ever again fell into 
regular Confederate occupation. And the same is 
true of those greater movements which McClellan 
had previously directed as general-in-chief — New 
Orleans, North Carolina, Kentucky, Missouri, New 
Mexico; and, had all his orders been carried out at 
New Orleans by Butler, Vicksburg, Jackson, 
Meridian, and all Southern Tennessee and all Mis- 
sissippi could be included. But that was not to be; 
the Secretary of War, an excellent lawyer, filed a 
brief and took command himself. 

McClellan did not attack the next morning, for 
the best of reasons. Not only was Couch's splendid 
division absent guarding the river roads to the rear 
of McClellan's army, but he could not be withdrawn 



SEPTEMBER 18-19 145 

until Lee had been so paralyzed as to be incapable 
of using them. At midnight, after the battle, Mc- 
Clellan ordered Couch's division back ; and it reached 
his front after a hard march during the next fore- 
noon. Humphreys' very full division (of new 
troops, it is true, but it was under Humphreys ; and 
he himself bluffed the Washington authorities and 
had its worthless arms replaced) reached the field 
only after an all-day and all-night twenty-two mile 
march, at ten o'clock on the i8th. A. P. Hill's Con- 
federate division was nearly fresh, and had suffered 
but little loss when he drove back Burnside at 
nightfall, as he reported only a loss of a thousand 
out of his six brigades — less a few men left at Har- 
per's Ferry — after Burnside's whole corps and a 
half had been forced back to the hills above the 
creek. 

But the controlling factor was that, while Lee 
had all the artillery ammunition he wanted, — all he 
obtained at Harper's Ferry, a large proportion of 
General Pope's, and the remainder which had come 
with the new troops, half the way by train from 
Richmond, — McClellan had little ammunition at all 
left, and none at all for his heavy guns, of which 
he had at least seven or eight full batteries — nearly 
fifty guns in all. McClellan says "a large number 
of our heaviest and most ef^cient batteries had con- 
sumed all their ammunition on the i6th and 17th, 
and it was impossible to supply them until late the 
following day." 



146 ANTIETAM 

That this statement is not overdrawn, we may 
learn from the report of Benjamin, of Benjamin's 
Unite,d States battery of 20-pound Parrotts. After 
the firing on the i6th he replenished his caissons on 
the morning of the 17th, or tried to do so, for he 
received only forty rounds, that being all that there 
was in the Antietam supply-train. At 5 . 30 p. m., 
the 17th, he fired his last six rounds at the enemy. 
After that, he says, "by order of General Burn- 
side I fired blank cartridges to draw the enemy's 
fire from the infantry." 

McClellan was pushing the Washington authori- 
ties for heavy ammunition from i o'clock p. m. on 
the 17th; he was urging them almost constantly 
from that time on : ''Force some 20-pounder Par- 
rott ammunition through to-night, via Hagerstown 
and Chambersburg." The railroads came in with 
a hearty swing; General Ripley, chief of ordnance 
at Washington, joined in; Governor Curtin, our 
splendid War Governor, did all that man could do; 
Watson, the Assistant Secretary of War, always 
loyal and faithful, did his best; President Garrett 
of the B. & O. pushed his end along with his great- 
est vigor; and even the Secretary of War, at mid- 
night of the 17th, sent word that everything must 
be cleared ahead for this ammunition, the life-blood 
for the palpitating heart and arteries throbbing 
against the enemy at the front. 

At 12.30 A. M.^ September 18, General Ripley, 
chief of ordnance, telegraphed McClellan : "A spe- 



SEPTEMBER 18-19 147 

cial train consisting of 2500 rounds of 20-pounder 
ammunition left last night for Hagerstown, in 
charge of Lieutenant Bradford, Ordnance Depart- 
ment." Field and small arm ammunition was to go 
later, and it went a great deal later — late next day, 
in fact. Lieutenant Colonel Ramsey, in charge of 
the arsenal at Washington, sent to General Ripley, 
September 18, the statement: ''The shipment of the 
ammunition for 20-pounders went last night by way 
of Hagerstown, with Lieutenant Bradford." 

So it seems pretty well established that 2400 or 
2500 rounds of 20-pounder ammunition — 60 rounds 
for each gun — started to McClellan from Washing- 
ton by way of Baltimore, Harrisburg, and Hagers- 
town before midnight on the 17th of September. 
What became of it? William Bender Wilson, the 
special and confidential military telegrapher of the 
War Department, whose services were so conspicu- 
ous that Pennsylvania has recently placed him upon 
her honored pension roll, — a very rare distinction, — 
tells us in his little book, published in 1892, ''A Few 
Acts and Actors in the Tragedy of the Civil War,^' 
the inside history of the shipment of this vital 
20-pounder ammunition. This ammunition started 
from Washington before midnight on the 17th and, 
with all the tracks open, with absolute right of way, 
and with express speed, never reached Hagerstown 
even — still a six or eight mile wagon-haul distance 
from McClellan — until one o'clock on the afternoon 
of the 1 8th. 



148 ANTIETAM 

Wilson says it was ready at the Washington 
arsenal at i a. m., September i8. Both Colonel 
Ramsey and General Ripley said it left the arsenal 
before midnight. Wilson did all the telegraphic 
work regarding this shipment, and followed its 
course to Hagerstown. It is forty miles from 
Washington to Baltimore. **Why," he says, "it did 
not reach the Northern Central Railway at Balti- 
more until after seven o'clock that morning has 
always been a mystery." Lieutenant Bradford was 
aboard; the train consisted of an engine, tender, 
and four B. & O. cars. How and where these seven 
hours were passed will never be known. The train, 
Wilson says, left Baltimore at y.2y ; was delivered to 
the C. V. R. R. at Harrisburg at 10.20 a. m. The 
run, eighty-four miles, was made in two hours and 
fifty-five minutes. It arrived at Chambersburg at 
12, noon, and at Hagerstown at 12.42, making a 
run from Harrisburg of seventy-four miles in one 
hour and fifty-eight minutes. The running time was 
shorter, for at two stations on the C. V. ten min- 
utes each were lost from hot boxes. He says that 
when the train ran into the Hagerstown station "all 
the journal boxes on the four B. & O. cars were 
ablaze; of this fact I was an eye-witness." 

This ammunition, with the running time given 
it, should have reached Hagerstown, Mr. Wilson 
says, at 7.20 a. m., and would then have "been of 
some avail to McClellan on that day" — Septem- 
ber 18. 



SEPTEMBER 18-19 149 

Mr. Wilson had his theory, which he gives on 
page 71 of his book, and those who care to, may see 
how he accounts for that fatal seven hours' delay 
which exposed McClellan, not only to attack by Lee, 
but tO' the charge of slowness, which word (used 
instead of "preparedness") acted on the people like 
a red rag flashed in the face of an excited bull. 



XV 

lee's flight to VIRGINIA m'CLELLAN's VICTORY 

But what of this failure to attack on the i8th? 
One might understand that on the i8th itself people 
might say, "Why does he delay?" "Lee may attack, 
himself." But after the i8th, when Lee had fled in 
the night from Northern soil, with his crushed and 
shattered army, why was it important that McClel- 
lan should have attacked on the iSth? Least of all, 
why of importance to a military man? All that 
could possibly have been gained by an attack was 
gained; all that an attack could have accomplished 
was to drive Lee across the river ; after Burnside's 
failure to envelop Lee's right and cut him off from 
his ford, only a mile in his rear, and to cut off 
A. P. Hill's approach, Lee could have retreated pre- 
cisely as he did, battle or no battle, for, as I have 
quoted, the next morning, September 19th, a Union 
regiment, — the Fourth Michigan, — marched across 
the Potomac by the same ford in line of battle, and 
Lee's trains were already across the river, even be- 
fore the battle of the 17th occurred. See War 
Records, vol. xix, part i, pp. 339 and 349-350. 

It is true that we might have destroyed ten or a 
150 



LEE^S FLIGHT TO VIRGINIA 151 

dozen thousand more of Lee's men, but at a cost of 
ten or a dozen thousand, more or less, of our own 
men. That process of mere attrition is, however, a 
sort of game called swapping to a loss, in the game 
of checkers, which reputable players do not usually 
approve of. So, in 1863, Lee lay one day also, after 
the battle, in front of Gettysburg. Who now re- 
proaches Meade that he did not then attack? The 
victory was no less — it was greater, and Meade's 
reputation has not been dimmed, but has, on the con- 
trary, been brightened thereby. Great victories 
crystallize out slowly from a great battle; at first, 
sometimes, no one knows who has been successful. 
Like a hunter, struggling body to body with a griz- 
zly bear, it takes some time, even when the final 
blow has been given, for the grip to relax, for the 
jaws to fall apart, for the muscles to unclasp, and 
for the great dying hulk to fall to the ground in the 
convulsion of death. But the victory is no less 
great ; the result no less inevitable. 

If Antietam was not a great crowning victory, 
then why was Gettysburg? The forces were sub- 
stantially the same. At Gettysburg we were on the 
defensive, and Lee attacked and failed; at Antietam 
Lee was on the defensive, and McClellan attacked 
and succeeded. When it comes to losses, it is true 
that at Antietam we, the attackers, only lost one- 
half as many as we did at Gettysburg, while Lee, 
the defender, lost from 5000 to 7000 more. At 
Antietam we took six thousand prisoners from Lee. 



152 ANTIETAM 

At Gettysburg he took six thousand prisoners from 
us. In both cases Lee lost his campaign, and was 
driven back to the wasted places of Virginia; and 
in both cases he was driven from Pennsylvania, for, 
as I have shown, Lee's invasion of 1862 was an in- 
vasion of Pennsylvania just as much as was that 
of 1863. He was broken to pieces sooner in 1862, 
that was all. 

It is time that history should clearly realize the 
fact that Antietam was our greatest day of battle, 
the bloodiest battle for the South and the most glori- 
ous for the Union arms in all that wondrous four 
years' war which gave to the world new examples 
of patriotism and higher lessons of heroism. 

During the night of the i8th Lee withdrew his 
shattered and depleted remnants across the river, 
and on the morning of the 19th the invasion and the 
invaders had passed into history. 

General Charles Griffin, commanding brigade in 
Morell's division. Fifth Corps, describes this broad 
and shallow ford, on September 19, as follows: 
"By direction of Major-General Porter the Fourth 
Michigan was ordered to cross the river and take 
some guns which our artillery fire had caused to 
be abandoned. This duty was handsomely per- 
formed, the regiment, about three hundred strong, 
fordng the river [some three hundred yards in 
width, and three feet in depth] in face of the 
enemy's infantry fire." War Records, vol. xix, 
part I, p. 350. 



LEE'S FLIGHT TO VIRGINIA 153 

General Porter, in his report (page 338), says 
that parts of the One Hundred and Eighteenth 
Pennsylvania and Eighteenth and Twenty-second 
Massachusetts regiments volunteered and accom- 
panied the Fourth Michigan in the crossing and 
return. 



XVI 

SHEPHERDSTOWN SEPTEMBER 20 

A MUCH misunderstood episode is what is com- 
monly called the Shepherdstown battle, on the 20th 
of September. This, Avhile popularly described as 
a slaughter, was in reality a very creditable affair; 
and, had it not been for the abominable arms put 
into the hands of the One Hundred and Eighteenth 
Pennsylvania Regiment, and for which the Wash- 
ington authorities were alone responsible, would 
have been considered a very successful and neces- 
sary reconnaissance. Many like it were subse- 
quently pushed across the Potomac and up the val- 
ley by McClellan during his occupancy of the north 
bank of the river, between September 20 and Octo- 
ber 25, 1862. 

Immediately after Lee's flight McClellan sent 
Couch up to Williamsport and directed Pleasonton, 
with the cavalry, not to cross the Potomac "unless 
you see a splendid opportunity to inflict great dam- 
age upon the enemy without loss to yourself." And 
he was to send half his force, with two batteries, 
to the Shepherdstown front, where Fitz John Porter 
had advanced with the Fifth Corps, and with the 
Sixth Corps in support. 

154 



SHEPHERDSTOWN 155 

On the morning of the 20th General Sykes was 
ordered to send a brigade of his regulars across the 
Potomac on a reconnaisance. After coming in con- 
tact with the rear of the retreating enemy, he sent 
back for another of his regular brigades. With this 
latter brigade was sent the old First Brigade of 
Morell's division. This First Brigade was com- 
posed of six veteran regiments, which, in the Seven 
Days, had lost 900 men, with one of its regiments 
detailed away elsewhere ; and in the Pope campaign 
it had lost nearly 600 more, with another one of its 
regiments detailed away. Such regiments as the 
Twenty-second Massachusetts, First Michigan, 
Thirteenth New York, and Second Maine speak for 
themselves, and could always take care of them- 
selves. But brigaded with these veterans was the 
entirely new One Hundred and Eighteenth Penn- 
sylvania, which knew nothing of war nor of how 
to take care of itself. To crown all, this regiment 
had been supplied by the War Department, when it 
left Washington (see Colonel Gwyn's Report), 
with condemned Enfield pieces, not more than fifty 
per cent, of which could be discharged. A very 
gallant sergeant of that regiment told me that they 
had to beat down the hammers with a stone to make 
them go off, and many of the nipples were broken 
off besides. Then Colonel Prevost, the commander, 
was shot down as soon as he himself took the colors 
to the front ; and the whole regiment, we may know 
from this circumstance alone, had become balled up, 



156 ANTIETAM 

part of it being caught by the enemy while still 
in fours. They could neither advance nor retire, 
and lingered there, irresolute and confused, while 
the remainder of the brigade, under orders, safely 
retired to and across the river, with a loss of less 
than nine men to a regiment — the purpose of the 
reconnaissance having been accomplished and the 
question of the enemy's movement toward Williams- 
port settled. About two hundred men of the regi- 
ment thus left behind were gotten together and the 
enemy heroically charged, but these few were soon 
driven back, and then the only thing to do was to 
try to escape. High rocky bluffs and lime-kilns 
were in their rear along the river, and down these 
they slid and tumbled, hid under the bluffs or 
tried to ford the river; finally most of them got 
away. 

The official casualty returns of all the Union 
troops on both sides of the river for September 19 
and 20 make the losses 363 ; the losses for the One 
Hundred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania alone are 
stated at 269. Colonel Gwyn in his report, dated 
September 30, puts them at 2^"]. But an examina- 
tion of the muster-out — and corrected — roster of 
this regiment shows that the actual losses of the 
One Hundred and Eighteenth on that day were 71 
killed or died of wounds, 71 wounded and saved, 
4 wounded and captured, and 63 captured un- 
wounded, making a total of 209. As before stated, 
some of those captured doubtless allowed them- 



SHEPHERDSTOWN 157 

selves to be taken, for 16 of these deserted after 
they had been returned to their regiment. 

The actual losses of the Union troops across the 
river on September 20 were 279, for the whole of 
the eleven regiments engaged. The magnitude of 
the enemy's forces which engaged these regiments 
seems startling. A. P. Hill reports that he had in 
the battle itself, in the first line, the brigades of 
Pender, Gregg, and Thomas, consisting of 13 regi- 
ments; in the second line, the brigades of Lane, 
Archer, and Brockenbrough, consisting of 14 regi- 
ments; and (see Early's Report) in supporting line 
of battle, in rear, the brigades of Early, Hays, and 
Trimble, consisting of i6j^ regiments, making an 
opposing total of 9 brigades, comprising 43j4 regi- 
ments, besides all their artillery. The commanding 
officer was Stonewall Jackson. 

Their losses in this little engagement were 262, a 
difference, compared with the actual Union losses, 
of only 17. But they got glory out of it, for A. P. 
Hill, in his report, told those at Richmond — and 
those at Washington, also — that '^then commenced 
the most terrible slaughter that this war has yet 
witnessed. The broad surface of the Potomac was 
blue with the floating bodies of our foe. But few 
escaped to tell the tale. By their own account they 
lost 3000 men, killed and drowned, from one brig- 
ade alone. Some 200 prisoners were taken. My 
own loss was 30 killed and 231 wounded; total 261.'* 
To which are to be added Early's losses (p. 975, 



158 ANTIETAM 

War Records, vol. xix, part i, page 975), making 
the total, as stated, 262. It would have taken a life- 
preserver to float a body in the Potomac at that 
time, and A. P. Hill knew it, for with his foot-sore 
tatterdemalions he had footed it across that river 
both ways, back and forth, twice within the previous 
three days. Poor McClellan! Poor Fitz John 
Porter! Poor History! The tale went; all hands 
were willing. 



XVII 

Stuart's useless cavalry raids — the raids of 

FORREST THE UNION RAID FROM HARPER's 

FERRY, SEPTEMBER 1 4- 1 5, 1 862 

Another misfortune befell the Confederate 
army a few days later. It was "Stuart's ride 
around McClellan," also heralded as a great ''Rebel 
success." It certainly did frighten the Pennsylvania 
farmers — of whom my own folks were a part — for 
the safety of Nell and Dobbin. However, Stuart 
merely wore out his cavalry horses and had to re- 
mount his men on Pennsylvania farm-horses to es- 
cape — which broke down and went to pieces, as his 
reports show — as soon as McClellan's great move- 
ment began at the end of October. This very 
expedition paved the way for our own cavalry's 
triumphant advance, and made Stuart's resistance 
useless. The "glory," which Stuart so loved, gave 
him the added theatrical eclat to "do it again" next 
year, when "he rode around" Meade so far that he 
lost Lee entirely, and so destroyed Lee's sole oppor- 
tunity for a successful invasion or of winning the 
Battle of Gettysburg. Stuart did no more "riding 
around" after that campaign, you may be sure. He 

159 



i6o ANTIETAM 

was a brilliant soldier, but theatrical and boastful, 
and he did not understand war in its larger aspects. 
We have the type of a scientifically correct *'rid- 
ing around," or riding through, by cavalry in the 
operations of Forrest, — who was a born general, — 
and of Van Dorn, when they rode around Grant 
in the late fall of 1862 while Grant was moving 
down to Meridian, and Jackson, and Central Mis- 
sissippi, to strike Vicksburg in the rear. They 
reached and struck Holly Springs, Grant's base of 
supplies, destroyed it and tore up the railroads north 
from Jackson and north from Tallahatchie, and, as 
Grant graphically says, December 23, 1862, ''have 
cut me off from supplies, so that farther advance by 
this route is perfectly impracticable. The country 
does not afford supplies for troops and but a limited 
supply of forage." And so Grant's great army, 
then far south, was sucked back, as it were, and the 
movement was never undertaken again. 

Or, take the cavalry expedition from Harper's 
Ferry on the night of September 14 and morning 
of September 15, just before the Battle of Antietam, 
of which it was a part, and which it so powerfully 
influenced. I was one of this expedition, and can 
confirm Colonel Voss' unofficial report, for, by the 
scattering of these temporarily joined organizations, 
after Antietam, no full report was ever sent in. 
The cavalry at Harper's Ferry, on Sunday, Sep- 
tember 14, demanded that they be allowed to go out, 
first, to escape surrender, and second, to strike and 



CAVALRY RAIDS i6i 

damage the Confederates by a night attack, if pos- 
sible. There were about 1500 to 2000 cavalry, in 
four or five different organizations — the Twelfth 
Illinois cavalry. Seventh squadron Rhode Island 
cavalry (to which I was attached), the First Mary- 
land cavalry (two organizations), and the Eighth 
New York cavalry, the whole placed under com- 
mand of Colonel Voss, who says : 'The commanding 
officers of the several cavalry organizations held a 
meeting to discuss the feasibility of escape by cutting 
their way through the enemy's lines. Present at 
this meeting were Colonel Davis, commanding 
Eighth New York cavalry; Major Corliss, com- 
manding the Rhode Island Squadron; Lieutenant 
Green, commanding detachments from First Mary- 
land cavalry; myself, and my second in command, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Hasbrouck Davis. It was unani- 
mously agreed that the plan was feasible, and a com- 
mittee was appointed to obtain the consent of Col- 
onel Miles, the commander of the fort. At first 
he would not listen to such a proposition at all, de- 
nouncing it as wild and impracticable, imperiling 
the lives of the whole command; but he finally 
yielded, and assented to the expedition." 

At this time Stonewall Jackson, Ewell, and A. 
P. Hill lay across the angle in rear of Harper's 
Ferry, on the Virginia side, from the Potomac to 
the Shenandoah; General Walker, with his division 
and his heavy guns, occupied Loudon Heights, 
across the Shenandoah, looking down on Harper's 



i62 ANTIETAM 

Ferry, and the two divisions of McLaws and Ander- 
son occupied the Maryland side of the river below 
Harper's Ferry, and had crowned Maryland 
Heights with artillery; while two of McLaws' brig- 
ades, having penetrated Solomon's Gap, lay along 
the northern slopes of Maryland Heights above 
Harper's Ferry. During Sunday afternoon the 
town was under bombardment from all three posi- 
tions, and Jackson had attacked for position with 
his infantry also. 

The place surrendered at 8 . 30 next morning, but 
without the cavalry, or their 1500 trained cavalry 
horses. On Sunday, also, the battles of South 
Mountain and Crampton's Gap had been fought, 
within hearing. In the night, D. H. Hill, from 
the former, and Longstreet, from Boonsborough 
and Hagerstown, were moving down to Sharps- 
burg, and Anderson and McLaws had been driven 
by Franklin down Pleasant Valley, and were occu- 
pying both sides of Maryland Heights to the 
Potomac. 

The expedition crossed the river, commencing 
at 8.30 o'clock p. M., in darkness, by the single, 
slight, pontoon bridge in place there, turned up 
the north bank, and almost at once climbed a very 
steep log road to the summit of the mountainous 
belt between Elk Ridge and the Antietam Creek. 
One company turned, by mistake, to the right, and 
in a few moments came upon the enemy. The night 
was very dark ; the first fifteen or twenty miles was 



CAVALRY RAIDS 163 

through the mountains by rough mountain roads, 
and not till the Antietam was nearly reached did 
we emerge from this almost impassable kind of 
country. McLaws' pickets were encountered on 
this mountain road, and the Confederate camp-fires 
were smoldering everywhere ; but by a curious coin- 
cidence (see McLaws) just as the night came on 
the brigades of Kershaw and Barksdale, excepting 
one regiment, were withdrawn from the top and 
western slopes of Maryland Heights, to form a line 
of battle across Pleasant Valley, to the east, and this 
accidental evacuation left the road nearly clear for 
the cavalry. At Sharpsburg we struck the main 
Boonsborough-Shepherdstown pike, along which 
lay, by this time — which was after midnight — 
Longstreet's just-arriving forces. At the north end 
of Sharpsburg, near an old church, a strong Con- 
federate picket was encountered, which fired upon 
the closed up head of our column — Colonel Voss 
says "a. sheet of flame from at least a hundred 
rifles." The column turned up toward Hagerstown, 
and the fence-bars opening into a field on the left 
of the pike were let down, beyond Sharpsburg, and 
below Jones's cross-roads, and the route deflected 
across country to strike the Hagerstown and 
Williamsport road where it connects at right angles 
with the Williamsport and Greencastle road leading 
up into Pennsylvania. Lee describes this action 
with his advance post at Sharpsburg. 

Here on the Hagerstown pike, just before we left 



1 64 ANTIETAM 

it, occurred another coincidence. Right in front 
of us, marching do\yn from Hagerstown to Sharps- 
burg, Benning's brigade (see Benning's report) 
was approaching; we had hardly cleared the pike 
when it reached that point, and marched by, on its 
way to Sharpsburg. There it heard of the cavalry 
raid, and two of its regiments were at once turned 
back, without a halt, to pursue the cavalry and pro- 
tect Longstreet's threatened wagon trains. They 
did not overtake the cavalry, however, which 
marched more than fifty miles that night, mostly 
over abominable roads, and much of it in impene- 
trable darkness. But these two Confederate regi- 
ments, by reason of this pursuit, did not reach 
Antietam till near noon on the 17th, were then worn 
out, and could not take their place with the Second 
and Twentieth Georgia in defending the Antietam 
Creek and the bridge against Burnside, but were 
put into the general line of battle, the Confederates 
thus being able to oppose only two regiments in- 
stead of four against Burnside's attack. 

And see also General Pendleton's report (chief 
of artillery), who passed Jones' cross-roads almost 
immediately afterward from Boonsborough to Wil- 
liamsport, which fixes the route of the cavalry. 
War Records, vol. xix, part i, pp. 829-830. 

After leaving the pike, says Colonel Voss, "we 
were also guided in choosing our path by the faint 
glimmer of their bivouac fires." (See report of 
Confederate General Pendleton, War Records, vol. 



CAVALRY RAIDS 165 

xix, part i, page 830, "I immediately posted guns 
to the front and on the flank, sent messengers to 
General Toombs, understood to be at Sharpsburg, 
for a regiment or two of infantry, set to work col- 
lecting a band of armed stragglers, and sent scouts 
to the front") These stragglers were those who 
brought the information to General Pendleton, and 
through whom, in the cornfields, we had beert 
riding. These were ridden through headlong, 
as it was now moonlight, and our columns were 
closed up. We then emerged on the Hagers- 
town and Williamsport road, when a third coin- 
cidence occurred. Lee was sending his trains 
across the river, by Williamsport, and Longstreet's 
ammunition train had already left Hagerstown and 
was pushing down toward Williamsport, but had 
not yet reached the point where we now struck the 
road, in the first gray dawn of the morning. The 
rumble of many wagons came from the right and 
clouds of yellow dust were there seen rising. His 
train consisted of "85 army wagons," says Colonel 
Voss, ''each drawn by six fine mules, and loaded 
with munitions of war and provisions, and followed 
by thirty or forty head of fat young steers." In 
addition, many of the wagons had wounded men 
piled upon their loads, 175 in all, I believe, who be- 
came prisoners, including a brigadier-general. The 
train was captured entire. Our troopers went with 
it, and turned each of the wagons to the right, at the 
intersection with the Greencastle road, just below, 



1 66 ANTIETAM 

and took them on a dead run up toward Pennsyl- 
vania while the main force remained behind to head 
off and occupy the wagon guard, said to have con- 
sisted of a brigade of infantry. We soon got out 
of their reach, with some desultory firing, blew up 
with their own ammunition sixteen of the wagons 
which broke down in the rush, and entered Green- 
castle, covered with dust, and hungry, at 9 o'clock 
A. M., Monday, September 15. Next day the com- 
mand was ordered to Antietam, and posted on the 
extreme right, below Jones' cross-roads, near the 
pike. See War Records, vol. li, part i. Supple- 
mental, p. 851. Colonel Voss reported more than 
600 prisoners taken in this operation. 

Now this was a good cavalry expedition. We 
saved 1500 to 2000 good cavalry horses from fall- 
ing into Jackson's hands, we put two Confederate 
regiments out of four out of the Antietam fight, 
just where they were most needed, and we captured 
one-third, or even more, of Longstreet's whole am- 
munition train, all his reserve ammunition, and a lot 
of prisoners and beef on the hoof. This was one 
of those humorous occasions concerning which the 
President asked General McClellan, October 24: 
''Will you pardon me for asking what the horses 
of your army have done since the battle of Antietam 
that fatigues anything?" He ought to have read 
General Pleasonton's reports and dispatches; per- 
haps he had no opportunity. 

It is doubtful indeed whether they ever learned 



CAVALRY RAIDS 167 

of this expedition at all at Washington; but Long- 
street wrote, more than fifteen years after the 
event : "The service you refer to was very credita- 
ble, and gave us much inconvenience. The command 
being in retreat, and in more or less apprehension 
for its own safety, seems to have exercised more 
than usual discretion and courage." 

General John G. Walker, who was upon Long- 
street's right and held the Confederate center in the 
battle of Antietam, told me, after the war, that the 
loss to Longstreet was very serious, and that the 
exploit itself was looked upon by the Confederates 
as a most remarkable achievement. One of our 
regular army officers at Vicksburg afterward told, 
in my hearing, that he had chanced to be in Green- 
castle, Pa., on some duty at that time, and said that 
"he never was so proud of American soldiers as one 
morning in September, 1862, when he saw the 
Union cavalry coming up out of Lee's army with 
his long train of ammunition and a lot of prisoners 
in their possession." When I told him that I was 
one of that party, he came over and congratulated 
me again and again. Alas ! he was soon afterward 
himself killed, so that even he could not report it. 
McClellan alone speaks of it. Li his despatch to 
Halleck, September 23, he recommended Colonel 
B. F. Davis — dear old Grimes Davis — for promo- 
tion in the regular army, from captain to brevet- 
major, "for conspicuous conduct" on this occasion. 
He received his promotion, and the next June, at 



1 68 ANTIET'AM 

Beverly Ford, says Pleasonton's report, "the brave 
and accomplished Colonel B. F. Davis, while com- 
manding a brigade, charged at the head of his 
column into the midst of the enemy and was shot 
through the head." He would have reached high 
rank had he survived. 



XVIII 

m'clellan's plan to drive lee by a frontal 
attack up the valley 

After Lee's flight across the river, and his pre- 
cipitate sending back of the divisions of A. P. Hill 
and Early to meet a threatened advance of Mc- 
Clellan's army, McClellan bent all his energies to 
preparing to cross the Potomac directly in his front 
and attack Lee in the lower Shenandoah Valley. 
To determine whether Lee would stand for a fight 
to a finish or retire up the valley, to return when 
the pressure was relieved, it was necessary to make 
repeated reconnaissances in force, with bodies 
strong enough to fight a battle, if necessary. To attack 
Lee successfully, or to so move as to avoid the neces- 
sity of giving up the whole movement halfway, and 
turning back to follow Lee again to Pennsylvania, it 
was necessary to have either the Potomac rise so 
as to make it possible to cut him off if he crossed, or 
else to cross and attack him in front, behind the 
Potomac. A move by McClellan up east of the 
mountains at this time would inevitably have 
brought Lee north again, and with terrific conse- 
quences down at Washington. 

,169 



170 ANTIETAM 

This direct attack was the plan McClellan urged, 
and it took all the power and influence of the Gov- 
ernment to force McClellan to adopt the slower and 
less direct method of moving up east of the moun- 
tains, and so "threaten Richmond," as it was called, 
nearly two hundred miles away. They offered him 
the splendid bribe of a whole added army from 
Washington to aid him if he would adopt this plan. 
And they did much more ; they so retarded his sup- 
plies that he could not attack, defeat, and afterward 
pursue Lee up the valley, as I shall describe. Mc- 
Clellan well knew — and Lee knew it as well as Mc- 
Clellan, for his dispatches are full of it — that as 
soon as McClellan passed up east of the mountains 
Jackson would cross the still shallow Potomac into 
Pennsylvania, with Longstreet guarding the passes 
south of the Potomac, to prevent McClellan's direct 
interference. (See Lee's reports.) 

No one need doubt what would have happened 
then in Washington, in the North, and to ATcClel- 
lan and his army, and to himself personally. So 
McClellan's only attack was a direct frontal attack, 
provided Lee would stand and take it rather than 
give up the still comparatively rich lower Shenan- 
doah Valley, where his army was now feeding and 
recuperating as well as getting reinforcements, for 
the new conscription law, taking in all under forty- 
five (instead of thirty-five), had gone into effect 
just previously. 

September 26 McClellan sent a cavalry recon- 



McCLELLAN'S FRONTAL ATTACK 171 

naissance from Shepherdstown toward Martinsburg, 
and found the enemy in force two miles back of 
Shepherdstown. October 2 a reconnaissance in 
force was made to Martinsburg. The enemy were 
found in force near Bunker Hill. Pleasonton, in 
his report of October 14, details these actions; Lee, 
October 2, gives a graphic account of this fight. 
General Kimball, with his brigade, and the Sixth 
United States cavalry and two batteries, advanced 
from Harper's Ferry to Leesburg, October 3. After 
the pursuit of Stuart, and the return from his fruit- 
less raid, October 10, General Humphreys, with a 
force of 6000 infantry, 500 cavalry, and 6 pieces 
of artillery, crossed at Shepherdstown and advanced 
to Charlestown and Leetown. The Confederates 
lost 24 men in resisting this advance. At the same 
time General Hancock, with the whole of his division 
and 1500 men of other divisions, and a force of 
cavalry and artillery, advanced on Charlestown also, 
and General McClellan accompanied the force and 
directed its operations in general. October 20 a 
reconnaissance was made by General Geary, to 
Lovettsville, across from Berryville, and on the 
mountain. The Confederate army had retired to 
near Winchester. The fall rains were at hand, and 
both armies were being refitted, as best they could, 
for the next movements. So the month of October 
was passing away, with the Army of the Potomac 
starving for supplies or fed from hand to mouth, 
and clothed scarcely at all. 



172 ANTIETAM 

It was not till October i6 that Lee (see letter 
to General Loring, W. R.) gave up his idea of 
entering Pennsylvania if McClellan's movements 
gave him the opportunity. 

No army during the whole war needed supplies 
more than McClellan's army at this time, unless it 
was the army of Lee, who says, in his letter to 
President Davis, September 28: ''History records 
but few examples of a greater amount of labor and 
fighting than has been done by this army during 
the present campaign." Of course, what was true 
of Lee's army was true of McClellan's, with this 
proviso, that the next move must be an aggressive 
advance by McClellan away from his supplies and 
a defensive retirement by Lee upon his supplies. 
See Grant's statement about his pursuit of Lee in 
1865, chapter xxix, in this narrative. 



XIX 

DOCTORED SYSTEM OF SUPPLIES FOR m'CLELLAN's 

ARMY 

But McClellan's army on the upper Potomac was 
not supplied. Lee knew this very well. Lee writes, 
October i : "I think it probable that as yet Gen- 
eral McClellan is able only to procure supplies from 
day to day." Again : "I think he is yet unable to 
move, and finds difficulty in procuring provisions 
from day to day." October 9: "I do not think that 
he is able to make any move yet." October 11: 
"Notwithstanding the assertions of the Northern 
papers, I think this [McClellan's] army is not yet 
sufficiently recuperated from its campaign in Mary- 
land to make a vigorous forward move." 

The components of McClellan's army had 
marched and fought since spring over all eastern 
Virginia and over a large portion of North Caro- 
lina and Maryland. A family of school children 
would want a couple of new outfits in that time. The 
Cumberland Valley, Northern Central, and Balti- 
more and Ohio railroads delivered their trains right 
into the camps of McClellan's army, and the Chesa- 
peake and Ohio canal came up to its very doors. 

Now the most ingenious contrivance was put 
173 



174 ANTIETAM 

into operation, of which you may be sure that 
neither President Lincoln nor Secretaries Seward 
and Welles had any knowledge, whereby the whole 
country would feel that McClellan's army in the 
field was having supplies flooded in upon it in al- 
most unexampled quantities, and which yet left his 
army to sit down to a veritable Barmecide feast, in 
which everything was snatched away when almost 
within its grasp. We need not necessarily suppose 
that this was deliberately done by any high military 
officers, for, as Napoleon said, ''Generals are always 
asking for more, and never have enough." But it 
robbed McClellan's army of its supplies just the 
same. 

It will be recollected that, after President Lin- 
coln had, in a personal interview, September i, 
directed McClellan to take charge of the fortifica- 
tions and troops in Washington, when Pope's 
routed army was streaming back, Halleck, on be- 
half of the War Department, issued general orders 
No. 122, dated September 2: ''Major General 
McClellan will have command of the fortifications 
of Washington and of all the troops for the de- 
fense of the capital." This order had not been re- 
voked, and, indeed, so far as the public was con- 
cerned, was the only actual authority under which 
General McClellan was doing any work at all, 
either in Washington or elsewhere. 

How McClellan took command in the field is 
most graphically told in the Report of the Commit- 



DOCTORED SYSTEM OF SUPPLIES 175 

tee on the Conduct of the War (see General Up- 
ton's "Military Policy," p. 376). "Bragg in the 
West had begun his march toward the Ohio River, 
while Lee with renewed confidence was crossing 
into Maryland. For two or three days the Presi- 
dent consulted his advisers, but with no satisfactory 
result. At last, assuming all the responsibility, he 
took the general-in-chief with him, turned his back 
on the War Department, and, without disclosing 
his purpose, proceeded to the home of General Mc- 
Clellan, where, for the moment, he brought the 
long controversy to a close by saying: 'General, 
you will take command of the forces in the field.' " 
This command was verbal only, and was in contra- 
diction of the still standing official orders of the 
War Department of September 2. And the War 
Department then turned its back on both the Presi- 
dent and General McClellan, issued no new orders, 
and did not revoke or modify the previous one. 

As a result, everything that went to the eighty 
thousand men lying around Washington, or fear- 
lessly riding through its streets and suburbs, and 
whatever was required for all the needs of society 
and recreation, "went to McClellan's army," and 
the people everywhere believed that it actually did. 
It was on the principle by which the husband com- 
pelled his wife to take the castor-oil prescribed for 
him, since they were married and were really both 
the same. And that is why the Army of the Poto- 
mac sat down to a Barmecide feast from the 17th 



176 ANTIETAM 

of September to the 15th of October, and then for 
the next two weeks had such a flood of clothing, 
food, and suppHes poured in upon its hapless head 
that they could not be distributed, but were left in 
great piles at the depot or on the dumps when the 
army marched away from them, picking up what 
they could as they passed. 

The following statement from the Chief Quarter- 
master of the Army of the Potomac will show the 
comparative numbers of the most essential supplies 
received at the different depots of the army actually 
in the field, and which could have been of any pos- 
sible use only to the army in the field, for two dif- 
ferent periods, the first up to October 15, from Sep- 
tember I, a period of forty-two days (six weeks) ; 
the second from October 15 up to October 31, a 
period of sixteen days (two weeks and two days) : 

Aggregate, First 42 Days. Aggregate, Second 16 Days. 

Coats and jackets. 17,500 Coats and j ackets . 33,000 

Pairs stockings. . .28,000 Pairs stockings. . .95,000 

Pairs drawers 27,700 Pairs drawers 70,000 

Flannel and knit Flannel and knit 

shirts 27,000 shirts 36,000 

Trousers 16,000 Trousers 77,500 

Blankets 20 Blankets 11,000 

Boots and bootees . 19,000 Boots and bootees . 77,000 

Aggregate per day, 3220 Aggregate per day, 25,210 

But Lee's army fared a little better. He got 
5000 pairs of shoes while in Maryland; 6400 on 



DOCTORED SYSTEM OF SUPPLIES 177 

October 2. Jackson was getting 400 pairs per 
week, and Lee 8150 pairs when McClellan moved, 
while October 28, the Confederate Secretary of 
War reported nearly enough clothing to supply the 
army for the winter. 

Colonel Ingalls, the chief quartermaster, says 
of this extreme slowness in supplying McClellan: 
"From this cause we were very late in receiving 
clothing, and much of it arrived at Berlin too late 
for issue, as the army was already on its march to 
White Plains, Warrenton, etc." Fifty thousand 
suits of clothing were left at Harper's Ferry, partly 
on the cars and partly in store. 

General Meigs stated to Halleck, October 14, 
that 9254 horses had been "issued" to the Army 
of the Potomac since the battles in front of Wash- 
ington; but the report of Quartermaster Myers, 
October 31, shows that only 3813 of these came to 
McClellan's own army; while, during the same 
period 3000 had been turned over to the Quarter- 
master's Department, from that army, as worn 
out; and 1500 more were unfit and diseased. 



XX 



THE GREAT MOVEMENT ON CULPEPER 

There is no military movement in the art of war 
so fraught with danger, and almost certain disas- 
ter, as to endeavor to pass across the front of a 
vigilant and well-commanded enemy, even inferior 
in strength, by the flank. This is what McClellan 
accomplished in this great movement on Culpeper, 
in spite of all that Stonewall Jackson and Lee, with 
urgent orders, and Longstreet, attempted to pre- 
vent. Jackson, at Winchester, in the valley, faced 
McClellan's advance across his front, directly; but 
the gaps in the Blue Ridge were his only line, and 
McClellan, by a swift right-wheel in force, closed 
them, one by one, and left Jackson helpless and 
useless. As the Potomac was now, from lateness 
of season, unavailable to Lee, McClellan accepted 
the President's preference, to move up the east 
side of the mountains, and crossed the Potomac by 
pontoons, one at Berlin, just below Harper's Ferry, 
and the other at Harper's Ferry itself. 

The movement commenced October 26, — five 
weeks after the last gun was fired at Antietam, — 
by a brigade of Pleasonton's cavalry and two 

178 



MOVEMENT ON CULPEPER 179 

divisions of Burnside's Ninth Corps crossing at 
Berlin and taking the advance. Next day the other 
division of Burnside's Corps and the rest of 
Pleasonton's cavalry crossed, and the First and 
Sixth Corps followed. The Second and Fifth 
Corps crossed at Harper's Ferry, and by the 2nd 
of November the entire army was across, and 
started on the march. A day, in a heavy rain, was 
lost in supplying the army with what it could 
hastily pick up from the supplies just arriving. 
On the first of November the First Corps moved to 
Purcellsville, the Second to Woodgrove, the Fifth 
to Hillsborough, and the Sixth was marching out 
from Berlin. Pleasonton's cavalry occupied Philo- 
mont and Bloomfield. The army marched along the 
eastern slopes of the Blue Ridge, closing the gaps 
by cavalry and infantry as it advanced. The 
Twelfth Corps, with General Slocum and General 
Morell, were left to guard the north bank of the 
Potomac, from Harper's Ferry up to Sharpsburg 
and Williamsport. 

The moment McClellan started, Lee started, with 
Longstreet's corps, up the Valley through Chester 
Gap to Culpeper, leaving Jackson near Winchester, 
with orders, of October 28, to that officer : ''Should 
you find that the enemy is advancing from the 
Potomac east of those mountains, you will cross by 
either gap that will bring you in the best position to 
threaten his flank and cut ofT his communications." 
But Jackson was not able to do either. McClellan 



i8o ANTIETAM 

advanced with such rapidity that Jackson was 
totally unable to strike a blow at the enemy's com- 
munications or to penetrate the gaps, or even save 
himself; so that when later on McClellan's army 
had advanced to within less than six miles of Cul- 
peper, and was about to attack, — had begun the 
attack, in fact, — and Longstreet was forced to 
order battle with his own corps alone against Mc- 
Clellan's whole army, Jackson had been bottled up 
in the Valley, and was still back at Winchester, 125 
miles away from Longstreet, by the nearest route 
he could take to rejoin him. 

Stonewall Jackson won many laurels, and he de- 
served them all; but he never won any from Mc- 
Clellan. Against McDowell, at the First Bull Run, 
he won his badge of knighthood. In the Shenan- 
doah Valley and beyond, against many com- 
manders, his army became known as the foot- 
cavalry, and swept the valley up and down, at their 
pleasure. He played with Pope as a cat plays with 
mice, at Cedar Mountain and the Second Manassas, 
and when ready seized and shook him out of his 
skin. At Harper's Ferry against Miles — poor 
handicapped, broken-hearted, and syndicate-sacri- 
ficed Miles — he counted his loot like an Eastern 
potentate. At Fredericksburg, against Burnside, 
he held the Confederate right, and broke and baf- 
fled all who tried to touch him; and at Chancel- 
lorsville he was the incarnate spirit of victory 
against Hooker. 



MOVEMENT ON CULPEPER i8i 

But when he touched McClellan the tale was dif- 
ferent. When he, with Lee's great army of vet- 
erans to aid him, struck McClellan's right at 
Gaines' Mill, though outnumbered three to one, 
Fitz John Porter held him at bay under McClel- 
lan's eye and command until the night had fallen, 
and then marched across the Chickahominy to join 
the great movement already in progress to the 
James, leaving far fewer dead, and no wounded, 
than the Confederates left. At White Oak Swamp 
McClellan so fixed it that Jackson stood gazing, and 
could not attack at all; and when he could and did 
attack, at Malvern Hill, he sorely wished that he 
had not done so. At Antietam historians scarcely 
know of his place or his deeds ; he was merely ''one 
of those who also fought." And when McClellan, 
on his last grand movement up east of the moun- 
tains made him helpless to carry out his instruc- 
tions to aid Longstreet's out-numbered and out- 
maneuvered corps, or even to save himself, Mc- 
Clellan swiftly and securely bottled him up at Win- 
chester, while his own splendid army swept onward 
to victory. 

Lee speaks of McClellan's moving with more 
activity than usual. Colonel Ingalls says in his re- 
port: "The march from the Potomac at Berlin to 
Warrenton, where General McClellan left the 
army, was a magnificent spectacle of celerity and 
skill." 

The public has always believed, or has been taught 



1 82 ANTIETAM 

to believe, that McClellan was removed from the 
command because he was slow. He certainly was 
not slow in getting Lee out of Maryland, eighty 
miles away and eight days after he was given com- 
mand of the army; but this march of his army from 
the Potomac to Culpeper, by way of Warrenton, 
was one which has never been looked into, or com- 
pared, in the light of what has been called "the 
deadly parallel." 

On October 25 the pontoon bridge was con- 
structed at Berlin. At Harper's Ferry there was 
one across the Potomac and another was thrown 
across the mouth of the Shenandoah, to connect. 
Two of Burnside's divisions were sent over at Ber- 
lin, October 26. Burnside wrote McClellan a 
friendly letter on the morning of October 27, pro- 
testing against McClellan's rush; that the passage 
was already protected, and that he didn't want to 
move his other division during the storm, because 
the advance might be reduced by sickness by the 
time its supports got up. McClellan consented. 
October 28 McClellan wrote Lincoln that head- 
quarters were at Berlin; that Franklin's troops 
were all over; that Reynolds was massed at Berlin, 
completing his supplies of clothing "to-day and 
early to-morrow" ; and that McClellan was about 
starting for Lovettsville. 

But to learn from original sources the dis- 
positions and movements of the units of McClel- 
lan's army from this time on until, and, — at Burn- 



MOVEMENT ON CULPEPER 183 

side's request, — for a few days subsequent to, his 
removal, volume li of the Official Records must be 
consulted. Most of these papers had been removed 
from the files, or for some reason had disappeared, — 
possibly by the means v^hich Pope so fiercely 
charged against Halleck in the West (see Chap- 
ter XXXV ), so that nearly all of the most important 
of these papers could not be included at all in 
volume XIX, where they belonged. They were sub- 
sequently discovered, and have been inserted in the 
Supplemental Volume, which was not published 
until 1897, ten years after the publication of the 
volume in which they chronologically belong. By 
means of these dispatches and other papers we are 
now enabled to determine precisely what McClel- 
lan was doing each day, where he was operating, 
and what means he was employing to accomplish 
his purposes. In fact, all the significant papers will 
be found only in the Supplemental (li) Volume. 
McClellan's orders to Pleasonton, of 1.30 A. M.^ 
Sunday, October 26, are very explicit. He was to 
cross the bridge at 9 a. m., — one of Burnside's 
divisions to precede and another to follow him, — 
and was to move the same day to Lovettsville, and 
next day to Purcellsville, there to be reinforced by 
Devens. He was to leave everything behind which 
would impede his movements for the next three 
days. Next day Sturgis with his division (of the 
Ninth Corps) was ordered to move at twelve 
o'clock to Lovettsville. The same day McClellan 



i84 ANTIETAM 

orders Franklin to send Averell with a strong cav- 
alry force to make a reconnaissance toward Mar- 
tinsburg. If Franklin finds that the enemy's in- 
fantry has moved toward Winchester, then Frank- 
lin was to move to Berlin and cross at once, "pre- 
pared to march next morning." October 29 Couch's 
Corps moved from Harper's Ferry around Loudon 
Heights, and on the morning of October 30 Rey- 
nolds crossed his corps at Berlin, Meade's division 
at 7.30, Rickett's at 9, and Doubleday's at 11 
o'clock. October 29 Sturgis was ordered to move 
at daylight next morning to Purcellsville, to com- 
municate with Whipple near Hillsborough. He 
was to avoid interfering with Getty and Whipple 
marching on the same road. Getty was then, the 
same day, ordered to Bolington, and from thence to 
Wheatland, starting at daylight. Stoneman's cav- 
alry was ordered to connect with Getty. 

October 30 Fitz John Porter's Fifth Corps 
marched at i p. m. from Sharpsburg to Weverton, 
in Pleasant Valley, on the Potomac. Same day 
Franklin's Corps moved from Hagerstown by way 
of Keedysville, to Berlin. The same day the Ninth 
Corps was far in advance, with Sturgis at the inter- 
section of four roads near Hillsborough, and with 
artillery on the flank, Getty in reserve one mile in 
rear to the left, in position to support Sturgis. 
Pleasonton was holding back Jackson's advance 
from the valley, in Snicker's Gap. Next day, No- 
vember I, — on orders of the preceding day, — Rey- 



MOVEMENT ON CULPEPER 185 

nolds with the First Corps moved by the front, 
passing Burnside by the flank, and took up posi- 
tion between Snickersville and Hamilton. Couch 
with the Second Corps moved forward between 
Woodgrove and Snickersville, and Pleasanton to 
Philomont, picketing the Snickersville and Aldie 
Road, and on to Upperville. 

By these maneuvers Jackson was shut off from 
forcing Snicker's Gap and striking McClellan's 
communications opposite Berr)rv^ille and twenty 
miles up from the Potomac. 

Meantime Sykes, of the Fifth Corps, on the 
night of October 31 was ordered to march past 
Humphreys' division and camp near Couch. The 
order reads : ''While continuing to supply youi; 
command with what it needs, you will hold it in 
readiness for active operations." 

It will also be seen from these maneuvers, that a 
great army in the presence of the enemy does not 
march like a gentleman taking a morning walk or 
a commercial traveler trying to catch a train, but 
by a series of co-operative moves, like those of the 
pieces of a chessboard, the combined result being 
some important point in strategy which will call 
"check" to the enemy in one direction, then in an- 
other, and finally, if properly carried out, "check- 
mate." 

Battles, in a properly conducted war, are only 
accidents. In the great Ulm campaign of Napoleon, 
a type of the highest war, there was no battle to 



i86 ANTIETAM 

be called a battle at all, yet Napoleon captured three 
separate armies outnumbering his own, crushed 
Austria, captured her capital, and drove away a 
Russian army. Says the historian: ''Fifty-four 
thousand prisoners, 12,000 killed and wounded, 200 
guns, 80 standards, and 5000 horses were the 
trophies of the campaign." The entire French loss 
was 6000 men. 

It has been seen that by reason of the woeful 
demoralization of the three combined armies in the 
Pope campaign, McClellan had to reorganize his 
army on the march to Antietam; and so, here, he 
had to supply his army on the march to Culpeper. 
The army was now^ glutted. For the previous six 
weeks it had been starved; for the previous six 
weeks it had been naked and shoeless; now on the 
march it had more clothing and shoes than it had 
strength to carry or time to put on. 

To Pleasonton McClellan writes on the evening 
of October 31 : "Burnside will advance beyond 
Reynolds on the 2nd. I think we shall continue to 
advance from to-morrow." 

November i he orders Couch with his Second 
Corps to enter Snicker's Gap and attack and carry 
it at once. ''General F. J. Porter will follow you 
with his corps." Should there be no enemy there, 
he was to leave a force and push on, which he did. 
General Pleasonton was at the same time ordered to 
advance and seize the Manassas Gap railroad at 
Springfield. November 2 the Fifth Corps passed 



MOVEMENT ON CULPEPER 187 

the Second Corps, General Porter asking Couch to 
see that his wagons should not interfere with Por- 
ter's marching. On the night of November i 
Averell with his cavalry was ordered to leave off 
observing the Shenandoah Valley, beyond the moun- 
tains, and join Pleasonton by a forced march. 

The concerted movements then went on to close 
Ashby's Gap or fight the enemy, if he appeared 
there. November 2 Hancock held Snicker's Gap, 
and dispersed with his artillery a Confederate force 
of 5000 or 6000 that advanced to retake it. No- 
vember 3 Couch's Second and Burnside's Ninth 
corps were ordered to Upperville, the entrance to 
Ashby's Gap. November 4 Ashby's Gap was occu- 
pied in force, and held, and the cavalry was pushed 
on to Piedmont. The same day the First Corps 
was pushed forward to Rectortown, on the Manas- 
sas Gap railroad, between that point and White 
Plains. Couch still held Ashby's Gap, now in rear, 
with orders to be ready to march south. The same 
day the Sixth Corps was ordered to Upperville, and 
Burnside was ordered to push on next morning to 
Salem, beyond the Manassas Gap railroad. 

At the same time Pleasonton was ordered to move 
on with his cavalry tozvard Chester Gap and down 
the road thence to Culpeper Court House. Averell 
had had a heavy engagement with Stuart, and 
Pleasonton was asked to find out and report his 
losses. November 5 Reynolds with his First Corps 
was ordered to move next morning as far in the 



1 88 ANTIETAM 

direction of Warrenton as possible, by way of 
Salem, and Bayard's cavalry was sent in rear of 
Warrenton. Sigel — from Washington — was now 
at Thoroughfare Gap, in the Bull Run Mountains. 

On the night of November 5 Pleasonton was 
ordered to concentrate Averell's brigade with his 
own force and move upon Little Washington and 
Sperryville. Chester Gap had already been sealed, — 
the gap through Avhich Longstreet had passed 
south, — and Pleasonton's move, when supported by 
infantry, would close Thornton's Gap, the last 
available gap which Jackson could use down to 
Swift Run Gap thirty miles behind Lee and Long- 
street, who were then at Culpeper. 

November 6 McClellan occupied Warrenton in 
force, with the First Corps. Couch, with the Second 
Corps, was ordered to follow Burnside's Ninth 
Corps to Waterloo; Pleasanton to Little Washing- 
ton and Sperryville; and Franklin to White Plains, 
with Fitz John Porter moving to the same point. 
The same day Burnside was ordered to push on to 
Waterloo, occupying that place by that night with at 
least a division. Sigel was ordered forward from 
Thoroughfare Gap to New Baltimore. 

At night, November 6, Sickles was ordered to 
push a portion of his force to Warrenton Junction, 
from Manassas Junction, and repair the railroad 
as he advanced. 

Bayard's cavalry was at the same time ordered to 
turn Warrenton and reach the upper Rappahan- 



MOVEMENT ON CULPEPER 189 

nock, keeping in touch with Burnside on his right. 
November 7 Bayard was ordered to scout the Rap- 
pahannock from Waterloo to the crossing of the 
Orange and Alexandria railroad. Sumner was 
ordered to Cedar Run, Franklin to New Baltimore, 
Reynolds in front of Warrenton, Bayard across the 
Rappahannock, and Pleasonton to near Sperr3rv^ille ; 
general headquarters to move next morning to 
Warrenton. The Ninth Corps was directed to 
Miller's Ford and Orleans, with Sturgis in front, 
on the direct road to Cidpeper, zvhere Longstreet's 
corps lay. The same date Sturgis was ordered to 
Amissville and Jefferson. "The general command- 
ing," the order reads, ''relies upon your prompt and 
efficient services in this matter, as an important 
movement is impending." Pleasonton at the same 
time was notified that Sturgis was at Amissville, 
with his other brigade and two batteries, as he was 
directed to assume command of the division and 
co-operate wath Pleasonton, "so as to enable you to 
carry out your instructions. He will send the two 
regiments at Amissville to Jefferson. Should you 
need further assistance, send a despatch to me [the 
corps commander] through General Stoneman at 
Waterloo, who has thrown a bridge over the river 
at that place." 

We are now able to locate and determine the posi- 
tions, distances, and movements of all the compo- 
nents of McClellan's army, and to determine what 
McClellan's plan was with such certainty that the 



190 ANTIETAM 

record will stand against any denial, even if he 
himself had denied it. Comparing the above with 
Longstreet's paper, cited in Chapter xxiii_, it will 
be seen that Longstreet's proposition had been en- 
tirely anticipated and neutralized. 

The order relieving McClellan was issued on the 
5th, but was not received until late on Thursday, 
November 7. Burnside asked McClellan to con- 
tinue in charge for a couple of days, until he could 
get his plans perfected. McClellan did so, and ar- 
ranged the movements so that they continued even 
after McClellan had left the army, on the loth, for 
Burnside did not assume active command, or issue 
any orders, or interfere with any movements, until 
November 15. (See Halleck's report, War Records, 
vol. XXI, p. 47, and Burnside's report, p. loi.) 

Halleck says "General Burnside did not com- 
mence his movement from Warrenton until the 
15th." Burnside says that, on receipt of a telegram 
from Halleck informing him that the President ap- 
proved his plan, sent November 14, ''arrangements 
for a move were commenced by drawing in the 
extreme right to the neighborhood of Warrenton." 
The extreme right was at that time in the imme- 
diate front of Longstreet at Culpeper Court House, 
and in battle contact, so that all the movements up 
to this time, November 15, were McClellan's, and 
the coming battle had been already established — 
"The Battle of Culpeper Court House," as it would 
have been known in history. 



XXI 

CELERITY OF ARMY'S ADVANCE COMPARISON WITH 

OTHER MOVEMENTS 

Now we are in a position to consider the question 
of McClellan's celerity or slowness, on which, 
ostensibly at least, depended his retention or re- 
moval. 

This route now traversed by McClellan — for the 
first time by any Union army — was afterward tra- 
versed by other armies. For example, Meade, after 
Lee had recrossed the Potomac in July, 1863, 
passed up to Culpeper over the same route precisely ; 
and Lee, on his great flanking movement toward 
Centerville in the fall of the same year, did so like- 
wise; and Lee also, in his march to Gettysburg, 
moved over pretty nearly the same route north to 
the Potomac, except that he, with Longstreet's 
corps, entered the Shenandoah Valley from Upper- 
ville. 

The distance in an air-line from the bridges at 
Harper's Ferry and Berlin, to Culpeper Court 
House is sixty- five miles; by the roads one-third 
more. McClellan commenced his crossing of the 
Potomac by two pontoon bridges October 26. A 

191 



192 ANTIETAM 

delay of a day occurred — on Burnside's protest — on 
account of a severe storm and to supply his troops 
with delayed clothing. On November 8 Pleasonton 
v^as at Amissville, seven miles in front of Culpeper 
Court House, with his whole division, and with his 
advance near Culpeper; and, calling for the in- 
fantry, Sturgis's division of the Ninth Corps, with 
artillery, moved up to his support and attacked the 
enemy next day, November 9. 

From the report, November 6, of Colonel Alex- 
ander, Lee's chief of artillery, we find: "Long- 
street's corps in position about Culpeper. Large 
force of enemy advancing toward the Rappahan- 
nock, and continued hot skirmishing of the cavalry 
in front." 

From Pleasonton's report : "From the 7th instant 
my advance pickets were at Hazel River, within 
six miles of Culpeper." 

Sickles reports, November 8: "General Bayard 
occupies Rappahannock station." 

Willcox, with the Ninth Corps, reports same day : 
"Ferrero's brigade started across Miller's Ford at 
1.40; took with him Dickenson's battery. Two 
regiments were ordered to Amissville, and then to 
Jefiferson. Stoneman has commenced building a 
bridge at Waterloo." 

Same date, November 8, Lee writes to Jackson, 
in the valley, near Winchester: "Since my letter 
to you of the 6th the enemy has occupied Warren- 
ton and reached Amissville from Salem, via Orleans. 



CELERITY OF ARMY'S ADVANCE 193 

There is said to be, in the vicinity of Amissville, 
a large force, infantry, cavalry, and artillery. There 
is also a large force of cavalry at Jefferson, and his 
cavalry last night was at Rappahannock Station. 
Stuart has fallen back to Hazel River." 

Willcox, corps commander, writes November 9: 
"I have ordered General Sturgis to Amissville with 
his other brigade and two batteries. He is directed 
to assume command of the division and co-operate 
with you, so as to enable you to carry out your 
instructions." 

So now we have, on November 9, at least a whole 
division of infantry and one of cavalry at Amiss- 
ville, in front of Culpeper, with their own divisional 
artillery and extra batteries, and all ready to ad- 
vance at once, according to instructions already 
given. The remainder of the army was bivouacked 
within supporting distance, the most of it within 
less than a day's marching distance, and Pleas- 
onton's cavalry and part of the infantry were at 
Hazel River in front, and in contact with Long- 
street's corps. 

General Lee reports, November 10, that the 
Union advanced forces were attacked by Stuart with 
a brigade of cavalry and two regiments of infantry, 
and driven back upon Amissville ; and that at Amiss- 
ville three brigades of infantry advanced upon 
Stuart and drove him back. 

McClellan's time consumed in reaching Amiss- 
ville and the line of the Rappahannock, and pass- 



194 ANTIETAM 

ing it with his cavalry, and bridging it, with his in- 
fantry, and with his whole army prepared for bat- 
tle and within easy supporting distance, was from 
October 26, when two divisions crossed, or Novem- 
ber 2, when all were across, to November 8, or 
November 9 at the latest. The extreme time is 
therefore thirteen days, and the actual time from the 
completion of the crossing to the infantry occupa- 
tion of Amissville is seven days. 

The marching distance is ninety miles; air-line 
distance, sixty. 

Now Meade, in July, 1863, crossed by the same 
bridges, with an extra one, however, at Berlin. He 
marched over the same roads, seized and held the 
same passes in the same way, followed Longstreet 
as McClellan did, and moved by Warrenton and the 
mountain slope to Amissville and the Upper Rap- 
pahannock. 

Meade's itinerary is given in Volume xxvii of 
the Official Records. The crossing commenced 
July 17, the last corps, the Sixth and Eleventh, 
crossing July 19. All were across July 20. July 
30 the cavalry reached Amissville. 

General Howard reports, July 30 : ''Culpeper 
Court House, Brandy Station, and Stevensville be- 
ing occupied by the Rebel army; Longstreet's and 
Stuart's cavalry are said to be there; all the fords 
along the Rappahannock guarded." 

Scouts were, however, out toward the Rappahan- 
nock, and at noon, July 30, engineers reached the 



CELERITY OF ARMY'S ADVANCE 195 

river and were at the station, and a point for throw- 
ing a bridge was being selected. 

We have, therefore, the time for Meade's move- 
ment, — from July 17 to July 30 as the extreme 
time, — thirteen days, the same as McClellan; and 
actual time from completion of the crossing to the 
cavalry occupation of Amissville, and of infantry 
at the Rappahannock below, ten days, which is three 
days in excess of the time consumed by McClellan. 

In R. H. Anderson's report of the Gettysburg 
campaign he gives the itinerary of the Confederate 
march from Culpeper to Shepherdstown, which is 
much the same distance as McClellan and Meade 
covered from the Potomac to Culpeper. Anderson's 
was a simple march of his own division, with no 
maneuvering, no presence of the enemy, and no 
considerations except those of the ordinary service- 
marching of a large organization. His division left 
Culpeper June 17 and reached Shepherdstown June 
23, too late to cross it that day. This gave the 
marching time of seven days, which is precisely the 
number of days occupied by McClellan in marching, 
maneuvering, and fighting his entire army over sub- 
stantially the same ground. 

General Kershaw's actual marching time from 
the Potomac to Culpeper, on his return march from 
Gettysburg, is given in his official report as seven 
days, arriving July 24. This was the same time 
for Kershaw's brigade as for McClellan's whole 
army. 



196 ANTIETAM 

In Lee's foot-race with Meade, in October, 1863, 
for Centerville, Lee marched from Culpeper to near 
Broad Run, — commencing his march October 9 and 
ending his advance in the evening of October 14, — 
and occupied six days. Meade's parallel movement 
occupied the same time. The distance was just one- 
half that from the Potomac to Culpeper. 

In the Pope campaign Longstreet's force was 
sent from Richmond to Gordonsville by rail, Au- 
gust 16. Longstreet thence commenced his infantry 
movement against Pope. Time was everything to 
Lee, because, while Longstreet was moving from 
Richmond to Jackson's aid and against Pope, Mc- 
Clellan was moving from Richmond to Pope's aid, 
and against Lee. It was a foot-race also. But 
Longstreet did not reach Jackson's hard-pressed 
lines until three corps of the Army of the Potomac 
had by a longer foot-march reached the field — on 
August 29, a period of thirteen days. Yet by the 
route taken by Longstreet from Gordonsville the 
distance was ten miles shorter than that from the 
Potomac to Culpeper. 

And to cite a historic example, when there was no 
enemy to oppose, and beautiful broad fields and roads 
to march over, in the inspiring Southern atmosphere 
of December, and when in their enthusiasm it is 
said that the sweet potatoes even started from the 
ground — I refer to Sherman's march from Atlanta 
to the sea. Colonels Bowen and Irwin, in their 
Military Biography of that splendid soldier, say: 



CELERITY OF ARMY'S ADVANCE 197 

"Thus, on the loth of December, 1864, the enemy's 
forces, under Hardee, were driven within the im- 
mediate defenses of Savannah, and Sherman's en- 
tire army, having leisurely marched over three hun- 
dred miles in twenty-four days with trifling oppo- 
sition through the whole of the enemy's country, 
was massed in front of the city." 

Sherman's march may have been leisurely, but a 
great many people, including Grant and Lincoln, 
were "almighty anxious to know where he was at." 
Had Sherman kept up the gait that McClellan did, 
on the march when the latter was removed for 
"slowness," Grant and Lincoln and all the rest of 
us would have heard from Sherman, at Savannah, 
a number of days before the loth of December; 
for a little calculation will show that the Army of 
the Potomac covered more ground per day than 
the men who proudly nicknamed themselves "Sher- 
man's Bummers" ; of whom, for a couple of years, 
I myself was one. 

In the Vicksburg campaign of 1863 Sherman's 
force marched on Jackson, Miss., and assaulted and 
captured the place. Celerity here also was vital, in 
view of separating Johnston from Pemberton. Sher- 
man marched from Grand Gulf (see Grant's 
"Memoirs") May 6, and reached the works in 
front of Jackson May 14, a period of nine days. 
The marching distance was len miles shorter than 
from the Potomac to the Rappahannock, where Mc- 
Clellan reached the river. 



198 ANTIETAM 

Another historic case of rapid marching is cited 
in Major Adams' ''Great Campaigns" (from 1796), 
a work which no miHtary student can afford to over- 
look. In the Friedland campaign of 1807, Benning- 
sen attempted to surprise Napoleon's left (Berna- 
dotte) by rapid marching. After marching seventy 
miles in ten days, he failed in his attempt, and 
halted for the following three days on account of 
fatigue and want of food. Bernadotte did not know 
that such a movement was even under way. 

On the pursuit of Lee's army from Petersburg 
to Appomattox, the pursuit was under full head- 
way on the morning of April 3, and, considering 
Sheridan's move from Five Forks, earlier. The 
surrender took place on the forenoon of the 9th, 
giving a marching time of a little less than seven 
days. The distance from Five Forks to Appomat- 
tox, where Sheridan passed Lee and closed on his 
front, is almost precisely the distance from Harper's 
Ferry, or Berlin, to Culpeper. And yet the speed 
was so great that Grant's forces had long out- 
marched his wagons, and even his ammunition, and 
Grant, in one of his conversations with John Rus- 
sell Young (which Grant himself revised before 
publication) said : "My pursuit of Lee was hazard- 
ous. I was in a position of extreme difficulty. You 
see, I was marching away from my supplies, while 
Lee was falling back on his supplies. If Lee had 
continued his flight another day I should have had 
to abandon the pursuit, fall back on Danville, build 



CELERITY OF ARMY'S ADVANCE 199 

the railroad, and feed my army. So far as sup- 
plies were concerned, I was almost at my last gasp 
when the surrender took place." (See "Around the 
World with General Grant," vol. ii, page 460.) 

In Adams' "Great Campaigns," p. 606, criticizing 
. the projected march, from Dijou to Blesme, of 
Bourbaki, with an army of nearly 200,000 men, to 
cut the transportations of the Germans, then be- 
sieging Paris, and with no enemy along the line, 
the distance being 94 miles, he gives for this urgent 
advance a marching rate of 8^ miles per day. This 
chapter, and also "Comments on Bourbaki's Opera- 
tions," explains Grant's anxiety, in the Appomat- 
tox campaign, to settle his advance there without 
penetrating further southwest. 

Such examples can be multiplied, from the Offi- 
cial Records, to any extent desired. In fact, I took 
the daily itinerary of a three years' regiment in the 
Army of the Potomac, which entered the service 
early in 1861, and added up all its marches under 
different army commanders and divided the total for 
each commander by the number of days of service, 
and used the official intineraries of other organiza- 
tions from 1864 to the end of the war to complete 
the record, and compared with them the correspond- 
ing itineraries of the troops of McClellan and other 
commanders, and the results were so startling to me 
that I refrain from giving them. Suffice it to say 
that, after counting as a whole McClellan's entire 
period of command in Eastern Virginia and Mary- 



200 ANTIETAM 

land, — i^yi months, — and including in the count 
all his periods of rest, march, recuperation, organi- 
zation, and reorganization, his average daily army 
march for all these months taken together was in 
excess of that of any other army commander East 
or West for equal periods. He fought more pitched 
battles, won more victories, inflicted greater losses 
on the enemy, and at less cost to his own army, for 
the same period than any other commanding gen- 
eral during the whole four years from April, 1861, 
to the end of the war. Any one can verify these 
facts who chooses to take the pains ; which, with con- 
siderable labor and a careful study and grouping 
of the intineraries of all our armies and all separate 
parts of those armies, I have done, from the Official 
War Records. 



XXII 

LONGSTREET ISOLATED JACKSON CUT OFF LEE 

BEWILDERED THE CAMPAIGN WON THE 

ARMIES FACE TO FACE AT CULPEPER, PROPOR- 
TION 3 TO I 

We are now in a position to take a broad view 
of the final epoch of the Maryland campaign of 
1862, that is, of the movement from the Potomac 
along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge to Sperry- 
ville and Culpeper, and also along the Orange and 
Alexander railroad to the upper Rappahannock. 
This whole movement forced Longstreet back to 
Culpeper Court House and cut off Jackson, far be- 
hind at Winchester, from entering the Gaps, and 
compelled him to rejoin Longstreet, if at all, by a 
movement from Winchester up the Shenandoah 
Valley to Swift Run Gap, and thence back to Cul- 
peper, an air-line distance of 100 miles' and a march- 
ing distance of about 125 or 130. We shall find 
that at the culmination, when Longstreet issued his 
order of battle on the morning of November 16, 
Longstreet was at Culpeper and Jackson at Win- 
chester, with McClellan's army squarely interposed 
between the two, and within infantry and artillery 



202 ANTIETAM 

firing-contact with Longstreet. The battle had, in 
fact, actually commenced. 

The forces on the opposite sides (see Volume 
XXI, Official War Records) were at this moment, 
just before Burnside took active command, as fol- 
lows : 

McClellan's army consisted of 268 regiments of 
infantry, 18 regiments of cavalry, and 73 batteries 
of artillery, the largest force by far which McClel- 
lan ever carried into battle, and which a few weeks 
afterward Burnside broke and shattered to pieces 
against the heights of Fredericksburg. 

Against this force of McClellan's stood Long- 
street's corps, including all the forces with him, 
which consisted of 89^ regiments of infantry, 15 
regiments of cavalry, and 45 batteries, which latter 
comprised also all the reserve artillery of Lee's 
army. 

McClellan's preponderance was in the proportion 
of nearly or quite 3 to i. 

Jackson's force, near Winchester, and entirely cut 
off and eliminated by McClellan's swift advance, 
and the holding of all the mountain passes by heavy 
bodies of infantry and artillery, consisted of 91 
regiments of infantry, 3 regiments and 2 battalions 
of cavalry, and 23 batteries, comprising about one- 
half of the whole Army of Northern Virginia. 
This latter, in all, counted 180 regiments of in- 
fantry, 19 regiments of cavalry, and 68 batteries of 
artillery. For the first time McClellan's artillery 



LONGSTREET ISOLATED 203 

exceeded all that of Lee, while previously it had 
always been very much less than Lee's. The pro- 
portion of all McClellan's organizations, regiments 
and batteries, to all of Lee's, including both the di- 
vided halves, was a little less than 2 to i. 

And this was the proportion, also, when Burn- 
side fought the battle of Fredericksburg. At Chan- 
cellorsville Lee had one-third less. 

McClellan's advance did what had never been 
done before, so far as the official records reveal, 
with reference to Lee himself. It paralyzed and 
bewildered him, and his official despatches show this 
bewilderment so clearly that no amount of expla- 
nation can affect the facts disclosed. 

Within forty-eight hours, from November 7, 
Lee issued four different written orders for action 
against McClellan, all incompatible with one an- 
other, and not one capable of being carried out, and 
not one of which was even attempted to be carried 
out; while the final order of battle, early on the i6th, 
was issued by Longstreet alone, and was contrary 
to all the other orders. 

November 7 Lee wrote Stuart: ''Should we be 
pressed back from here [Culpeper Court House], 
my design is to retire through Madison, while Jack- 
son ascends the valley, so that a junction can be 
made through Swift Run Gap, and we hold our- 
selves on the enemy's right flank if he attempts to 
proceed southward." 

November 8 he writes to Jackson: "It is more 



204 ANTIETAM 

necessary than ever that you should move up the 
valley, since Swift Run Gap is now the nearest one 
open to you, unless the road through Fisher's is 
practicable." 

November 9 he writes to Jackson : "The enemy's 
object may be to seize upon Strasburg with his main 
force, to intercept your ascent of the valley. This 
would oblige you to cross into the Lost River Val- 
ley [into the Alleghanies], or west of it, unless you 
could force a passage through the Blue Ridge ; hence 
my anxiety for your safety. If you can prevent 
such a movement of the enemy, and operate strongly 
upon his flank and rear through the gaps of the 
Blue Ridge, you would certainly, in my opinion, 
effect the object you propose. A demonstration of 
crossing into Maryland would serve the same pur- 
pose, and might call him back to the Potomac." 

November 9, at night, he writes to Stuart : "Can 
you ascertain what he is doing in your front; if he is 
stationary, or what he is about? If he moves into 
the valley, I will advance Longstreet's corps to cut 
off his communication with the railroad." 

November 10 he writes to Jackson : "As soon as 
you think that your presence in that portion of the 
valley will not retard or prevent the advance of the 
enemy east of the Blue Ridge, I wish you to ad- 
vance with all celerity to unite with Longstreet's 
corps." 

Jackson was still at the same place, however, even 
a week later. 



LONGSTREET ISOLATED 205 

The same day, November 10, Lee writes the War 
Department : ''Should the enemy descend into the 
valley, General Longstreet will attack his rear and 
cut off his communications. The enemy is, appar- 
ently, so strong in numbers that I think it preferable 
to attempt to baffle his designs by maneuvering 
rather than to resist his advance by main force." 

As a result of all these orders, and all these 
maneuverings, nothing at all was done. Jackson's 
half of Lee's army lay idle at Winchester, and 
Longstreet's half, at Culpeper, confronted McClel- 
lan, who was more than three times as strong as 
Longstreet, and twice as strong as Lee's whole army 
had it been united. 

Meantime, however, the inspiring spirit of the 
whole had passed away. McClellan was removed 
from the command and Burnside put in his stead, 
and the movements instituted by McClellan and car- 
ried on at Burnside's request even after McClellan's 
removal, had spent their force. The army and, 
visibly to Lee, its cavalry, infantry, and artillery, 
opposite Longstreet at Culpeper, became gradually 
quiescent. Lee was more bewildered than ever. 
Stuart, on the loth, was ordered to penetrate this 
mysterious screen, and he drove back our advance, 
but was met by the Ninth Corps and forced to retire, 
and the mystery in front became deeper than ever. 

During this interval Burnside had evolved his 
plan: to abandon Lee and Longstreet and Jackson 
to their own devices, and march, by the left flank. 



2o6 ANTIETAM 

thirty miles away to Falmouth. Here the river, so 
little where he now was, had become a mighty 
stream, with Nature's own fortifications beyond, 
far stronger defenses than man could build, — de- 
fenses which frowned from their impregnable 
heights over the town and over the deep and wide 
Rappahannock, and confronted the heights at Fal- 
mouth on the northern bank, too far away from 
the Confederate lines to be dangerous to the defend- 
ing Confederate army. 

And this plan was carried by Halleck to Wash- 
ington on the 9th, and there the wiseacres sat in 
judgment upon it, and Burnside waited. November 
13 Burnside could not wait longer, and urged Hal- 
leck, if possible, to send him a definite answer. And 
then, November 14, Halleck sent him an approval, in 
the name of the President ; but given with such Hal- 
leckian conditions that, if Burnside should succeed, 
the credit would belong to Halleck, and if he should 
fail the blame would fall upon Burnside. All the 
official reports establish this. 

Then on the 15th, and not till then, the new com- 
mander of the army waked up, and ordered the re- 
tirement to Fredericksburg. An unwonted activity 
prevailed along Longstreet's front; our troops of 
all arms were in motion. The military eye and mind 
of Lee and Longstreet could not conceive that an 
advantage such as Napoleon at Boulogne had 
worked many months to achieve could be thrown 
away merely to discredit its author, and the crisis 



LONGSTREET ISOLATED 207 

of the campaign was felt to be upon them. There 
was now to be no movement to Swift Run Gap to 
join Jacl'cson and "hang on McClellan's flank," if 
he tried to move south; there was to be no march of 
Jackson up the valley to unite before the battle with 
Longstreet; there was to be no falling upon Mc- 
Clellan's rear, to cut his communications with the 
railroad ; there was to be no advance of Jackson into 
Maryland to call back McClellan to the Potomac. 

There was to be a battle then and there, at Cul- 
peper Court House, on the i6th day of November, 
to be known to history as the ''Battle of Culpeper," 
in which McClellan's whole army, three to one, was 
to be hurled straight forward upon one-half of Lee's 
army. The other half was 125 miles in the rear 
across a sealed-up range of mountains, with Mc- 
Clellan squarely between, so that McClellan, after 
Longstreet had been disposed of and his beaten 
fragments pursued and scattered or destroyed by an 
overwhelming force of one-half McClellan's army, 
could with the remaining half of his men himself 
turn back through the coveted gaps south of Jack- 
son, close in upon him, and defeat and destroy his 
other half of Lee's army, or drive it, as Lee had 
said, across the western mountains into 'Tost River 
Valley, or west of it,^ and then turn to follow up 
the debris of Longstreet. Longstreet must stand 
fast and fight where he was, or else lose either 
Richmond, or Jackson, or both, and, in any case 
his own army, as an army. At this moment Long- 



2o8 ANTIETAM 

street's corps lay in front of Culpeper Court House. 
The Army of the Potomac stretched from Hazel 
River, four miles in front of Longstreet's position 
(commencing several miles west, with the Ninth 
Corps in front of Thornton's Gap), and extending 
in a continuous series of positions to the front of 
Warrenton — with our left near the Rappahannock 
River, at the Station. Our entire army was concen- 
trated — the two projecting flanks excepted, and they 
connected — along an air-line of fiftten miles. Our 
right covered, by a short extension, Milan's and 
Swift Run Gaps, with Madison Court House mid- 
way, and in front, on the Rapidan. Jackson's Con- 
federate corps lay to the north, distant 50 miles in 
an air-line, across the mountains, and by the gaps a 
march of 125 miles. 



XXIII 



LONGSTREET^S BATTLE-ORDER BURNSIDE's RE- 
TREAT — lee's great relief 



So on November i6, on or before the morning 
dawn, we may be sure, Longstreet issued his battle- 
order for that day, to be found only in Volume 
Li^ part 2, pp. 645-6, Official War Records. 

General Orders Headquarters First Army Corps, 

No. 49. November 16, 1862. 

The troops of this command will be held in readiness for 
battle upon a moment's notice. Commanders will see that pro- 
visions, ammunition, and transportation are at hand and in 
such quantities as may be wanted to meet their necessities. 
The Commanding General relies upon the valor and patriotism 
of these well-tried troops to sustain them in the struggles 
that they may be called upon to encounter. Officers, be cool 
and take care of your men. Soldiers, remain steady in your 
ranks, take good aim, and obey the orders of your officers. 
Observe these injunctions, and your general will be responsi- 
ble for the issue. 

By command of Lieutenant-General Longstreet. 

I find no similar order from Longstreet during the 
whole course of the war; it was like a last will and 
testament. 

209 



210 ANTIETAM 

General Pleasonton was entirely right when he 
wrote back, from Corbin's Cross-roads, to his corps 
commander, November lo: "Jackson has no cav- 
alry except some few for scouts. Leave a strong 
force to face Jackson, covering Warrenton and its 
junction, with a corps of observation at Barbee's; 
push your forces down to Culpeper vigorously, in- 
clining to the right, to take in Woodville and Madi- 
son. Give us ten days more of good weather and 
wind up the campaign in a blaze of glory/' 

Yes, these were the ''carrying out of his instruc- 
tions" in the Ninth Corps commander's letter of 
November 9; the infantry of Sturgis, and Stone- 
man's cavalry, and the artillery had come on, on 
that same day, to Amissville and Jefferson ; Pleason- 
ton was extended away over west to Sperryv^ille on 
the foot-hills of the Blue Ridge. He was carrying 
out McClellan's instructions. Poor man! He knew, 
to his heart's sorrow, that McClellan was lost to the 
army; but he did not know, he could not believe, 
that everything else was for years, in that day, lost 
with McClellan. 

By referring to map i, sheet lxxiv^ of the atlas 
accompanying the Official War Records, the posi- 
tions of the respective armies can be clearly under- 
stood. The successive gaps in the Blue Ridge from 
the Potomac to far beyond Swift Run Gap are all 
laid down, and it will be seen that Snicker's, Ash- 
by's, Manassas, Thoroughfare, Chester, and Thorn- 
ton's gaps were all closed and sealed by McClellan, 



LONGSTREET'S BATTLE-ORDER 211 

while Longstreet, at Culpeper Court House, was 
more than twenty miles southeast of the nearest of 
them in the flat country between the Rapidan and 
the Rappahannock. The intervening country was 
covered by McClellan's army, so that for either 
Longstreet or Jackson to reach the other the entire 
Army of the Potomac must first have been attacked 
and defeated by either half of Lee's army. 

Of Pleasonton's ability to perceive and understand 
a military situation I cite the following opinion 
of General Sickles, in the North American Review 
for March, 1891 : 

"Pleasonton, chief of the cavalry corps, made his 
arm superior to that of the enemy in every equal 
combat Besides, he was gifted with rare military 
intuitions. He sent Buford, with our strongest cav- 
alry division, to Gettysburg when nobody had di- 
vined the place chosen by Lee to concentrate his 
army for the battle. He sent Gregg to our right 
to encounter Stuart and thwart his movement to our 
rear; on the third day, the day of Pickett's assault, 
he sent Kilpatrick on our left, where the enemy at- 
tempted a similar diversion, but was defeated." 

Regarding McClellan's plans and operations, we 
have a powerful corroboration from the principal 
Confederate actor in the events described, except 
that when he made his statement he was not aware 
that McClellan's plans and operations, at Burnside's 
request, were being fully carried out for some days 
after McClellan's removal from command, no active 



212 ANTIETAM 

part having been taken by Bumside until consent 
to act in another direction had been received from 
Washington, November 14-15. 

General Longstreet, in his article on the Battle 
of Fredericksburg (''Battles and Leaders," vol. iii, 
p. 84; Century Company), written long before the 
publication of the Supplemental Volume li^ of the 
War Records, which first published the facts, cor- 
rectly states what McClellan — at the time of his 
removal — had purposed to do. Longstreet never 
knew that McClellan's plans had been already prac- 
tically accomplished before Burnside took command, 
and that the gaps which Longstreet refers to as 
possibly open, were by November 9 hermetically 
sealed by the Ninth Corps and all McClellan's cav- 
alry, under Pleasonton, down past Hazel River, and 
well on to Madison Court House and beyond. 

The following is the extract from Longstreet's 
article above referred to : 

''Burnside made a mistake from the first. He 
should have gone from Warrenton to Chester Gap. 
He might then have held Jackson and fought me, 
or have held me and fought Jackson, thus taking 
us in detail. The doubt about the matter was 
whether or not he could have caught me in that 
trap before we could concentrate. At any rate, that 
was the only move on the board that could have 
benefited him at the time he was assigned to the 
command of the Army of the Potomac. By inter- 
posing between the corps of Lee's army he would 



LONGSTREET'S BATTLE-ORDER 213 

have secured strong ground and advantage of posi- 
tion. 

"With skill equal to the occasion he should have 
had success. 

''This was the move about which we felt serious 
apprehension, and we were occupying our minds 
with plans to meet it when the move toward Fred- 
ericksburg was reported. General McClellan, in his 
report of August 4, 1863, speaks of this move as 
that upon which he was studying when the order for 
Burnside's assignment to command reached him." 

There was no battle; it turned out to be a huge 
but very pleasant joke on Longstreet, and he found 
it out as soon as his battle-order was sent out ; and 
when he and Lee saw the great Army of the Poto- 
mac marching off as if in retreat, the snappy orders 
came from Lee like whip-cracks, to McLaws, and 
Ransom, and Anderson, and Pickett, and Alexan- 
der, who went gaily trooping away, on interior 
lines, to Fredericksburg, and Jackson, with McClel- 
lan and all his troublesome attentions out of the 
way, was making those long-legged tracks of his 
up the valley, not away up to Swift Run Gap this 
time, but anywhere, all the gaps open, to join Long- 
street and have a good time. (See orders, in the 
War Records, to each of the above commanders.) 

McClellan left the army. General Emory Upton, 
then commanding a volunteer regiment, tells of the 
army's "demonstrations and applause," and how he 
and his own regiment stood, by his orders, cold and 



214 ANTIETAM 

silent because he was the son of an Abolitionist, 
and an Abolitionist himself. But when afterward 
confronted with the true facts he learned to know 
McClellan ; he vindicated him ; and his later and bet- 
ter judgment found vent: ''Twice I destroyed all 
that I had finished, because it fell short of carrying 
conviction. It may astonish you that I now regard 
McClellan in his military character as a much abused 
man"; that ''the differences of opinion between him 
and the Administration would probably never have 
arisen but for the interference of Stanton. He was 
at the bottom of all the disasters of the year 1862." 
(See General Michie's biography and letters of 
Upton.) 



XXIV 

WAR DEPARTMENT STRATEGY^ CONFEDERATE AND 

UNION 

To show the almost irresistible power of the 
malific civilian cabal at Washington, to which Lin- 
coln himself was subjected, I cite an incident show- 
ing General Meade's extreme peril many months 
even after the battle of Gettysburg, from which peril 
Lincoln was able to save him, and probably the 
army, and the cause of the Union, only by strategy, 
by fighting fire with fire. Lincoln had once half- 
jestingly said : "You must understand that I have 
very little influence with this Administration" ; and 
again, without any jest, had cried: "I am so borne 
upon." And indeed, in the extremity of his em- 
barrassment, had offered to resign the Presidency 
to obtain relief. The incident I quote is 
taken from the authorized biography of Zachariah 
Chandler, a senator who was all-powerful in the 
cabal to which I refer, and the origin of which I 
have referred to elsewhere in this volume. 

''At the War Department Mr. Chandler was as well 
known (and was reputed to be scarcely less power- 
ful than) as the Secretary himself." See "The 

215 



2i6 ANTIETAM 

Detroit Post and Tribune [his own newspaper] 
Biography, 1880." 

'The Committee on the Conduct of the War did 
not beHeve that the selection of General Meade for 
the command of the Army of the Potomac was a 
fortunate one. . . . It is a fact that they 
recommended the removal of General Meade from 
the command, and the reinstatement of Hooker. 
On the 4th of March, 1864, Mr. Chandler and Mr. 
Wade called upon the President, and told him that 
they believed it to be their duty, impressed as they 
were with the testimony the Committee had taken, 
to lay a copy of it before him, and in behalf of the 
army and the country demand the removal of Gen- 
eral Meade and the appointment of some one more 
competent to command. The President asked what 
general they could recommend. They said that for 
themselves they would be content with General 
Hooker, believing him to be competent. 

"They said that Congress had appointed the Com- 
mittee to watch the conduct of the war ; and unless 
the state of things should be soon changed, it would 
become their duty to make the testimony public 
which they had taken, with such comments as the 
circumstances of the case seemed to require." (See 
Biography of Senator Chandler, page 245.) 

It will be seen that this threat is almost verbatim 
the threat which Pope made to Halleck on October 
30, 1862, and which was sufficiently powerful to 
cause the removal of McClellan as soon as the letter 



WAR DEPARTMENT STRATEGY 217 

reached Washington, November 4-5, and while our 
final victory was already in hand, and which re- 
moval gave us two more years of war besides count- 
less treasure and hundreds of thousands of brave 
men lost. (See statement of General Upton.) 

Lincoln had yielded then, but he had had fifteen 
months' experience since, and while, even now, he 
was not strong enough to force the cabal, he was 
strong or skillful enough to force their hand. 

The Chandler biography says : ''Meade was not 
removed, but General Grant was, within a week, 
given command as general-in-chief." 

Grant was too strong for the cabal, and for Stan- 
ton and Halleck. Meade was safe. 

It was not only in the Union army that this inter- 
ference of the Secretay of War appeared. In the 
Confederate army it manifested itself. It is true 
in only a modified form, for it came by indirect 
authority of the President, but it could not be tol- 
erated in any form, and it was instantly seized and 
crushed and a barrier erected to make its repetition 
impossible ever afterward. Well would it have 
been for the cause of the Union and the success of 
its armies had the like treatment been accorded a 
usurping Secretary here, for license grows by what 
it feeds upon, and it is but a step from the exercise 
of delegated authority to the assumption of the 
authority itself. 

January 31, 1862, just before the depletion and 
disorganization of McClellan's army began, and just 



2i8 ANTIETAM 

when Jefferson Davis had written, "Events have 
cast on our arms and hopes the gloomiest shadows/' 
Stonewall Jackson wrote to the Secretary of War 
that the Secretary's order requiring him to direct 
General Loring to return with his command to Win- 
chester immediately had been received and promptly 
complied with. Jackson then adds: ''With such 
interference in my command I cannot expect to be 
of much service in the field, and accordingly respect- 
fully request to be ordered to report for duty to the 
superintendent of the Virginia Military Institute at 
Lexington. Should this application not be granted, 
I respectfully request that the President will accept 
my resignation from the army." 

This communication of Jackson's was endorsed 
by General J. E. Johnston : "Respectfully forwarded 
with great regret. I don't know how the loss of this 
officer can be supplied." 

Secretary Benjamin then wrote to Johnston, stat- 
ing substantially the excuse made to McClellan for 
ordering away his First Corps and Blenker's divi- 
sion while the movement was in progress : that 
Loring's command had been ordered away because 
he and Davis had news of some contemplated move- 
ment up at Winchester by McClellan, and volun- 
teering, in true Stantonesque language, the opinion 
that Jackson had scattered his forces "quite too far 
apart for safety," but concluded by saying that these 
suggestions were merely his own opinions, "the 
decision being left to yourself." 



WAR DEPARTMENT STRATEGY 219 

General Johnston begged Jackson to reconsider. 
"Under ordinary circumstances," he said, "a due 
sense of one's own dignity, as well as care for pro- 
fessional character and official rights, would de- 
mand such a course as yours; but the character of 
this war, the great energy exhibited by the Govern- 
ment of the United States, the danger in which our 
very existence as an independent people lies, requires 
sacrifices from us all who have been educated as 
soldiers." 

The Governor of Virginia wrote Jackson an im- 
passioned appeal. Johnston wrote the President 
earnestly to prevent such a catastrophe from oc- 
curring again, saying: "On a former occasion I 
ventured to appeal to your Excellency against such 
exercise of military command by the Secretary of 
War. Permit me now to suggest the separation of 
the Valley District from my command, on the 
ground that it is necessary for the public interest. 
A collision of the authority of the honorable Secre- 
tary of War with mine might occur at a critical 
moment. In such an event disaster would he in- 
evitable. The responsibility of the command has 
been imposed upon me. Your Excellency's known 
sense of justice will not hold me to that responsi- 
bility while the corresponding control is not in my 
hands. . . . What I propose is necessary to 
the safety of our troops and cause." 

Jackson authorized the Governor to withdraw his 
resignation, stating that his views remained un- 



220 ANTIETAM 

changed, and adding: "If the Secretary persists in 
the ruinous poHcy complained of, I feel no officer 
can serve his country better than by making his 
strongest possible protest against it, which, in my 
opinion, is done by tendering his resignation, rather 
than be a willful instrument in prosecuting the war 
upon a ruinous principle." 

The Secretary's wings were clipped. On March 
13 Executive General Orders were issued: "Gen- 
eral Robert E. Lee is assigned to duty at the seat 
of government; and, under the direction of the 
President, is charged with the conduct of military 
operations in the armies of the Confederacy." 

General Huger afterward complained that the 
Secretary of War was nothing but a clerk, so far 
as troops were concerned. 



XXV 

m'clellan's strategy for turning the confed- 
erate POSITIONS ON THE PENINSULA MADE 
IMPOSSIBLE BY INTERFERENCE FROM WASHING- 
TON 

This case, on a small scale, was precisely what 
befell McClellan on a large scale, when Blenker's 
division and then the First Army Corps were taken 
away from him at a time when most of his army, 
and the commanding general himself, had already 
landed on the Peninsula and the First Corps was 
absolutely necessary, and its cooperating destination 
and movements had been prepared and ordered. 
But the stake was too great for McClellan to have 
resigned ; a hundred thousand of his men at Wash- 
ington and on the Peninsula, and the fate of the 
nation, depended on his continuance in command, 
even as best he could, for the people at Washing- 
ton were children in the art of war. 

When McClellan's army, in March, 1862, was 
drawn back from the Warrenton front and rapidly 
moved by water to its new base at Fort Monroe 
and the Peninsula, he left more than 55,000 men, 
the heavy artillery, and the works on which he had 

221 



222 ANTIETAM 

expended the labor of thousands of contrabands for 
months. 

At a council of all the corps commanders held 
March 13, the Peninsula movement was unani- 
mously recommended, provided the Mcrrimac 
(Rebel ironclad) could be neutralized, which was 
most effectually done by the Monitor, which Mc- 
Clellan rushed forward. (See War Records.) 

Heintzleman, Keyes, and McDowell agreed that, 
besides the garrisoned works, a force of 25,000 
would suffice to render Washington secure ; Sumner 
put it at 40,000. McClellan left more than 50,000, 
besides, of course, those afterward detained. 

The movement commenced. Hamilton, Fitz John 
Porter, Heintzleman, Couch, the regulars and cav- 
alry, had landed on the Peninsula. Then, March 
31, Stanton notified McClellan: "The President 
directs that Blenker's division be sent forward to 
Harper's Ferry, there to await orders, instead of 
being sent to Fort Monroe." General Sumner 
wrote, March 31, from Warrenton Junction, that 
his two principal divisions had been removed. Then, 
April 4, came the crowning blow. "The President, 
deeming the force to be left in front of Wash- 
ington insufficient to assure its safety, has directed 
that McDowell's force [the First Corps] should be 
detached from the forces operating under your im- 
mediate direction." Did these men know what they 
were doing? 

Magruder had been fortifying across the Penin- 



McCLELLAN'S STRATEGY, ETC. 223 

sula, on the Yorktown line, for many months, em- 
ploying all the negroes he could hire or impress, 
from one thousand to two thousand in number. 
McClellan's main move must be against these works, 
because the James River was still in possession of 
the Confederates, and the heavy forts at Yorktown, 
and at Gloucester immediately opposite, — only at 
short cannon range apart, — forbade the passage 
of wooden transports up the York River while 
Gloucester was in possession of the enemy. (See 
Magruder's elaborate dispatches in the War 
Records. ) 

McClellan's plan was to break this blockade by 
using McDowell's corps in a great turning move- 
ment on the north side of the York River. It was 
fashionable to sneer in those days at fortifications; 
and, indeed, the only possible means of even keep- 
ing the public quiet after McClellan was deprived 
of McDowell corps was to iterate and reiterate, — 
to have the press teem with these innuendoes and 
charges, — that McClellan didn't need McDowell's 
corps and that Washington City needed it badly; 
that McClellan lay in the mud with more than 
100,000 men in front of a line of works that even 
an energetic cow could climb over in most places; 
and that if he had had McDowell's corps to put into 
the mud also it would have been all the same, or 
worse. Even Grant had not yet been educated up to 
the value of fortifications. August 23, 1861, he 
wrote from Jefferson City, Mo. : '1 am not fortify- 



224 ANTIETAM 

ing here at all. . . . With the picket guard 
and other duty coming upon the men of this com- 
mand, there is but little time left for drilling. Drill 
and discipline are more necessary for the men than 
fortification. Another difficulty in the way of forti- 
fying is that I have no engineer officer to direct it; 
no time to attend to it myself, and very little dis- 
position to gain a Tillow notoriety' from a branch 
of service that I have forgotten all about." 

But after that period Grant learned, — at Vicks- 
burg, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and Petersburg, — 
quite a different lesson, and the branch of service 
that he had forgotten all about came back to him 
with a vividness that left all along the trail of his 
armies fortifications of a class and scope which 
America had never seen before; and he so taught 
his soldiers, that the first thing they did, when in 
the face of the enemy, was to take to digging with 
sticks, bayonets, spoons, and tin cups. 

Grant wrote to Meade, July 30, 1864: "Our 
experience to-day proves that fortifications come 
near holding themselves without troops. If, there- 
fore, the enemy should attempt to turn your posi- 
tion, do not hesitate to take out nearly every man 
to meet such attack. . . . With a reasonable 
amount of artillery and one infantryman for six 
feet, I am confident either party could hold its lines 
against a direct attack of the other." 

July 5, 1864, General Warren proposed the with- 
drawal of two corps from his left, provided he could 



McCLELLAN'S STRATEGY, ETC. 225 

construct or have two small redoubts with a battery 
and 500 men, and another along the road that would 
hold 1500 men. He counted these 2000, with their 
batteries and works for defensive purposes, as equal 
there to two army corps for offensive purposes, 
and added: 'Tt gives you an idea how important 
I regard the similar works now held by the enemy 
in our front." 

July 12, 1864, Grant writes Meade: 'T would 
not permit any attack against the enemy in an in- 
trenched position." 

July 2j\ "I do not want Hancock to attack in- 
trenched lines." 

October 2, to Meade : "Intrench and hold what 
you can, but make no attack against defended forti- 
fications." 

October 24: "Parke should be instructed that if 
he finds the enemy intrenched and their works well 
manned, he is not to attack, but confront him, and 
be prepared to advance promptly when he finds out 
by the movement of the other two columns to the 
right and rear of them that they begin to give way." 

This is so accurate a description of McClellan's 
proposed turning movement by McDowell, while 
Heintzleman and Fitz John Porter held the front, 
that it could have been incorporated verbatim in 
McClellan's report. 

Grant tells Butler, October 24 : "I do not want 
any attack made by you against intrenched and de- 
fended positions." 



226 ANTIETAM 

Again : "Let it be distinctly understood by corps 
commanders that there is to be no attack made 
against defended, intrenched positions." 

December 7, 1864, General Humphreys wrote 
Meade that, as directed, he had withdrawn 13,300 
men for a movement elsewhere, leaving ''the lines 
held by a minimum force," which he described as 
"total six miles of line, 4600 men." 

December 8 Meade wrote Grant that he proposed 
to hold all the intrenched lines of the Army of the 
Potomac "with about 11,000 men, leaving about 
22,000 men and 30 guns available for any move- 
ment." 

So evident, even to the enemy, was Grant's re- 
vised opinion of the extreme value of fortifications, 
that in 1864 Lee wrote the Secretary of War, Au- 
gust 22 : "I think it evident that the enemy has 
abandoned the effort to drive us from our present 
position by force, and that his purpose now is to 
compel us to evacuate by cutting off our supplies. I 
think his intention in the late demonstration north 
of the James River was not only to cause the re- 
moval of troops from Petersburg, but also to try to 
break through to Richmond." 

If one will substitute York for James, and York- 
town for Petersburg, he will have, exactly, Mc- 
Clellan's plan, just before McDowell was with- 
drawn. 

While General Grant had learned these lessons 
at great expense from the Confederates, and the 



McCLELLAN'S STRATEGY, ETC. 227 

Administration had learned it from Grant, and the 
people were left in the opinion that Grant was still 
banging away and charging the works, McClellan 
had learned his lessons, at a very small expense, 
from the Russian works in the Crimea, and the 
Allied assaults and their results, where the United 
States Government had sent him during the Crimean 
War for that very purpose. (See McClellan's great 
report on the Armies of Europe, republished in 
1861, which Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American 
Biography describes as "a model of fullness, ac- 
curacy, and system.") 

As for our men lying in the mud and water so 
long before the Rebel works, I will later on cite the 
testimony of General D. H. Hill, an eye-witness, 
who will tell us that the condition of the Confed- 
erates was so much worse, and that our own men 
were so much more healthy and comfortable, that 
they used to pity the poor Johnnies, as good Chris- 
tians ought to have done. 

McClellan's plan (see his letter of April 4, dated 
at Fort Monroe, the very day McDowell's force 
was taken away from him,) was that, with one 
division of the First Corps he should land on the 
Severn River, up the Bay, and assault the Glouces- 
ter works from the rear. The fort at Gloucester 
Point was on much higher ground and commanded 
the works at Yorktown at short cannon range, but 
was open in the rear. 

General Magruder had written of the defenses 



228 ANTIETAM 

at Gloucester on September 7, 1861 : "The landing 
of the [Union] army in rear of Gloucester Point 
can be effected easily, and without opposition, an 
extensive shore and many navigable rivers affording 
every opportunity." 

McClellan's movement of McDowell was to be 
extremely prompt; in fact, he had already tele- 
graphed — when he wrote McDowell, April 4 — to 
Franklin and Rucker to get this division embarked 
at once. 

Now Magruder states, as to his own forces, in 
his report of April 11, that "some 1500 are over 
the York River, at Gloucester Point." 

McClellan's next directions,. April 4, to Mc- 
Dowell were that he should hold the other two 
divisions to move up the York River immediately 
upon the fall of Yorktown. The captured works 
at Gloucester and the navy, under Goldsborough, 
who was ready and anxious to attack, would have 
silenced the Yorktown works, so that McDowell's 
force could have gone up protected by the navy, 
while his other division marched up the excellent 
sandy roads along the north bank of the York 
River. This force, moving to the head of York 
River, would have been in rear of Magruder, who 
would have had to abandon his works and retire 
on Richmond or else cross the James River, — as 
occurred in a like case during the Revolutionary 
War, — to save themselves. 

July 6, 1 78 1, Cornwallis lay with his army near 



McCLELLAN'S STRATEGY, ETC. 229 

Williamsburg. Lafayette and Wayne appeared on 
the Peninsula, north of him, and attacked. Al- 
though the attack was repulsed, yet the Americans 
still hung near the Chickahominy above him, and 
Cornwallis, the day after the battle of Green 
Springs, retreated across the James River by boats 
and abandoned the Peninsula. (See Johnston's 
"Yorktown Campaign of 1781.") 

McClellan would now have been at liberty to use 
water transport to establish his new base at the 
White House and present himself in front of Rich- 
mond before the bulk of General J. E. Johnston's 
army, then upon the upper Rappahannock, could 
have arrived there. 

The effect of this movement, if carried out, is 
clearly shown in Lee's letter, to General Magruder 
at Yorktown, dated April 9: 'T intended to call 
your attention to the possibility of the enemy's forc- 
ing a passage by the batteries on the York and James 
rivers, below your lines at Yorktown and Williams- 
burg. It was not my intention to advise the aban- 
donment of the Williamsburg lines, even if you 
should be compelled to fall back from Yorktown, 
unless the movements of the enemy by water should 
place him in the rear of the former as well as the 
latter position. In that event you would be com- 
pelled to place the Chickahominy between you and 
the enemy." 

He was advised to destroy the wharves on the 
York and James rivers, ''in the rear of your present 



230 ANTIETAM 

lines, as the enemy would be most likely to use them 
for landing their troops." 

This, of course, meant the abandonment of the 
whole Peninsula and the concentration of Magruder 
in front of Richmond, to defend that city alone, 
no other considerable part of the Confederate army 
having yet, at that time or for many days after- 
ward, reached Richmond or Yorktown. 



XXVI 

POSITIONS AND NUMBERS OF CONFEDERATE FORCES 
WHEN m'cLELLAN OCCUPIED THE YORKTOWN 
FRONT ON THE PENINSULA 

Let us try to see where Johnston's army of 
Northern Virginia actually was located while Mc- 
Clellan's investment of Yorktown, and the opera- 
tions on the Peninsula were in progress. 

In the "Summary of Events" at the beginning 
of Volume xl^ Official War Records, we find: 
"March 17, 1862, Embarkation of the Army of the 
Potomac commenced at Alexandria, Va." "April 
2, Headquarters Army of the Potomac transferred 
to vicinity of Fort Monroe." "April 12, Command 
of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. Army, ex- 
tended over the Departments of Norfolk and the 
Peninsula." 

McClellan had sent his forces down by divisions, 
as the transport service was slow. 

The condition of the country roads at this time 
at Warrenton, and thence to Richmond, is shown 
by numberless dispatches. General G. W. Smith 
reports; March 10, from Warrenton Springs: "I 
am fairly launched on a sea of mud." 

231 



232 ANTIETAM 

McClellan's movements were not known until 
after the end of March. General Johnston on 
March 27 was encamped on the Rapidan, 125 miles 
in an air-line from Yorktown. Ewell's division 
was on the Rappahannock, near the bridge; the 
divisions of Longstreet, Jones, Early, and D. H. 
Hill were near Johnston, on the Rapidan. 

Lee had just ordered 10,000 men to Richmond. 
Huger, south of the James, had been ordered to 
Magruder, who was holding the Yorktown line, and 
the Peninsula, against McClellan. By April 5 
(Magruder's report on that date) McClellan's forces 
had reached the Confederate works, and had begun 
firing. Magruder's force was about 11,500. This 
was a small force, relatively, but it was much larger, 
and of better quality, than the force which defeated 
Grant in his attempt to break the merely temporary 
works held largely by militia, in front of Peters- 
burg in June, 1864. 

March 28 the divisions of Early and Toombs 
were ordered South to Richmond, but did not get 
away until April 4. Ewell was in command at 
Williamsburg April 6; Rodes' brigade arrived 
April 7, without transportation, the other regiments 
reporting in the same condition. General McLaws' 
command arrived about the same time and Early's 
brigade April 8. 

March 28 the public property was ordered from 
Gordonsville, but Lee forbade its being sent to 
Richmond. March 28, also, Huger was ordered by 



POSITIONS AND NUMBERS, ETC. 233 

Lee to hold his few troops at Norfolk, across the 
James. 'The move on the Peninsula may be a 
feint, and the real attack be on Norfolk." 

The same date, the 28th, Lee wrote Johnston on 
the Rapidan, to hold his lines there, as it would be 
better to give up the Peninsula and Norfolk than 
lose the Central Railroad and connection with the 
valley at Staunton. 

It was not until April 4 that Johnston was ordered 
to move to Richmond from the Rapidan. 

Johnston wrote Lee, still from the Rapidan, April 
6, that "the railroad is operating so slowly that 
there is abundant time to instruct me further." 

April II Magruder reported the arrival of D. H. 
Hill, bringing his total force up to 20,000 men. 

April 13 Hill took command at Yorktown, and 
reported only sixty-five rounds of ammunition per 
gun for the heavy artillery. General Magruder had 
removed five 8-inch guns to the land side of the 
works, adding that "General Johnston's presence 
and General Johnston's army may save us; other- 
wise the contest will be hopeless." 

April 15 Hill reported that Goldsborough has 
been bombarding Yorktown with two gunboats for 
two days, and that he had but two guns which 
could reach the gunboats; "the other shells are 
worthless." He says, "I am much troubled about 
the river." "If the enemy get a position in rear of 
us [that is, across the York River] our men cannot 
stand to their guns on the land side. Every day is 



234 ANTIETAM 

a gain to the enemy." It was only on April 20 
that Johnston's army had reached the Yorktown 
lines. 

April 21 D. H. Hill wrote the War Department: 
"As far as the defense of our position is concerned, 
we are immeasurably the losers. The enemy keeps 
beyond the range of our guns and pelts us all day 
long. It is true that but few are killed daily, but 
our men are kept in the wet trenches and are 
harassed day and night. Disease will destroy a 
hundred-fold more than the Yankee artillery. Pro- 
tected by these guns, however, he can retire to his 
comfortable tents and fires while our poor fellows 
are in the wet and cold. This is a sad but true pic- 
ture of our situation." 



XXVII 

THE DETRACTORS OF m'cLELLAN HIS FRIENDS AND 

SUPPORTERS — Lincoln's vindication of 

M^CLELLAN 

Those who witnessed the scene at Warrenton, 
when McClellan, stripped of all authority and or- 
dered to report himself at Trenton, N. J., rode 
through the ranks of that magnificent and 
triumphant army, as he left it, to that army's woe 
and to his country's needless and irreparable loss, 
will never forget it. Those who have read the de- 
scription of eye-witnesses will ever be thrilled by its 
recollection; and those who have done neither, but 
have traced during the Rebellion the parallel careers 
of McClellan and the army he created, — for while 
the Government furnished money and men, it was 
McClellan himself who created and made the Army 
of the Potomac, — will know what must have hap- 
pened on that wonderful occasion. I need not de- 
scribe it, save to quote a sentence from a private let- 
ter of General Hancock to his wife, on that occa- 
sion : "The Army are not satisfied with the change, 
and consider the treatment of McClellan most un- 
gracious and inopportune." 

235 



2^6 ANTIETAM 

It is true that there were men in the army at one 
time or another who did not like McClellan, and 
who eagerly came before the civilian strategists, in- 
cluding the Congressional Committee on the Con- 
duct of the War, and testified most bitterly and 
recklessly against him. But the history of the army 
careers of these witnesses themselves vindicated 
McClellan more triumphantly than the strongest 
testimony from these men could have done, if in his 
favor. , It was not Grant, Meade, Sherman, Sheri- 
dan, Thomas, Hancock, Reynolds, Couch, Slocum, 
Wright, Buell, Ingalls, Williams, Hunt. Humph- 
reys, Warren, Pleasonton, and soldiers of this stamp 
and eminence, that were to be found in the ranks 
of those detractors, but men that belonged to the 
bread-and-butter brigades who sought to curry favor 
with the powers that were, and who, as a reward, 
lost caste, influence, and command. Many of those 
in power at Washington who loved the prejudiced 
information, despised the prejudiced informer, so 
that the inexorable law of the "survival of the 
fittest," long before the war ended eliminated these 
men from command more effectually than McClel- 
lan himself could have done, had he been all-power- 
ful and so disposed. You will search the records 
of 1864 and 1865 ii^ ^^vcs. for the names of these 
men; nearly all are missing, and justly so. 

And that great Lincoln, not himself a soldier, 
and slow to learn the principles — and never to learn 
the practice — of the art of war, but a few months 



THE DETRACTORS OF McCLELLAN 237 

after McClellan's removal lived to vindicate in the 
following letter McClellan's previous career and all 
his teachings and practices; to legitimatize all Mc- 
Clellan's repudiated requests ; to confirm all his argu- 
ments; and to establish all that McClellan had so 
vainly sought to have accepted and to disestablish 
all that he had so vainly urged the authorities not 
to do. 

The remarkable letter, cited below, from Mr. Lin- 
coln to General Halleck, written September 19, 
1863 (vol. XXIX, part 2, pp. 207-208), should have 
a place in history alongside that other celebrated 
letter he wrote to Hooker on the question of a 
dictatorship, and that other noble letter in which he 
declared that he would save the Union with slavery, 
or he would save the Union without slavery, his 
sole object being to save the Union. This letter was 
written by Mr. Lincoln himself, unknown to Hal- 
leck or to anyone else: 

"Executive Mansion, 
Washington, September 19, 1863. 

Major-General Halleck: By General Meade's dispatch 
to you of yesterday, it appears that he desires your views 
and those of the Government as to whether he shall advance 
upon the enemy. I am not prepared to order or even advise 
an advance in this case, wherein I know so little of the par- 
ticulars, and wherein he, in the field, thinks the risk is so 
great and the promise of advantage so small. And yet the 
case presents matter for very serious consideration in an- 
other aspect. These two armies confront each other across 
a small river, substantially midway between the two capitals, 
each defending its own capital and menacing the other. Gen- 



238 ANTIETAM 

eral Meade estimates the enemy's infantry in front of him 
at not less than 40,000. Suppose we add fifty per cent, to 
this for cavalry, artillery, and extra-duty men, stretching as 
far as Richmond, making the whole force of the enemy 
60,000. General Meade, as shown by his returns, has with 
him, and between him and Washington, of the same classes of 
well men, over 90,000. Neither can bring the whole of his 
men into a battle, but each can bring as large a percentage 
as the other. For a battle, then, General Meade has three 
men to General Lee's two. Yet, it having been determined 
that choosing ground and standing on the defensive gives so 
great advantage that the three cannot safely attack the two, 
the three are left simply standing on the defensive also. If 
the enemy's 60,000 are sufficient to keep our 90,000 away 
from Richmond, why, by the same rule, may not 40,000 of 
ours keep their 60,000 away from Washington, leaving us 
50,000 to put to some other use? Having practically come to 
the mere defensive, it seems to be no economy at all to em- 
ploy twice as many men for that object as are needed. With 
no object, certainly, to mislead myself, I can perceive no 
fault in this statement unless we admit we are not the equal 
of the enemy, man for man. I hope you will consider it. 

To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that to attempt to 
fight the enemy slowly back into his entrenchments at Rich- 
mond, and there to capture him, is an idea I have been trying 
to repudiate for quite a year. My judgment is so clear 
against it that I would scarcely allow the attempt to be 
made, if the General in command should desire to make it. 
My last attempt upon Richmond was to get McClellan, when 
he was nearer there than the enemy was, to run in ahead 
of him. Since then I have constantly desired the Army of 
the Potomac to make Lee's army, and not Richmond, its 
objective point. If our army cannot fall upon the enemy and 
hurt him where he is, it is plain to me it can gain nothing 
by attempting to follow him over a succession of intrenched 
lines into a fortified city." 



THE DETRACTORS OF McCLELLAN 239 

Where now was the vaunted march on Center- 
ville? Where the "On to Richmond" ? Where was 
the great garrison of 80,000 men, besides all the 
fortifications, to guard Washington? Where now 
was the condemnation of McClellan's move to the 
Peninsula, to reach the communications and Lee's 
army by the back and side doors, and strike there 
first? and where the robbing of McClellan to keep 
his troops back at Washington and so render suc- 
cess impossible? And where was Lincoln's urging 
for McClellan to move east of the mountains and 
take 40,000 from Washington's 90,000, or west of 
the mountains and get 15,000? 

Mr. Lincoln's reference to McClellan's run- 
ning into Richmond when he was nearer there, and 
so getting ahead of Lee's army, refers to the very 
part of the 1862 campaign during which McClellan 
was removed, and shows that Mr. Lincoln did not 
yet understand war or topography. 

For McClellan to pass by his own flank across the 
front of Longstreet and Jackson, to ''run into Rich- 
mond," was the very plan employed by Grant the 
next year, which began at the Wilderness, where 
his whole front half in the advance had to be called 
back, when it had gotten twenty miles ahead, to 
save the rear half from total destruction, and which 
ended at Cold Harbor, where the Confederates lost, 
substantially, but as many hundreds as we lost thou- 
sands. 

Mr. Lincoln never thought of Lee's suggestion 



240 ANTIETAM 

to Jackson, when he was in his direst strait, Novem- 
ber 9, 1862, to cross the Potomac, so as to draw 
back McClellan's army to that river. But if Jack- 
son had been able to make the movement, — which, 
however, McClellan had fully provided against, — 
the yell from Washington and the North would 
have hurried McClellan back, as it nearly did Grant 
in August, 1864, even if at the very gates of Rich- 
mond, and practically ''moving in"; and Mr. Lin- 
coln would have been the first to utter it. And so 
he ought to have been. For Grant's dispatch, scare 
at Washington July 26, 1864, see W. R., vol. xl, 
part 3, page 484 : For removal of all Grant's heavy 
guns and ammunition to be sent north, in urgent 
haste, and all in our works, see from page 641 to 
page y^y, orders, dispatches and reports. See also 
General Hunt's report, vol. xl, part i, pages 658- 
660. For Lincoln's visit to meet Grant at Fortress 
Monroe, part 3, page 636. Everything on board 
transports for sailing, at City Point and Broadway 
Landing, July 31. Page 721. For Grant's letter to 
Halleck, of August 15, 1864, ''My withdrawal now 
from the James River now would insure the defeat 
of Sherman," vol. xlii, part 2, page 193; and Lin- 
coln's reply of August 17, 1864, "Hold on with a 
bull-dog grip, and chew and choke as much as pos- 
sible," vol. xlii, part 2, page 243. 

Besides, McClellan was not nearer Richmond 
than Lee was, but directly the reverse, for from 
Sharpsburg to Richmond is 150 miles in an air- 



THE DETRACTORS OF McCLELLAN 241 

line; while from Longstreet's position, near Front 
Royal, with Jackson immediately behind him, is 
only 105 miles. By marching routes the difference 
in favor of Lee was enormously greater. Then, 
Mr. Lincoln obviously believed that McClellan could 
slip past a Confederate front of 60 miles, in full 
view from the mountains, "unbeknownst" to Lee; 
and that the preparations for and initiation of a 
great military movement does not betray itself at 
once, of necessity, to the military eye and mind 
of the enemy. 

As a matter of fact, the day McClellan began to 
move Lee began, and with Longstreet's corps passed 
the southern gaps, which McClellan had not yet 
reached, and was at Culpeper Court House before 
McClellan was at Warrenton. Lee's mistake was 
in leaving Jackson in the valley too long; he took 
the chances, for military reasons, but miscalculated 
McClellan's speed, and Jackson was caught, and 
held fast there, in spite of all that could be done 
to relieve him or bring him to Longstreet's aid. 



XXVIII 

THE CAUSE OF m'cLELLAN's REMOVAL 

The question recurs : Why was McClellan re- 
moved, and ordered to Trenton? As a last ditch, 
many have fallen back on what is called McClellan's 
attitude on the slavery question. But McClellan's 
attitude was precisely that of Lincoln, but not at all 
that of Stanton and some of the members of Con- 
gress with whom the Secretary of War was in close 
and secret contact. And these matters ought to be 
made clear, because they have affected the judgment 
of military men who ought to have learned better — 
Grant and Upton, for example. 

Early in the war — May 17, 1861 — McClellan 
wrote to Adjutant General Townsend, at Washing- 
ton, from his Headquarters, Department of the 
Ohio, at Cincinnati, that Garrett Davis had told 
him that the Union men of Kentucky had resolved 
that "we will remain in the Union by voting, if we 
can; by fighting, if we must; and if we cannot hold 
our own we will call on the General Government 
to aid us." And he asked McClellan what he would 
do, from Ohio, if they called upon him for assist- 
ance. He replied that if there were time he would 
refer to General Scott for orders; if there were not 

242 



CAUSE OF McCLELLAN'S REMOVAL 243 

time, he replied, "I would cross the Ohio with 
20,000 men. If that were not enough with 30,000, 
and if necessary with 40,000; but I would not stand 
by and see the loyal Union men of Kentucky 
crushed." (Official War Records, Supplemental 
Volume li, part i, pp. 381, 383.) 

To Buell he wrote, while general-in-chief, No- 
vember 7, 1 861 : 'Tt is absolutely necessary that we 
shall hold all the State of Kentucky. Not only that, 
but that the majority of its inhabitants shall be 
warmly in favor of our cause. . . . You will 
please constantly bear in mind the precise issue for 
which we are fighting. That issue is the preserva- 
tion of the Union and the restoration of the full 
authority of the General Government over all por- 
tions of our territory. We shall most readily sup- 
press this rebellion, and restore the authority of the 
Government, by religiously respecting the constitu- 
tional rights of all. I know that I express the feel- 
ings and opinions of the President when I say that 
we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of 
the Union and the constitutional authority of the 
General Government. 

"The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon it 
that their domestic institutions will in no manner be 
interfered with, and that they will receive at our 
hands every constitutional protection." (War 
Records, vol. v, page 38.) 

That this was in accordance with Mr. Lincoln's 
views is demonstrated by the fact that Kentucky 



244 ANTIETAM 

was excepted in the Emancipation Proclamation. 
That McClellan's views of the protection of slaves 
did not extend beyond the loyal boundaries is shown 
by his general plan of army movements throughout 
the Rebel States, submitted to the Secretary of 
War, for the President, February 3, 1862: ''We 
should then be in a condition to reduce at our leisure 
all the Southern seaports, to occupy all the avenues 
of communication; to use the great outlet of the 
Mississippi; to re-establish our government and 
amis in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas; to force 
the slaves to labor for our subsistence instead of 
that of the Rebels; to bid defiance to all foreign 
interference." 

McClellan was the very first to use fugitive slaves 
in a large way. 

General Butler, down at Fortress Monroe, in 
May, 1 86 1, was wonderfully pestered with the slave 
question. On May 25 three slaves ran away from 
the plantation of the commander of the secession 
forces of the district and gave themselves up to his 
picket guard. Butler examined the negroes sepa- 
rately, and ''determined for the present, and until 
better advised, to avail myself of their services," 
which were much needed, and that "I would send a 
receipt to Colonel Mallory that I had so taken them, 
as I would for any other property of a private 
citizen which the exigencies of the service seemed 
to require." 

General Scott and Secretary of War Cameron 



CAUSE OF McCLELLAN'S REMOVAL 245 

both endorsed this report as having "much to praise 
and nothing to condemn. It is highly interesting 
in several aspects, particularly in its relation to the 
slave question." 

In July Butler made a complaint against Colonel 
Duryea, that he took nine of these escaped slaves 
to Washington with him, against his express orders, 
and after a portion of them had been detained by 
Butler's provost-marshal. He wanted instructions, 
but he doesn't seem to have gotten any until Mc- 
Clellan got to Washington, and he was not so 
squeamish. General Wool was then in command 
at Fort Monroe, and wrote to the Secretary of War, 
September 22, 1861 : "I have called for an imme- 
diate report from the proper officers as to the 
negroes here, in reference to General McClellan's 
request, and I shall then forward as many as can 
be spared." 

General Wool had written, September 18: "I 
would be much gratified if you would tell me what 
I am to do with the negro slaves that are almost 
daily arriving at this post from the interior. Am 
I to find food and shelter for the women and chil- 
dren, who can do nothing for themselves?" 

McClellan cried ''Yes," and the Secretary of 
War, Cameron, at once wrote to General Wool 
from Washington : ''You will, as early as prac- 
ticable, send to General McClellan at this place all 
negro men capable of performing labor, accompanied 
by their families" 



246 ANTIETAM 

Who is so silly as to imagine that General Mc- 
Clellan had temporarily "borrowed" the women and 
babies from their Rebel owners ? 

September 26, 1861, McClellan requested the 
general-in-chief ''to send contrabands to Harper's 
Ferry to perform the labor required, if there are 
any disposable in Washington." 

And McClellan saw that these men were paid 
fifty cents per day and board, and that government 
supplies were issued to feed and clothe the women 
and children. 

The amount of misrepresentation regarding Mc- 
Clellan is so great everywhere that it is almost im- 
possible to run these clues out, in every case; but 
whenever they are laboriously and persistently run 
out, misrepresentation, false suggestion, and false- 
hood will be found as thick as blackberries. 

McClellan's main purpose, as was Lincoln's, was 
to save the Union ; others had different views and 
purposes connected with conquering and subduing; 
and Lincoln, to avoid divided counsels, was obliged 
to use these factors as well, and they in turn were 
constantly endeavoring to use Mr. Lincoln also. 

There were two diametrically opposing views at 
Washington, both in favor of suppressing the Re- 
bellion, but outside that dominating purpose one 
view was to conquer the South absolutely, to rule it 
as conquered territory, and to ignore State lines, 
and the States themselves. This view was a real 
view, and had something in its favor; but it con- 



CAUSE OF McCLELLAN'S REMOVAL 247 

ceded the right of secession, as well as that of con- 
quest, and neither Lincoln nor McClellan accepted 
this view at all. To them it was a Union of in- 
divisible States. 

Secretary Chase expressed the radical view in his 
letter to Mellen, of March 26, 1862 : "While I think 
that the government, in suppression of rebellion, 
in view of the destruction by suicide of the State 
governments with the actual or strongly implied 
consent of the majority of the citizens of the seven 
Rebel States, have so far forfeited all right to be 
regarded as States," etc. (see Warden's "Life 
of Chase") ; and also in his conversation of Decem- 
ber 10, 1 86 1, with Senator Wade and Representa- 
tive Ashby, Chairmen of the Territorial Committees 
of their respective houses, and who concurred with 
Chase in his statement, that when a State govern- 
ment attempted to withdraw from the Union "the 
State organization was forfeited, and it lapsed into 
the condition of a Territory, with which we could 
do as we pleased." 

This was in accordance with President Johnson's 
phrase, "To make treason odious," and also with the 
spirit of the Reconstruction period. 

But these men, even in the darkest days of the 
Rebellion, did not represent the people for whom 
they claimed, or, in fact, often did not even claim, 
to act. They possessed speech, and they often 
suborned the press, they worked in secret, and 
sought by every art and device to bring the people 



248 ANTIETAM 

up to their plane of action. But they never suc- 
ceeded; the great Northern people never endorsed 
them, and the army repudiated them with indigna- 
tion. It was only the lamentable tragedy of Lin- 
coln's assassination which, even for the moment, 
swept the American people off their feet, and gave 
this coterie of active theorists their power success- 
fully to interfere. The great mass, even of the 
strenuous Abolitionists, always belonged to that 
class to which the poet Whittier belonged, of whom 
his biographer says : "After the war was over he 
would have made the terms of settlement liberal and 
conciliatory. He was too wise and too humane 
to stir the still living embers of passion and re- 
sentment for any political end, however dear to 
him." 

Lincoln, during the war, kept on organizing 
States in the Confederate territory wherever he 
could find a loyal nucleus, — in West Virginia, 
Louisiana, and in Virginia, — and he represented 
those more enlightened views which, after Recon- 
struction had demonstrated the futility, the danger, 
and the unpopularity of the radical plan, were uni- 
versally accepted. 

McClellan, in his letter of instructions to Buell, 
in Kentucky, November 12, 1861, clearly put forth 
his views on this subject. "Bear in mind," he 
said, "that we are fighting only to preserve the 
Union, and to uphold the power of the General Gov- 
ernment. As far as military necessity will permit, 



CAUSE OF McCLELLAN'S REMOVAL 249 

religiously respect the constitutional rights of all. 
Preserve the strictest discipline among the troops, 
and while employing the utmost energy in military 
movements, be careful to so treat the unarmed in- 
habitants as to contract, not widen, the breach exist- 
ing between us and the Rebels." 

Since the war we have tried both plans; and I 
feel satisfied that the views of Lincoln and McClel- 
lan will now find almost universal endorsement, 
and the theory of ''State suicide" almost universal 
dissent. 

As regards emancipation, this proclamation was 
regarded by McClellan, as well as by Lincoln, as 
purely a war measure, and McClellan believed that 
it would prove inefTective in hostile regions wherever 
our armies did not penetrate, and could not reach; 
while, without it, in hostile regions where our armies 
did penetrate, the slaves were already free to aban- 
don their masters, and we would protect them, — 
would, as McClellan said, ''force the slaves to labor 
for our subsistence instead of that of the Rebels." 
By ceasing to be rebels, and surrendering, in all our 
territory, under McClellan's plan, they could avoid 
the penalty ; by ceasing to be rebels, and surrender- 
ing, in rebel territory, under Mr. Lincoln's plan, 
they must still suffer the penalty. One plan invited 
early submission ; the other, resistance to death, for 
it was the slaves who supported the armies in the 
field and the women and children at home. One 
said to the boy in the tree, "I will punish you if you 



250 ANTIETAM 

don't come down" ; the other, "I will punish you as 
soon as you do come down." 

It is true that, almost under any circumstances, 
the system of human bondage must have received 
its death-blow with the success of our arms. It was 
a "peculiar institution," and was rapidly growing 
out of harmony with the age, and even with the 
mass of the Confederate soldiers. (See what Dr. 
Steiner said of the negroes in the Confederate 
ranks at Frederick, and the fact that negro soldiers 
were afterward enlisted in 1865 in the Confederate 
armies.) But there was a far greater question at 
issue, and one involving even emancipation itself, 
and that was the preservation of the Union ; for the 
success of the Confederacy meant not only the de- 
struction of our great Republic, but the failure of 
emancipation also. If we could not conquer the 
Rebels when they were a part of our own popula- 
tion, much less could we have found men and means 
to invade and conquer the South when an inde- 
pendent foreign country. It will be seen a little 
later on into how grave peril the Union cause fell 
from political mismanagement, even in the very 
closing months of the war. 

No one now believes that the Emancipation 
Proclamation legally freed any slaves, except tem- 
porarily by martial law. Lincoln knew that him- 
self, or he would not have insisted, in his confer- 
ence with the Rebel Commissioners at City Point 
at the end of January, 1865 (see Grant's 



CAUSE OF McCLELLAN^S REMOVAL 251 

"Memoirs"), that they must concede the surrender 
of slavery as a prerequisite to any peace. (See 
Volume xLvi, part 2, p. 509, Official War Records.) 
Mr. Lincoln's demands were that three things were 
indispensable : "First, the restoration of a national 
authority throughout all the States. Second, no 
receding, by the Executive of the United States, on 
the slavery question, from the position assumed 
thereon by him in the late annual message to Con- 
gress and in preceding documents. Third, no ces- 
sation of hostilities short of an end of the war and 
the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Gevorn- 
ment." The first and third were, of course, subject 
to acceptance or rejection; but if the second had 
become a ''res ad judicata" in 1862, it is difficult to 
see how any amount of "receding" could put these 
negroes back into slavery again in 1865. 

The slaves were already free, slavery was already 
abolished, if the proclamation was legally effective 
when issued; and the Constitution of the United 
States, and of the States themselves, forbade already 
the reduction to slavery of any legal freeman. We 
all now know what freed the slaves and abolished 
slavery in the United States; it was not the Proc- 
lamation ; it was an amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, and that was not adopted till 
after the war had ended. 

But there is no doubt that the Proclamation in- 
creased the hostility of the South, enforced, will- 
ingly, universal conscription, silenced the Southern 



252 ANTIETAM 

Unionists, and prolonged the war. Everyone agrees 
to that. The sole excuse of its issuance was that 
it was worth the price, especially for political effect 
upon other nations, as defining the attitude of our 
Government on the question of slavery in so far 
as the States in rebellion were concerned. The 
validity and strength of this position may be fully 
conceded. But a shorter war would have afforded 
the same advantage, with less loss and far less risk. 
But historians in general, and the public as well, 
do not clearly understand what that price was, and 
how we were, at last, and almost by a miracle, saved 
from paying some such fearful price. 



XXIX 

OUR GRAVEST PERIL IN THE CLOSING YEAR OF 
THE WAR 

McClellan could have preserved the Union, en- 
listed home aid in every Rebel State, ended the war, 
and brought peace and fraternity in 1862, as Upton 
categorically declares, and as Jefferson Davis prac- 
tically conceded, when he wrote on the very eve of 
McClellan's spring campaign, February 19, 1862: 
* 'Events have cast on our arms and our hopes the 
gloomiest shadows." 

In July, 1 86 1, Mr. Davis again wrote: "Every- 
body disappoints me in their answers to my re- 
quisitions for troops, and the last hope of a large 
force of militia coming to your aid seems doomed 
to add another to past disappointments." Up to this 
time the Southern heart was not fully enlisted in the 
cause. 

September 5, 1861, he wrote: '*We have been 
disappointed in our efforts to get arms. Lee is still 
in the mountains of Virginia. My means are short 
of the wants of each division of the wide frontier 
I am laboring to protect. One shipload of small 
arms would enable me to answer all demands, but 

253 



254 ANTIETAM 

vainly have I hoped and waited." The Confederate 
correspondence during all this period, up to the 
assumption of generalship and command by our 
new Secretary of War, and his active interference 
with our armies, betrays the hopelessness of the 
Confederate cause in the East, and gives ample 
intimations of equal peril in the West. 

Then McClellan's comprehensive plan was sub- 
mitted (vol. V, Official Records, p. 44), describing 
his proposed Peninsula campaign and its expected 
results, dated February 3, 1862, as follows: "The 
second base of operations available for the Army of 
the Potomac is that of the lower Chesapeake Bay, 
which affords the shortest possible land route to 
Richmond and strikes directly at the heart of the 
enemy's power in the East. 

"The roads in that region are passable at all sea- 
sons of the year. The country now alluded to is 
much more favorable for offensive operations than 
that in front of Washington (which is very un- 
favorable), much more level, more cleared land, 
the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and the 
spring some two or three weeks earlier. A move- 
ment in force on that line obliges the enemy to 
abandon his entrenched position at Manassas in 
order to hasten to cover Richmond and Norfolk. 
He must do this ; for should he permit us to occupy 
Richmond, his destruction can be averted only by 
entirely defeating us in battle, in which he must be 
the assailant. This movement, if successful, gives 



OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC 255 

us the capital, the communications, the supplies of 
the Rebels, Norfolk would fall, all the waters of 
the Chesapeake would be ours, all Virginia would 
be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon 
Tennessee and North Carolina. The alternative pre- 
sented to the enemy would be to beat us in a posi- 
tion selected by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath 
the Caudine Forks." 

This extract is a capital essay on the principles 
of war. It disposes of the boastful notion that the 
point of attack should have been the intrenched 
annies of the enemy, and dissipated the allegation 
that McClellan had some other dilatory scheme of 
his own. Grant started in to "buck the tiger" at 
the Wilderness, and expended an army and a whole 
summer in getting to where McClellan went by 
water without losing a man or a week. Grant then 
spent nine months more in facing and flanking the 
works at Petersburg, — and it was necessary work, 
and capitally done, — but as soon as he could extend 
his left far enough away from the armies in front 
of Richmond and Petersburg to cut the sole line 
of Confederate communication (as Richmond was 
the sole line in 1862), lines more than sixty miles 
to the west, Petersburg fell, Richmond was aban- 
doned, and the whole Confederate government and 
archives were in hopeless flight, and ended in a final 
and early surrender. As I have shown elsewhere — 
which is substantially the view of Napoleon — bat- 
tles in war ought to be in the nature of unpreventa- 



256 ANTIETAM 

ble accidents, occurring only where strategy fails 
or is resisted. A perfectly conducted war would 
be one of positions, communications, flankings, turn- 
ings, and the like, in which hostile armies are com- 
pelled to move thus and so under penalty of anni- 
hilation or surrender; in which case sensible men 
who understand war, finding a battle hopeless, would 
move themselves and their men accordingly. Bat- 
tles, of course, occur; so do railroad accidents and 
street fights, but these are evidences of miscal- 
culation on one side, or on both. 

In the fall campaign, the so-called Bristoe cam- 
paign, of 1863, Meade got to Centerville first. 
Lee was balked, and retreated without an attack. 
In the Mine Run movement the conditions were 
exactly reversed, and Meade retreated without an 
attack. In the Pope campaign, if Pope had fallen 
back to Centerville, instead of moving around, be- 
wildered, out among the Bull Run Mountains, Lee 
would not have attacked; or, if he had, he would 
have been defeated. Strategy is by far the superior 
and more powerful agency of the two in war. It 
is all a question of "Where you are at," if you have 
anything available by means of which to "be at," 
when the time and opportunity arrive. 

By one blow McClellan would have cleared three 
States. The proof is that the same blow did the 
same thing three years later ; but during those three 
years — alas ! 

McClellan continues to unfold his plan : "Should 



OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC. 257 

we be beaten in battle, we have a perfectly secure 
retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe, with 
our flank perfectly covered by the fleet. During 
the whole movement our left flank is covered by the 
water. Our right is secure, for the reason that the 
enemy is too distant to reach us in time. He can 
only oppose us in front. We bring our fleet into 
full play. 

"After a successful battle our position would 
be: Burnside forming our left, Norfolk held se- 
curely; our center connecting Burnside with Buell, 
both by Raleigh and Lynchburg; Buell in eastern 
Tennessee and North Alabama; Halleck at Nash- 
ville and Memphis. The next movement would be 
to connect with Sherman [not William T.] on the 
left by reducing Wilmington and Charleston ; to ad- 
vance our center into South Carolina and Georgia ; 
to push Buell either toward Montgomery or to unite 
with the main army in Georgia; to throw Halleck 
southward to meet the naval expedition from New 
Orleans. We should then be in a condition to reduce 
at our leisure all the Southern seaports; to occupy 
all the avenues of communication; to use the great 
outlet of the Mississippi; to re-establish our Gov- 
ernment and arms in Arkansas, Louisiana, and 
Texas; to force the slaves to labor for our sub- 
sistence instead of that of the Rebels; to bid defi- 
ance to all foreign interference." 

A comprehensive plan! Was it simply ideal? 
Then trace the history of the war of the Rebellion 



258 ANTIETAM 

from the day that McClellan stated these proposals, 
and you will find that every part of his plan was not 
only feasible, but that it was carried out to the letter 
(by others). Not one was missed; but the time of 
accomplishment was sadly postponed. Even the re- 
establishment of Southern State governments, which 
Lincoln carried out, was in the plan. 

After what pain, what cost, what blood and tears 
did it come! After what heart-breakings at home 
and in the field! And after what long years, still 
hoping and praying for the day, 

"When the cruel war is over." 

And all the South was sprinkled with blood, and 
scattered over it everywhere are the national ceme- 
teries of gallant soldiers who perished that this na- 
tion might live. Was the War Department strategy 
worth w^hat it cost us ? We could have had all this 
salvation in 1862, almost ''without money and with- 
out price." 

It was ours to take, or to leave; and we left it. 
And, after all, we won only, as it were, by a 
scratch — by almost a miracle, in fact. 

The inside history of the winter of 1864 and the 
spring of 1865 has never been written, and has 
never been appreciated. Our armies were melting 
away. It is true that the Confederate armies were 
melting away also, but that was by the casualties of 
battle, and the dead in battle are but a small portion 
of those who 

*'Live to fight another day." 



OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC. 259 

They deserted, too, but that was from starvation ; 
and their armies could have even then gone where 
suppHes were abundant. (See later on in this 
chapter. ) 

But the time of our regiments expired, and the 
men marched home, as they had a right to do. Piled 
up bounties, which Upton has so strenuously con- 
demned in his history, created a new profession; 
the purlieus were drained, foreign supplies of rag- 
tag and bobtail were imported at great cost; skill- 
ful emissaries even searched the South and supplied 
substitutes to fill their Northern State quotas from 
the ignorant and degraded field-hands of Southern 
plantations; and the recruits were a sad lot. 

Major O. C. Bosbyshell, of the Loyal Legion, 
in his history of the Forty-eighth Pennsylvania 
veteran regiment, describing the battle of Poplar 
Spring Church, in the Petersburg front, September 
29-October 2, 1864, says: 

"Some of the Massachusetts regiments in the 
front line, having large numbers of Germans in their 
ranks, many of whom had not been in the country 
over six weeks, and were utterly ignorant of the 
English language, were thrown into great disorder 
by the savage charge of the Rebel regiments. These 
Germans ran pell-mell through the ranks of the sup- 
porting regiments. Pleasants was greatly enraged 
at these fleeing soldiers as they dashed blindly to 
the rear, pushing and shoving their way between 
the ranks of the Forty-eighth, and with drawn sword 



26o ANTIETAM 

slashed to the right and left among them with the 
strength of an athlete, staying the flight effectually 
anywhere near his sweeping saber. Many a sore 
head and stinging rib resulted from the blows well 
laid on by him." 

That Massachusetts should have so filled her 
quotas is evidence of exhaustion of her own better 
material. If so patriotic a State had to resort to 
such means, the other States must have suffered 
also. Perhaps I exaggerate. Read General Grant's 
testimony. He writes to Stanton as early as Sep- 
tember II, 1864: "I hope it is not the intention to 
postpone the draft to allow time to fill up with re- 
cruiting. The men we have been getting in this way 
nearly all desert, and out of five reported North 
as being enlisted, we don't get more than one effec- 
tive soldier." 

At the same time Halleck wrote Grant from 
Washington : "Had not the new infantry regiments 
now coming in [these were drafted, not recruited] 
better be sent to City Point? Facilities for deser- 
tion here and with General Sheridan are so great 
that we shall soon lose large numbers." 

Stanton, referring to the drafts, says, September 
II, 1864, that candidates try to keep back the men 
till after election, especially in Ohio, Indiana, and 
Illinois. Not a regiment, or even company, has 
been organized in Illinois. "A special call from you 
would aid the department in overcoming the local 
inertia and personal interests that favor delay." 



OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC. 261 

Grant writes: "The enforcement of the draft 
and prompt filHng up of our armies will save the 
shedding of blood to an immense degree." 

September 20 he writes : 'The ease with which 
our men of late fall into the hands of the enemy 
would indicate that they are rather willing pris- 
oners." 

January 5, 1865, Stanton wrote: 'Tf you do 
not guard against straggling and desertion you will 
lose many men, as the facilities at Baltimore are 
great, and the business vigorously conducted by 
bounty brokers." 

Sheridan writes January 6: "We have lost a 
great many men by desertion." 

January 8 he writes that Grover was obliged to 
lie over a day in camp; "this gives the bounty- 
brokers a chance to work on the men, and I am 
afraid will cause desertion." 

January 10 the quartermaster wrote to Washing- 
ton that "Grant could not move his army if he 
would, for want of forage; that the animals had 
been on half rations since January 3." 

February 15, 1862, Halleck wrote a remarkable 
letter to Grant from which I make the following 
extracts : 

"In reply to your telegram in regard to the pay- 
ment of the troops before Richmond, I would re- 
mark that these troops have been paid generally to 
a later period than those in the West and South. 
Some are unpaid for seven or eight months. The 



262 ANTIETAM 

fault is not in the Pay Department, but a want of 
money in the treasury. 

"I understand that the Quartermaster's Depart- 
ment is already $180,000,000 in debt, and that until 
a part, at least, of this is paid it will be almost im- 
possible to purchase and transport supplies. The 
manufacturers cannot furnish cloth, or the tailors 
make clothes, or the shoemakers make shoes, or the 
railroads transport troops and supplies, much longer, 
unless paid a part, at least, of their claims. Some 
of the Western roads cannot pay their employes 
and threaten to stop running their trains if they 
cannot be paid what the Government owes them. 
Serious difficulties also exist with the New York 
Central, Hudson River, Harlem, and other roads. 

"What is here said of the Quartermaster's De- 
partment also applies to the Commissary, Medical, 
Ordnance, and other departments. 

"If we pay the troops to the exclusion of the 
other creditors of the Government, supplies must 
stop, and our armies must be left without food, 
clothing, or ammunition. 

"What we want is some more great victories to 
give more confidence in our currency and to con- 
vince financial men that the war is near its close. 
In money matters these are the darkest days we 
have yet had during the war." 

During the closing month, in front of Petersburg, 
President Lincoln was with Grant almost con- 
stantly. During this period both Admiral Porter 



OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC. 263 

and General Sherman testify to Mr. Lincoln's great 
anxiety to have the war ended at once, if it could 
possibly be done, and far preferably without serious 
fighting. 

Says General Grant, in one of his conversations 
with John Russell Young, on his Eastern tour, which 
conversations Grant personally revised : ''He was 
very anxious about the war closing; was afraid we 
could not stand a new campaign." 

Grant himself says : ''Rich as we were, I do not 
see how we could have endured it another year, 
even from a financial point of view." 

Speaking of this great fear, General Grant says : 
"There was no time in the war when it was more 
critical than after the battle of Five Forks, when 
Lee abandoned Richmond. It was President Lin- 
coln's aim to end the whole business there. He was 
most anxious about the result. He desired to avoid 
another year's fighting, fearing the country would 
break down financially under the terrible strain on 
its resources. I know when we met it was a stand- 
ing topic of conversation. If Lee had escaped and 
joined Johnston in North Carolina, or reached the 
mountains, it would have imposed on us continued 
armament and expense. The entire expense of the 
government had reached the enormous cost of four 
millions of dollars a day. It was to put an end to 
this expense that Lee's capture was necessary." 

He tells us by what a hair's-breadth Lee was cap- 
tured, how narrowly his junction was prevented, 



264 ANTIETAM 

either with Johnston in North CaroHna, or John- 
ston's junction with him in the great valley of 
southwest Virginia, reaching down by way of 
Bristol, east Tennessee, into Georgia and Ala- 
bama. 

Grant says : ''My pursuit of Lee was hazardous. 
I was in a position of extreme difficulty. You see, I 
was marching away from my supplies, while Lee 
was falling back on his supplies. If Lee had con- 
tinued his flight another day I should have had to 
abandon the pursuit, fall back to Danville, build the 
railroad, and feed my army. So far as supplies were 
concerned, I was almost at the last gasp when the 
surrender took place." (See conversations with 
Grant, revised by himself, in John Russell Young's 
''Around the World With General Grant," volume 
II, page 460, copyright 1879.) 

Had Lee known this, he could easily have gained 
another day. At Amelia Court House he lost 
thirty-six hours in foraging over an exhausted 
country for supplies, when his railroad trains had 
by a mistake carried his own supplies to Richmond, 
and left them there. He had thousands of horses 
and other animals in his commissary and quarter- 
master's supply train, which had no supplies to haul, 
and which were afterward captured or broken down 
before his army reached Farmville. There was plenty 
of such meat, to be driven on the hoof, to get his 
army out of their emergency. At Appomattox Sta- 
tion there arrived from Lynchburg, on the night 



OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC. 265 

before the surrender, five heavily loaded trains filled 
with hams, cornmeal, and all sorts of foods, shoes, 
and clothing. I can speak personally of this, as I sup- 
plied my command, and all the rest of us infantry 
and cavalry officers did the same, from these trains, 
after their capture on the morning of the 9th, and 
the piled up food looked about as abundant when we 
left it as it did when we found it We captured and 
emptied these moving trains only four miles from 
Lee's advance, while he was halted at Appomattox 
Court House, and only six hours before the sur- 
render took place. 

General Grant says, and he ought to have known : 
"Nor have I ever felt that the surrender at Appo- 
mattox was an absolute military necessity, I think 
that in holding Richmond, and even in consenting 
to that surrender, Lee sacrificed his judgment as a 
soldier to his duty as a citizen and a leader of the 

South." .;w liiE 

His love for Virginia and for his Virginia sol- 
diers and their families doubtless influenced him 
greatly; but had he abandoned Virginia with his 
army, even temporarily, and joined Johnston, or 
not joined Johnston, boundless supplies awaited 
him. His railroads were worthless and worn out, 
but they would have been as worthless for carrying 
our supplies as for carrying his; and by marching 
his army to the supplies, instead of trying to haul 
them to his army over railroads that couldn't haul, 
he might have solved the problem and given our 



266 ANTIETAM 

national Government certainly another campaign, 
another year, and perhaps more. 

The official report of the Confederate Bureau 
of Subsistence, dated March lo, 1865, says: "The 
crops south of North Carolina, in Georgia, Alabama, 
and Mississippi, were never so large." "From North 
Carolina 7,500,000 bread rations, 6,000,000 meat 
rations; from Virginia, 5,000,000 bread rations, 
5,500,000 meat rations; from east Tennessee and 
its communications 15,000,000 bread rations, 
5,000,000 meat rations." These were all predicated 
on the railroads. Beyond these, in central Alabama, 
Mississippi, and Georgia, the supplies were illimita- 
ble, as the Confederates had ceased planting cotton 
and gave their time to food supplies. 

There was nothing at all in front to prevent 
Lee or Johnston from going there ; Sherman's army 
was on the Atlantic Coast; most of Thomas' army 
had just joined him, and Grant was on the James 
River. We practically had no others. 

But this had not been the Confederates' only 
chance, of late. When Sherman abandoned the 
pursuit of Hood's army, leaving it intact, to make 
his march to the sea, it was the same army which 
had just baffled Sherman from Dalton to Atlanta, 
with more than six months of continuous fighting. 

Among all the fatuous things ever done by a 
Confederate army, one of the worst was that of 
Hood's planting himself down in front of Nash- 
ville, doubtless a part of some occult War Depart- 



OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC. 267 

ment strategy at Richmond, and lying there for 
long weeks while all the North was open to his 
invading columns. Sherman had left no army be- 
hind to take the place of that which he marched 
across to the Atlantic; he left behind his sick, 
wounded, and worn-out, whatever was not fit for 
the march before him, and all this debris was scat- 
tered over thousands of square miles of territory. 
Hood's was the only compact and efficient army in 
the field in the West. And Hood lay down before 
Nashville and waited, while Thomas set himself to 
work to make an army. With the Twenty-third 
Corps as a nucleus, under Schofield, and the Fourth 
Corps, under Wood, he armed and drilled all that 
he could find or gather — wagoners, mechanics, any 
and everybody. He gathered a bit here and a bit 
there; he dragged out his convalescents and scoured 
his scattered garrisons; he sent up to middle Mis- 
souri and brought down A. J. Smith and his men 
(see War Records, vol. xlv, part i, pp. 31-34), and 
after weeks of incessant labor he got together, De- 
cember 15-16, 1864, a force which attacked and 
defeated Hood, and drove him south in scattered 
fragments, to be reunited only months afterward in 
the Carolinas. 

Grant's anxiety about Hood was natural, and it 
was very great. But it was no part of prudence 
for Thomas to have attacked before he was fit to 
attack; because, had Hood, later on, pulled up 
stakes and gone to where he ought to have gone 



268 ANTIETAM 

in the first place, Thomas by that time had boats 
and transportation enough with which to follow him 
around by water, and fight him. But when Hood 
first planted himself before Nashville, after driv- 
ing back Schofield from Franklin, there was no 
concentrated force anywhere which could have inter- 
fered with him, and none which could have been 
concentrated in time. Says General Grant, very 
properly: **My objection to Sherman's plan at the 
time, and my objection now, was his leaving Hood's 
army in his rear. I always wanted the march to the 
sea, but at the same time I wanted Hood. If Hood 
had been an enterprising commander he would have 
given us a great deal of trouble. Probably he was 
controlled from Richmond. As it was, he did the 
very thing I wanted him to do. If I had been in 
Hood's place, I would never have gone near Nash- 
ville. I would have gone to Louisville, and on north 
until I came to Chicago. What was the use of his 
knocking his head against the stone walls of Nash- 
ville? If he had gone north Thomas would never 
have caught him. We should have had to raise new 
levies. I was never so anxious during the war as at 
that time." 

Yes, Hood could have marched through Illinois, 
Indiana, and Ohio, and he, too, could have sung the 
song: 

"Five hundred miles of latitude, five hundred to the lakes.** 

Or he could have crossed Ohio to Pennsylvania, 



OUR GRAVEST PERIL, ETC. 269 

captured Pittsburg, swept West Virginia and the 
V^alley, threatened Washington, or even joined Lee; 
or he could have done the same by marching east 
from Parkersburg in West Virginia. 

The ''new^ levies" to v^hich Grant referred, not 
to speak of time, — when there was no time, — would 
have been useless against Hood's veterans. What 
would have been instantly wanted, and imperatively 
demanded, were soldiers. And the only soldiers 
available, for Sherman was buried and unheard of in 
the depths of Georgia, and there were no armies to 
be had elsewhere, was the Army of the Potomac, 
and all of it, to meet Hood's triumphant sixty thou- 
sand veterans. 

That meant that the spring campaign of 1865 
would have started from Washington, where the 
spring campaign of 1861 had started, and if Grant 
and Lincoln and Halleck were good judges of the 
situation, it would have been very difficult to have 
had it start anew and continue very vigorously, if 
at all, if it had to start anew — after four years of 
war — where it had started at the beginning. 

The statements above made in this chapter show 
a moral exhaustion in the loyal States almost equal 
to the physical exhaustion, especially in transporta- 
tion, of the South. Napoleon said that the moral 
factor was far more important in war than brute 
force, that war was essentially a moral and not a 
physical problem. 

The loss to Great Britain of Cornwallis' eight 



270 ANTIETAM 

thousand at Yorktown was of trifling moment, but 
seven years of war had brought an inertia in camp 
and cabinet, a weariness, and a moral exhaustion 
which could not be revived ; and we ourselves, after 
four years, found the same difficulties, the same 
moral exhaustion, the same scraping the slums for 
worthless recruits, the same desertions, and the same 
financial depletion and collapse, at hand. 



XXX 

GRANT^S PICTURE OF SECRETARY STANTON's CHARAC- 
TERISTICS DANGER OF THE REWARD OF m'CLEL- 

lan's success — m'clellan's qualities as a 
commanding general 

So we see that it was not merely a matter of a few 
more years of war, to secure certain personal results, 
with the conclusion destined to be the same in the 
end, that was involved in preventing McClellan 
from finishing up the war in 1862. It was a matter 
that put to deadly peril the Union, the Government, 
republican institutions, and all that for which our 
soldiers, our young men, so gladly went to fight and 
so freely gave their lives. It was one of those 
blunders which are said to be worse than crimes. 
Said General Upton, writing in 1879 to his friend 
Colonel Henry A. DuPont: "If you want to know 
who was the cause of a three years' war, after we 
created a disciplined army of six hundred thousand 
men, it was Stanton." 

Grant in his "Memoirs" clearly depicts the char- 
acter of the Secretary of War in such aspects as 
show how he was able to accomplish so much 
actual injury in so short a space of time. He depicts 

271 



2^2. ANTIETAM 

him as a man of tireless energy, personally timid, 
but bold in action and direction until called down 
by a higher authority. Then, if he saw that his 
superior "meant business" and was bound to have 
things done in his own way, Stanton subsided at 
once and did as he was directed, always, however, 
furtively glancing at the bone from which he had 
been driven away, and ready to seize it on the slight- 
est relaxation of the master's attention or as soon as 
opportunity offered. To translate Grant's language 
into the vernacular, he was from tip to toe what is 
called ''a bluffer," and one who increased his power 
by bullying and lacerating whenever it was safe to 
do so. It is not an agreeable task to speak ill of 
anyone, and Stanton had high abilities ; but he was 
backed up by a secret clique of civilians, he repre- 
sented a powerful guild of politicians, and he felt 
that he was justified in carrying out his and their 
purposes at whatever cost to army, people, or coun- 
try, believing that the end justified the means, and 
that the means, if boldly employed, were within his 
compass. 

Says General Grant, who alone made Stanton 
bend the knee to him, and stipulated for this before 
he would consent to assume command in the East 
at all: ''Mr. Stanton never questioned his own 
authority to command, unless resisted. He cared 
nothing for the feelings of others. In fact, it seemed 
to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify. 
He felt no hesitation in assuming the function of 



STANTON'S CHARACTERISTICS 273 

the executive, or in acting without advising with 
him. If his act was not sustained, he would change 
it — if he saw the matter would be followed up until 
he did so." Consult Grant's ''Personal Memoirs," 
vol. II, pp. 536-537, etc. 

''Mr. Lincoln," continues General Grant, "did 
not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfillment 
of a public trust. Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and 
he was willing to trust his generals in making and 
executing their plans. The Secretary was very 
timid, and it was impossible for him to avoid inter- 
fering with the armies covering the capital when it 
was sought to defend it by an offensive movement 
against the enemy guarding the Confederate capital. 
He could see our weakness, but he could not see 
that the enemy was in danger. The enemy would 
not have been in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in 
the field." 

As General Upton has so clearly shown, the Sec- 
retary was very much in the field ; or, rather, he 
was like that other aggressive creature, who does so 
m.uch damage when he plants himself in a china- 
shop, while suffering no personal danger to himself. 
But the bull does his damage while ignorantly try- 
ing to get himself out, whereas the Secretary did 
his while ignorantly trying to get deeper in. 

Then, of course, there was seen looming up, be- 
fore these men at Washington, the ever present 
danger that what had been granted to Washington, 
Jackson, Harrison, Taylor, and PicrcC'—and was 



274 ANTIETAM 

yet to be awarded to Grant, Hayes, Garfield, and 
Harrison, and, later on, Roosevelt, — might be 
granted to McClellan. A military man, successful 
and conspicuous, might be chosen by the sovereign 
will of the people of the whole country to be their 
President; and this was something to be prevented 
at all hazards. 

But McClellan, in his place in the army, could 
surely have done nothing politically to ensure this 
reward at the hands of the people; none of those 
other soldiers I have mentioned did so. Yet still, 
if he were the really successful general I have at- 
tempted to describe, such danger would doubtless 
exist; while on the contrary, if he were the slow, 
inefficient, and useless general he was depicted to 
be, then the surest way to ruin his chances of politi- 
cal preferment would have been to allow him to 
work out his own damnation for himself, and re- 
main in command of that army whose soldiers wept 
when he left them, and whose great officers joined 
in a magnificent tribute to him soon afterward, when 
he was powerless and helpless, and which Stanton, 
on hearing of it through General Carl Schurz, inves- 
tigated, and suppressed with a bang ! 

Then, was it for his slowness that he was re- 
moved? If so, his sloth must have been recently 
acquired. General Scott wrote him, July 13, 1861, 
to Beverly, Va. : "The General-in-Chief and, what 
is more, the Cabinet, including the President, are 
charmed with your activity, valor, and consequent 



STANTON'S CHARACTERISTICS 275 

successes of Rich Mountain, the nth, and of Bev- 
erly this morning. We do not doubt that you will 
in due time sweep the Rebels from Western Vir- 
ginia, but we do not mean to precipitate you, as you 
are fast enough." 

I think I have been able to show, when Mc- 
Clellan appeared slow, who it was that slowed him ; 
and when he was unsuccessful, what it was that 
made him so ; and when he was successful, that it 
was only in proportion as he could get the ropes of 
interference off which were wound around him 
from Washington ; and that when he was free of 
these he was the most successful of all our com- 
manding officers, the most thorough, and the most 
rapid. 

It was for these qualities that Grant — who had 
then been Major-General, Lieutenant-General, full 
General, and twice President — said to John Russell 
Young, when in the Straits of Malacca : "I knew 
McClellan, and had great confidence in him. I 
have, for that matter, never lost my respect for 
McClellan's character, nor my confidence in his 
loyalty and ability. I saw in him the man who was 
to pilot us through, and I wanted to be on his 
staff. ... I should have liked to have joined 
McClellan." 

McClellan, afterward describing how they came 
to miss one another, said, in his love and admira- 
tion for Grant : ''This was his good luck ; for had 
I been there I would, no doubt, have given him a 



276 ANTIETAM 

place on my staff, and he would probably have re- 
mained with me and shared my fate." 

And Grant, as well as McClellan and Meade, had 
several close shaves of his own, and from the same 
uncanny source. 

While McClellan was in command at Camp Den- 
nison, in 1861, there passed between him and the 
War Department the shortest and oddest corre- 
spondence which I have come across in the War 
Records, and which throws a pleasing side-light on 
that officer : 

"Cincinnati, Ohio, May 22, 1861, 
Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War: 

Will you please authorize me to use boards to put up 
places for worship at Camp Dennison? Parties furnishing 
nails and labor. Geo. B. McClellan, Major-General." 

War Department, May 22, 1861. 
Major-General George B. McClellan, Cincinnati : 
The Lord's will be done. 

Simon Cameron, Secretary of War. 

It was for these qualities, also above narrated, 
that General Long, Lee's military secretary, after- 
ward Brigadier-General and Chief of Artillery of 
the Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, re- 
ports in his "Memoirs of Lee" (edited under the 
supervision of General Marcus J. Wright, after- 
ward Agent of the United States for Collecting Con- 
federate Records), the following, which occurred 



STANTON'S CHARACTERISTICS 277 

long after the war : ''One thing I remember hearing 
him say. He asked General Lee which, in his 
opinion, was the ablest of the Union generals; to 
which the latter answered, bringing his hand down 
on the table with an emphatic energy, 'McClellan, 
by all odds!'" (See page 233.) 



XXXI 

WHY WAS m'cLELLAN REMOVED AND FITZ JOHN 

PORTER COURT-MARTIALED THE POPE-HAL- 

LECK-STANTON DISPATCHES 

So the question again recurs. What was that which 
we doctors call "the exciting cause" of McClellan's 
removal from command on that most unfortunate 
occasion ? 

We shall have to look far away for an answer 
to what was then the scene of an Indian uprising, 
in the wilder parts of Minnesota. We shall take up 
the antecedent features of the astounding affair, 
and more particularly detail in Chapter xxxiii fol- 
lowing just what this "exciting cause" proved to be. 

It was especially important to the War Depart- 
ment strategists at Washington that someone at that 
time should turn up, somewhere far removed from 
the wholesome influence of the loyal Army of the 
Potomac and its commander; and, like a gift of 
Providence, came forth the twin heroes Halleck and 
Pope. 

General Halleck sent to Secretary Stanton, June 
4, 1862, his made-up dispatch: 

278 



McCLELLAN REMOVED, ETC 279 

"Halleck's Headquarters, June 4. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War: 

General Pope, with 40,000, is thirty miles south of Corinth, 
pushing the enemy hard. He already reports 10,000 prisoners 
and deserters from the enemy, and 15,000 stand cf arms cap- 
tured. Thousands of the enemy are throwing away their 
arms." 

Stanton telegraphed back : 

"Your glorious dispatch has just been received, and I have 
sent it into every State. The whole land will soon ring with 
applause at the achievement of your gallant army and its 
able and victorious commander." 

And even the President was deceived. He tele- 
graphed also : 

"Your dispatch of to-day to the Secretary of War re- 
ceived. Thanks for the good news it brings." 

The fighting in the West, it is true, had been 
actually done by others ; but Lyon was dead, and 
Grant in disgrace, and Halleck and Pope emerged 
into public view in the very nick of time. A vic- 
tory far beyond that of Fort Donelson, or that of 
Shiloh, or of anywhere else, was made to order 
and heralded abroad, for it brought thousands of 
prisoners, and more to come ; and the great, tender- 
hearted Lincoln wanted Rebel prisoners far more 
than he wanted dead Rebels. 

Pope, within one week from the proclamation 
abroad of the bogus dispatch, was rushed to Wash- 
ington; and within ten days more he was made 



28o ANTIETAM 

commanding' general of a new army, — the Army of 
Virginia, — with Washington as its very own, and all 
the rest of Virginia as its "hinterland," or sphere 
of influence. When Pope reached Washington he 
must have tried to explain matters, for Stanton 
telegraphed Halleck to know why he sent such a 
dispatch. Halleck excused himself, like a lawyer, 
by saying that he sent only the reports the generals 
made to him. If anybody had lied, the inference 
was, it must have been Pope. 

Halleck himself was brought on next, imme- 
diately following Pope. He was a lawyer, a closet- 
strategist, and a compiler at second-hand of books 
on strategy, but one who never manifested any 
strategical skill of his own; or, if he did, feared to 
use it. (See Grant, ''Personal Memoirs," vol. i, 
p. 578; vol. II, pp. 317, 318, 327, 337.) 

Now, when General Pope came to the Eastern 
armies every ofhcer in those amiies knew the truth 
about the bogus victory, about Grant, and every- 
thing else, for the grapevine telegraph among sol- 
diers always took care of that sort of thing. 

William F. G. Shanks, in his "Personal Recollec- 
tions of Distinguished Generals," relates an inci- 
dent which could not have failed to reach the armies 
in the East, for it brought Sherman and Grant to- 
gether for life, and Sherman was an Eastern army 
officer, and one of McClellan's generals, having been 
sent by the latter to command in the West. 

There is much of romance in the story of Grant's 



McCLELLAN REMOVED, ETC. 281 

and Sherman's friendship. It began in 1862, and 
ever afterward continued to grow in strength. When 
the armies of Halleck were lying — literally so, 
indeed — before Corinth, Grant was to all appear- 
ance shelved in disgrace. He was second in com- 
mand, but to be second in command then was to be 
the ''fifth wheel to the coach." Grant was much 
chagrined at his position, and felt in tenfold degree 
each petty indignity which Halleck heaped upon 
him. One day General Sherman, who commanded 
one of the divisions of the wing under the command 
of General George H. Thomas, went to General 
Grant's quarters and bolted with his usual abrupt- 
ness into Grant's tent. They didn't stand on cere- 
mony in the field. He found the general actually 
weeping with vexation. Sherman asked the cause, 
and for the first time Grant recounted the indig- 
nities which he had endured, the troubles he had en- 
countered, and the false position in which he had 
been placed before the country. 'The truth is, 
Sherman," he said, 'T am not wanted. The coun- 
try has no use for me, and I am about to resign and 
go home." 

"No, you are not," returned Sherman impatiently; 
"you are going to do nothing of the sort. The 
country does need you, and you must stay here, bear 
these petty insults, and do your duty." And, the 
author says, Sherman argued Grant down, and kept 
him there until Halleck's appointment, as general- 
in-chief. "left the command in the West vacant." 



282 ANTIETAM 

Then Grant had his chance, but neither he nor 
Sherman ever forgot Halleck. Sherman, in his 
"Personal Memoirs," relates this story in much the 
same manner. 

Pope's coming East under these circumstances 
could certainly inspire no confidence in the men. 
His boastful address to his Virginia army, that in 
the West they had always seen the backs of their 
enemies while in the East we did the opposite — when 
every officer and soldier in Virginia knew that all 
the battling which Pope ever did in the West did 
not equal, in actual fighting. Big Bethel or Dranes- 
ville — was tactless, to say no worse. His order — 
promptly vetoed by the President — to remove 
from their farms and homes and send beyond our 
lines all male citizens found therein, unless they 
took the oath of allegiance, was harsh, ill-timed, and 
despotic. An important fact, clearly set forth in 
General Upton's "Military Policy," was that Pope 
attributed to one day, in his Bull Run battle, the 
events which had really occurred on another day, 
and that, after assuming command on June 27 he 
never went out to see his army until July 30. There- 
fore, in the light of the foregoing acts, Pope could 
not have failed to produce an uneasiness among all 
military bodies, private soldiers and officers alike, 
long before the Army of the Potomac had been 
ordered up from the Peninsula. 

I can testify of my own knowledge to the feeling 
prevalent among the troops near Washington at 



McCLELLAN REMOVED, ETC. 283 

the beginning of July, when General Pope conducted 
a review of a few thousand men near Fort Worth, 
back of Alexandria. A mere corporal in the ranks 
then, I knew little of General Pope; but a jest, with 
a curse, went the rounds, after that terribly hot day 
of double-quicking past the grandstand (doubtless 
not true, but it was in everybody's mouth) : "Oh, 
Pa, twot 'em 'round again; they look so pretty." 
The incident has no value as history, but it exempli- 
fies a popular feeling in the army at the time, long 
before McClellan or his army was a possible factor 
in the case. 

There is nothing that sifts out a man like sol- 
diering. A man can fool courts and cabinets, news- 
paper reporters and editors, and even the public, but 
if he is a military commander he cannot fool the 
intelligent and square-dealing veteran soldiers. These 
men, giving up their time, their pleasures, their 
business, their wives and sweethearts and families, 
and throwing just so much of their actual lives away 
like chaff, have offered themselves as living sacri- 
fices for their country, and are ready to pay the 
price with life or suffering. And these men want 
to feel and to know that the commander into whose 
hands they are put for weal or woe is a good man, 
a capable man, a powerful man, the best that can 
be obtained ; and that they are as safe in his hands 
as they can be in any human hands, and that the 
great cause for which they have periled life and all 
that makes life worth living is in good hands. Talk 



284 ANTIETAM 

about the fierce light which beats upon a throne! 
It is nothing to that searching Hght by which among 
soldiers — skilled soldiers, true soldiers, veterans — 
the commander is observed, and felt; and, if worthy, 
tied fast to. and lived with, and died for. When 
they find one such that they can trust in implicitly, 
that they can believe in absolutely and follow fear- 
lessly, they surrender themselves and all they have 
to that commander with a joyful self-sacrifice that 
makes them immortal heroes. 

Of such commanders Emerson says : ''A river of 
command runs down from the eyes of some men, 
and the reason why we feel one man's presence and 
not another's, is as simple as gravity; and this 
natural force is no more to be w-ithstood than any 
other natural force." 

Lord Wolseley says : "This is the influence which 
men, with what I may term great electrical pozver 
in their nature, have exercised in war. Caesar, Marl- 
borough, Napoleon, Sir Charles Napier, and many 
others I could name possessed it largely. The cur- 
rent passed from them into all around, creating 
great enthusiasm in all ranks far and near, and 
often making heroes of men w'hose mothers and 
fathers even had never regarded them in that light. 
This feeling is an addition of at least fifty per cent, 
of strength and energy to an army where it exists." 

Bonaparte said that he often noticed the imme- 
diate electric effect of his arrival on the battle- 
field. 



McCLELLAN REMOVED, ETC. 285 

We all recollect what occurred when Sheridan 
reached his half-routed army in his ride from Win- 
chester to the battle-field of Fisher's Creek, in the 
Shenandoah Valley. 

On the hurried march from the Potomac to 
Gettysburg, and especially on that exceedingly long 
march of the Sixth Corps, the word passed in the 
night from rank to rank, **McClellan is back again, 
and in command." The whole column took on new 
life and energy, and enthusiasm took the place of 
uneasiness and despondency, as they marched on 
in anticipated triumph, to the glory of a new An- 
tietam. It was not McClellan ; but it was the next 
best thing possible, it was one of his own chosen 
tl-^i-ee — Reynolds, Meade, and Hancock — who took 
the army and saved the country. 

So the poor boy-private at Antietam, with his 
leg shot off at the thigh, raised himself on his elbow 
and cried out with his dying breath, as McClellan 
was riding by along the battle Hues: ''God bless 
you, General McClellan !" And the peerless Bayard, 
dying beside a tree on the fatal field of Fredericks- 
burg, sent this message: 'Tell General McClellan 
that my only regret is that I do not die while under 
his command." So, too, General Grant said to John 
Russell Young: "McClellan is to me one of the 
mysteries of the war. As a young man he was al- 
ways a mystery. He had the way of inspiring you 
with the idea of immense capacity, if he would 
only have a chance. Then he is a man of unusual 



286 ANTIETAM 

accomplishments — a student, and a well-read man." 
Grant thus separated this peculiar psychical power 
of the commander from the habits, education, and 
acquirements of the individual, while he attributed 
both to McClellan. It is from the universal recog- 
nition of this controlling factor, by his old sol- 
diers, that even to this day they have never been 
satisfied with what history professed to teach re- 
garding him. What General Emory Upton discov- 
ered by investigation, his old soldiers found out by 
personal experience; and they know, with General 
Upton, that the military answer to the McClellan 
problem, as so far presented in current history, 
"cannot be made to prove, and is not correct." 



XXXII 

pope's battle and his defeat SECOND 

MANASSAS 

General Upton traces the Second Bull Run bat- 
tle with a pen of fire, and puts the blame where it 
belongs. This is what he says : "The criticisms on 
the march of Franklin's corps have all been based 
on the assumption that there was a broad pike from 
Alexandria to Centerville, that this highway was 
all the time open, and that nothing prevented a 
junction with the hard-pressed Army of Virginia 
save the indifference of the commander of the Army 
of the Potomac. . 

"The facts as subsequently established were that, 
from the afternoon of the 26th until the afternoon 
of the 28th, from 25,000 to 30,000 Confederates 
were on the direct line of communication with the 
Army of Virginia; that from the time General 
Pope reached Centerville, on the 28th, till the even- 
ing of the 29th. no positive information had been 
received as to his whereabouts ; that his cavalry was 
so used up that not five horses per company could 
be forced into a trot ; that he sent no dispatch to the 
Government till the morning of the 30th, and that 

287 



288 ANTIETAM 

Franklin's corps, on the information derived on the 
night of the 29th, joined him on the 30th,, part of it 
having marched twenty miles." 

After Pope's defeated army began to pour back 
upon Washington, and after McClellan's Army of 
the Potomac had been entirely sent out to Pope, 
leaving himself in command of only his staff and 
orderlies, less than one hundred men. General Upton 
says that, having acted on the theory of the War 
Department strategists, there were only 5989 men 
left to garrison Washington, ''of whom 2235 were 
militia, whose term of service would expire before 
the end of the month." 

As regards the Army of the Potomac, in this 
Pope campaign, I quote General Upton again : ''The 
accusation that the Army of the Potomac would not 
fight, will justify the inquiry, 'What troops fought 
the Second Battle of Bull Run?' The Army of Vir- 
ginia, as we know, consisted of the corps of Gen- 
eral Banks, Sigel, and McDowell. Of these General 
Banks' corps took no part, being assigned to the 
protection of the trains." 

Sigel reported June 30 that his corps w^as not in 
good condition, the organization not complete, and 
the cavalry not more than 800 effective men and 
horses. 

Pope had already complained of straggling, as 
early as July 22. He stated afterward, of the battle 
itself, that "at least one-half of this great diminu- 
tion of our forces was occasioned by skulking and 



POPE'S BATTLE AND DEFEAT 289 

straggling from the army. Thousands of men strag- 
gled away, and were not in any action." This corps 
(Sigel's) was estimated at 9000 on the 26th of Au- 
gust. 

In addition, the two divisions of King and 
Ricketts numbered 13,000; "these two divisions," 
says Upton, ''about 13,000 men, and General Sigel's 
corps, 9000, were all the troops belonging to the 
Army of Virginia who confronted the 60,000 Con- 
federates on the 29th and 30th." To these are to 
be added Reno's division of Burnside's corps — the 
other two divisions being still opposite Fredericks- 
burg. The remaining troops, says Upton, Rey- 
nolds, Kearny, Hooker, of Heintzleman's corps, and 
Morell and Sykes, of Porter's corps, in all 20,500, 
belonged to the Army of the Potomac. 

Had Pope fallen back on Centerville on the 24th 
or 25th, says Upton, — as Meade did in October of 
1863, — Franklin and the remaining divisions of 
Burnside could have reached him in time. 

But, as Upton says, Pope did not understand his 
own plan. He w^as claiming a great victory, driving 
the Rebels, and he could not understand the events 
which were taking place all around him ; and as 
there was later on demanded someone to suffer, 
Pope poured the vials of his wrath on Porter and 
McClellan, and the War Department strategists 
were only too glad to compound, for bringing Pope 
and Halleck to Washington, by laying their failure 
on the men who really saved them. That such was 



290 ANTIETAM 

the case Pope, in especial, never did and never could 
comprehend. 

Porter was court-martialed, as is well known. 
The evidence was cooked. That w^hich was incon- 
venient was suppressed, exculpating dispatches were 
concealed, the testimony of the Confederate officers 
who knew the facts on their own part was ignored, 
and the victim was cashiered. But subsequently, 
when the urgent necessity of convicting him to save 
Pope, Halleck, and Stanton had passed, a new and 
fairer tribunal, composed of Schofield, Terry, and 
Getty, went over the whole case and clearly demon- 
strated that it was Fitz John Porter who had saved 
Pope's army, instead of defeating it, who had saved 
the capital, and that he deserved well of his coun- 
try. (See War "Records, vol. xii, part 2, pp. 513- 
536.) Grant, too, in his fair-mindedness and 
breadth of character, promised to stand by Porter 
forever, and he did so ; and his article, published 
in 1883, '*x\n Undeserved Stigma," not only vindi- 
cated Porter, but was the noble act of a fellow- 
soldier now too great to be assailed, but who had 
himself passed under the same harrow. Grant to 
Porter : 

"As long as I have a voice it shall be raised in 
your support, without any reference to its effect 
upon me or others." {North American Review, 
December, 1885.) 



XXXIII 

pope's demand which halleck dared not re- 
fuse THE FALSE DISPATCH OF HALLECK's 

WHICH BROUGHT POPE AND HALLECK TO COM- 
MAND AT WASHINGTON 

After Pope's campaign in Virginia was over, he 
was sent to Minnesota to command against the sav- 
ages — a position of degradation, as he held it to be. 
He wrote a series of remarkable letters to Halleck, 
commencing with one of September 30, 1862. (See 
War Records, vol. xii, part 3, pp. 816-827.) He 
accused Halleck of not sustaining him against Mc- 
Clellan; that McClellan would never forgive Hal- 
leck for superseding him; that Halleck was under 
"a deep personal obligation" to Pope, and that he 
could learn what it was by consulting the President, 
Secretary of War, or other members of the Admin- 
istration; that he had besought the President, and 
Halleck himself, to be allowed to go West to his old 
place again; and that the journals, and members of 
the Cabinet even, were representing that McClellan 
was really commander, "while you are but a tool in 
his hands." 

291 



292 ANTIETAM 

Halleck replied, defending himself in his usual 
manner by showing that whatever credit there was, 
was his, and whatever blame there was belonged 
to the ''President and entire Cabinet." 

But Pope came at him again, under date October 
20: ''The greatest criminal is McClellan, and my 
charge is direct and plain against him. Your reason 
for retaining him in command, 'the feelings of many 
officers of the Potomac Army,' is the very strongest 
reason, in my view, why he should not be re- 
tained. . . . He [McClellan] should never 
have been placed in command of anything under 
such circumstances. 

"I wrote you because I desire you to understand 
fully my feelings, and the course of action that I 
shall pursue. I had hoped that you would render 
official steps unnecessary. 

"Had I imagined for a moment that he would 
be rewarded with his partisans for abandoning me, 
and betraying his trust, and that you would, at least, 
have consented to his and their advancement after 
such an act, and would have failed to sustain me, or 
even to do me the barest justice, or to make the 
slightest acknowledgment in public of my services, 
I would never have put foot in Virginia." 

And now comes the stinger : 

"Your not doing so, when the whole facts came 
to be known, cannot fail to be the subject of remark, 
especially so as the circumstances under which you, 
came to Washington and I undertook the campaign 



POPE'S DEMAND, ETC. 293 

in Virginia are well known to one-half of Con- 
gress.'' The italics are mine. 

He adds that if Halleck cannot do justice, even in 
words, to him, "No man regrets more than I do that 
you occupy such a position, or would more gladly 
see you out of it." 

Halleck evidently considered and consulted. He 
did not reply so far as publication shows, and Pope 
came at him again. This letter was dated at Saint 
Paul, Minn., October 30, 1862. It should have 
reached Washington November 4. The very next 
day, November 5, McClellan was removed from 
command, by the following order: 

War Department, Adj. General's Office. 
General Orders Washington, November 5, 1862. 

No. 182. 
By direction of the President of the United States, it is 
ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the 
Command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major- 
General Burnside take the command of that army. 
By order of the Secretary of War. 

Then General Pope, and the rest, felt easier. Pope 
wrote, November 20 : "I will wait the action of the 
Government with all the patience that is in my 
nature." 

They had not finished yet with Fitz John Porter, 

and, as Pope says, "My position here is not pleasant. 

My future command or place I leave to 

yourself, without uneasiness, feeling assured that 

you will do me justice." 



294 ANTIETAM 

And so the knowledge in the breast of one-half 
of Congress, and in the secret files of the Committee 
on the Conduct of the War, and in the minds of 
various others who thought it the better part of 
valor to be prudent, slumbered until the war had 
ended, and then, and not till then, General Pope felt 
free to ask ugly questions, and to put them in print, 
too, which he did. (See War Records, vol. x, part 
2, pp. 635-637.) 

Washington, D. C, 
July 3, 1865. 
Major-General H. W. Halleck, U. S. A., 

Washington, D. C. 
General: 

The war has now ended, and the events and incidents con- 
nected with it are passing into history. As I do not wish that 
any report or misconception which has been circulated to 
my prejudice, and which is susceptible of explanation, should 
stand recorded against me, and as the reasons which actuated 
me in preserving silence until this time no longer exist, I 
desire to invite your attention to a dispatch published in the 
newspapers, dated at Corinth, Miss., June 4, 1862, purporting 
to have been sent by you to the Secretary of War, and con- 
taining substantially the following words, viz.: "General 
Pope is thirty miles south of Corinth, pushing the enemy 
hard. He already reports 10,000 prisoners and deserters, and 
15,000 stand of arms captured," etc. I do not know that 
you ever sent such a dispatch ; but as I do know that I never 
made such a report, I infer that if you sent the dispatch in 
question, you must have done so under a very great mis- 
apprehension. I have therefore to request that you furnish 
me a copy of any report made by me upon which such a dis- 
patch as that in question was sent. I have full records of 



POPE'S DEMAND, ETC. 295 

all my letters, dispatches, and reports to you during the 
operations at Corinth, and no such report is among them. 
I am, General, respectfully, your obedient servant, 

John Pope. 

But Halleck declined to furnish Pope a copy of 
such report, and said that all his papers were boxed 
up for California, adding: "I never reported to 
the Secretary of War dispatches received from you 
which were not so received." 

This lawyer's letter was too much for Pope, and 
he wrote Halleck, July 5, that that officer was to 
pass three weeks before going to California, in New 
York; that only a short time would be required to 
look up this paper; that if Halleck meant to still in- 
sist that the dispatch was a correct transcript of any- 
thing that Pope had sent him, he was ''altogether 
unsatisfactory," — which was certainly true, but that 
was because in this case he had to be. 'Tn short, 
General, I utterly deny that the dispatch purporting 
to have been sent by you to the Secretary of War 
was based upon any report from me such as is 
therein stated, and I therefore call upon you to dis- 
avow this dispatch or to furnish me with a copy of 
the report attributed to me." He says that such a 
question ''in almost any other case" could be easily 
and conclusively settled by a reference to the offi- 
cial files, "but I have ascertained, General, that when 
you left the West you ordered that portion of the 
dispatches and reports concerning the operations 
around Corinth, which bear upon this question, to be 



296 ANTIETAM 

cut out of the official books, and brought with you to 
Washington, leaving the official records in Saint 
Louis mutilated and incomplete.'' 

Pope then sums up the case; says that he has all 
the evidence requisite; that if Halleck would not, 
or could not, clear it up, — which, of course, Pope 
knew that he couldn't, and which Pope himself had 
not done when it would have been of some use, — he 
would feel quite different toward what one may call 
his old friend and comrade ; that Pope desired to still 
maintain those relations, but ! 

Halleck, however, believed that silence was 
golden in this case, and no answer is recorded to 
General Pope's last letter. However, the letters 
answered themselves. 

It is somewhat humiliating, and not creditable to 
any of those concerned, to have to record these 
facts; but it is a question of either McClellan or of 
his detractors, and the innocent should not in such 
a case, and in so serious a case particularly, be the 
one to be made to suffer. 

It is perfectly clear that General Pope, when he 
wrote his letters to Halleck from Minnesota in 1862, 
was thoroughly aroused. He was no hypocrite in 
believing that he was a grossly abused man, and that 
Halleck was responsible for it ; and that in his bogus 
dispatch, mutilation of records, and other conduct 
just before he left Corinth, and when he came to 
Washington as General-in-Chief, Halleck had been 
guilty of acts which would, if made public, forfeit 



POPE'S DEMAND, ETC. 297 

him his place in the army and degrade him as a 
man, and he offered to Halleck in categorical tenns 
the alternative either to dismiss McClellan and 
court-martial and convict Fitz John Porter, or else 
to be court-martialed and cashiered himself. 

Halleck chose the former alternative, and at once, 
through his co-partner Stanton, had McClellan re- 
moved and Fitz John Porter court-martialed, and 
the court packed to cashier the latter — if not to 
have him shot. 



XXXIV 

m'cLELLAN THE PRESIDENT THE ARMY OF THE 

POTOMAC CONCLUSION 

There is nothing to show that the President ever 
had the slightest cognizance of the circumstances 
and conditions surrounding these tragical events. 
Indeed, it is certain that Lincoln not only did not 
know, but never even dreamed, of cabals and ma- 
chinations. He was surrounded with webs and en- 
tanglements, and there was absolutely no one to 
whom he could then turn whose words of advice, 
if just and true, would not be drowned out or 
silenced, and the adviser would have been destroyed 
for doing his unselfish duty. McClellan himself 
never believed that Lincoln was anything else than 
just and friendly. In the report of his final cam- 
paign, dated August 4, 1863, ^^^S after his removal 
from command, he accords this just and noble 
tribute to the President : 

"I cannot omit the expression of my thanks to 
the President for the constant evidence given me 
of his sincere personal regard, and his desire to sus- 
tain the military plans which my judgment led me 
to urge for adoption and execution. I cannot at- 



McCLELLAN— THE PRESIDENT 299 

tribute his failure to adopt some of these plans, and 
to give that support to others which was necessary 
to their success, to any want of confidence in me; 
and it only remains for me to regret that other coun- 
sels came between the constitutional commander- 
in-chief and the general whom he had placed at the 
head of his armies — counsels which resulted in the 
failure of great campaigns. 

"If the nation possesses no generals in service 
competent to direct its military affairs without the 
aid or supervision of politicians, the sooner it finds 
them and places them in position the better it will 
be for its fortunes. 

"I am devoutly grateful to God that my last cam- 
paign with this brave army was crowned with a vic- 
tory which saved the nation from the greatest peril 
it had then undergone. I have not accomplished 
my purpose if, by this report, the Army of the Poto- 
mac is not placed high on the roll of the historic 
armies of the world. Its deeds ennoble the nation 
to which it belongs. Always ready for battle, al- 
ways firm, steadfast, and trustworthy, I never called 
on it in vain ; nor will the nation ever have cause to 
attribute its want of success, under myself, or under 
other commanders, to any failure of patriotism or 
bravery in that noble body of American soldiers." 



XXXV 

SOME NOTES OF m'cLELLAN's LIFE AND PERSONALITY 

While this work is essentially a military criticism 
based on official data, much of which is new to the 
public, and intended for military students and stu- 
dents of strategy, it may be well to append, in 
the briefest form, some personal data relating to 
General George B. McClellan himself. Perhaps this 
can best come from a military man himself, one 
who knew him at West Point and during the War 
with Mexico, and who has written important works 
on kindred subjects; and yet one who was not em- 
ployed in the military service during the War of the 
Rebellion, having left the army six years before the 
war, to engage in literary pursuits which have made 
his name famous throughout the world. I refer to 
Professor and President Henry Coppee, whose 
''Conquest of Spain" is a monumental work which 
could only have been accomplished by one of high 
military judgment. 

The remarks on the personality and history of 
General McClellan I select from his biographical 
notice of McClellan in Appleton's "Cyclopaedia of 
American Biography," published in i^ 

300 



NOTES ON McCLELLAN'S LIFE 301 

Professor Coppee entered the Military Academy 
of West Point in 1841, and was graduated in 1845, 
while McClellan entered the same institution in 1842, 
and was graduated in 1846. so that they were asso- 
ciated as students for three years. 

Coppee's life was fruitful, and gave him every 
opportunity to measure men, and especially military 
men, and their qualifications and achievements. 

He served as an officer of artillery during the 
War with Mexico, and was promoted for gallantry 
at Contreras and Churubusco ; he was principal as- 
sistant professor of geography, history, and ethics 
at West Point for five years; he resigned from the 
army in 1855, to become professor of English lit- 
erature in the University of Pennsylvania, until 
1866; then president of Lehigh University, at Beth- 
lehem, in 1874; and was one of the Regents of the 
Smithsonian Institution, at Washington. He was 
twice a member of the United States Mint Assay 
Commission; he was editor of the United Service 
Magazine in 1864- 1866. In addition to many works 
not military. Professor Coppee was the author of 
"Manual of Battalion Drill," ''Evolutions of the 
Line," "Manual of Court-Martial," "Life and Ser- 
vices of General U. S. Grant," and "The Conquest 
of Spain by the Arab-Moors," and translator from 
the French of "La Guerre Civile en Amerique," by 
Count Paris. 

Says Professor Coppee of McClellan : 



302 ANTIETAM 

''Born in Philadelphia, Pa., December 3, 1826; 
died in Orange, N. J., October 29, 1885. 

"Educated by private tutors, he spent two years 
at the University of Pennsylvania, where he shared 
first honors; at the age of fifteen years and six 
months (while under legal age) he became by spe- 
cial authority a cadet at the Military Academy at 
West Point July i, 1842. In his class were Gen- 
eral Stonewall Jackson, General Reno, and others 
who subsequently became distinguished. 

''He led his class in mathematics, and was gradu- 
ated July I, 1846. He was appointed brevet second 
lieutenant in the corps of engineers (the highest 
class), and served during the War with Mexico, in 
the operations resulting in the capture of the city; 
was promoted for meritorious conduct, and in 1848 
was made assistant and instructor of practical engi- 
neering at West Point. He was engaged in the Red 
River and other Government explorations, and, later, 
as engineer on the Western frontiers, and in 
Oregon and Washington. He was sent to Europe 
during the Crimean War, on a commission to study 
the organizations, arms, field and siege-works, and 
operations of the different armies, the results of 
which were published in his elaborate report, "The 
Armies of Europe," and which was used in re- 
organizing our own armies during the War of the 
Rebellion. He wrote a number of other military 
works of a practical character, and devised the well- 



NOTES ON McCLELLAN^S LIFE 303 

known McClellan saddle for cavalry, which has 
come into universal military use. 

"In 1857 he resigned from the army, which was 
then largely unemployed, to accept the position of 
chief engineer of the Illinois Central Railroad, and 
became its vice-president in 1858, and in 1859 was 
elected president of the Eastern Division of the St. 
Louis, Missouri and Cincinnati Railroad. Imme- 
diately on the breaking out of the War of the Rebel- 
lion he resigned, to re-enter the army, and April 23 
he was appointed major-general of the Ohio Volun- 
teers, and placed in command of the Department of 
the Ohio, which included the States of Ohio, 
Indiana, and Illinois, with portions of Virginia and 
Pennsylvania. 

"In a month he was in the field, and immediately 
engaged in a most successful war, which made 
West Virginia a loyal State ever afterward. 

"His subsequent history is a part of the history 
of his country." 

Of his personal qualities and characteristics, Pro- 
fessor Coppee has this to say : 

"McClellan was about five feet eight inches in 
height, firmly built, with broad shoulders ; solid and 
muscular, an excellent horseman. Modest and re- 
tiring, he had withal a great self-respect, a gracious 
dignity. His personal magnetism has no parallel 
in military history, except in that of the first Napo- 
leon; he was literally the idol of his officers and 
men. They would obey him when all other control 



304 ANTIETAM 

had failed. His hold upon the people was never 
relaxed. The army idolized him, and his popularity 
followed him. In 1864 he was chosen to deliver 
the oration at West Point on the occasion of the 
unveiling of the monument erected to the memory 
of the officers and soldiers of the regular army." 

In 1864, when the very crisis of the war was upon 
us, and when it was perilous *'to swap horses when 
crossing a stream," McClellan was made one of the 
Presidential candidates. His personality was his 
only platform, and, even then, he received from the 
loyal States and the anny alone a vote of 1,800,000, 
against his opponent, the immortal Lincoln, who re- 
ceived but 2,200,000, in an undoubtedly trammeled 
election. We can feel now that Lincoln's election 
was necessary then; but how sad the melancholy 
aftermath, and the loss of Lincoln, the Pacificator, 
who never lived to be. 

In 1877 McClellan was elected Governor of New 
Jersey, and declined a re-election. 

On his return from Europe, in 1868, he received 
ovations which those who were present will never 
forget. His procession through the streets of his 
native city was literally bordered with tears, and 
no subsequent receptions to others ever equalled or 
approached that of McClellan in his ovvai home. 

We can well understand how Grant, long after the 
War, said to his confidential friend and companion, 
John Russell Young : *T saw in him the man who 
was to pilot us through, and I wanted to be on his 



NOTES ON McCLELLAN'S LIFE 305 

staff. I should have liked to have joined McClel- 
lan," and, as McClellan pathetically said, ''would 
have shared my fate." 

And hov\r Robert E. Lee, after the War, when 
asked his opinion of which was the ablest of the 
Union generals, as narrated by his biographer and 
military secretary. General A. L. Long, brought his 
hand down on the table with emphatic energy, and 
said, ''McClellan, by all odds !" 



NOTES 



Antietam, The battle of South Mountain, September 14-15, 
prevented Longstreet from closing down in rear of Franklin 
and Couch, in Pleasant Valley, and forced Longstreet and 
D. H. Hill to turn south from Boonsborough to Sharpsburg, 
and abandon invasion of Pennsylvania from Hagerstown. 
See pp. 100, loi. 

Conscription. First general Confederate conscription was 
issued ten days after Stanton's order, in April, 1862, to stop all 
recruiting, close the offices and sell the furniture to the best 
advantage. See p. 29; also "Confederate Conscription," in 
Index. 

CuLPEPER. Technique of the strategy and tactics used by 
McClellan to pass by his flank across Jackson's front, and 
intervene between the two halves of the Confederate army, 
and strike Lx)ngstreet directly, by a frontal attack. 

(All of the above only to be found in the Supplemental 
Volume LI, of the Official War Records, published and issued 
in 1898-1899, instead of Volume xix, which had been pub- 
lished in 1887.) The general movement commenced five 
weeks after the last gun was fired at Antietam. 

Impossibility of an earlier advance east of the Blue Ridge, 
which the President insisted on. Up until the movement 
commenced, or at least to October 15th, the Army was living 
from hand to mouth, as practically no quartermaster's stores 
had been received since spring. The horses had largely de- 
creased since the Antietam campaign commenced. See note 
"Supplies," below; Lee's statements also of how McClellan's 
army was without means for a movement. Any advance of 
McClellan east of the Blue Ridge would also have opened 
Maryland and Pennsylvania to a fresh invasion, as Lee's 
whole army was at Winchester, thirty miles from the Poto- 
mac, and McClellan's army would have been east of the 
mountains, near Bull Run, and entirely beyond possibility of 
reaching and attacking Lee's new invasion except by a long 
pursuit into Pennsylvania, and an entire abandonment of our 

307 



3o8 NOTES 

movement to Culpeper or Richmond. Lee proposed, to both 
Generals Loring and Jackson, this precise movement (see 
their dispatches received). November was too late for such 
a general Confederate invasion, and McClellan left one whole 
corps and nearly half of another on the north bank of the 
Potomac to prevent even the threat of such a movement. 
See pp. 176, 177; 182, 183; 182-190; 193. 

Franklin and Couch at battle of Crampton's Gap and 
occupation of Pleasant Valley. Franklin held these until the 
night of September 16, and Couch until September 17; the 
purpose to prevent a great turning movement by Lee, from 
Sharpsburg across the Potomac, to Boteler's Ford; thence 
down Virginia to Harper's Ferry, then across the Potomac and 
down the north bank, and up east of the South Mountain, 
to occupy the passes, open Washington and Baltimore to cap- 
ture, and compel McClellan, by want of supplies, to retire into 
Pennsylvania. It was all balked by McClellan. See pp. 82-86; 
90-92. 

Grant followed the same route in June, 1864, that McClel- 
lan did in June-July, 1862, from Cold Harbor (Gaines' Mill), 
to Harrison's Landing. 

Grant crossed there to unite with Butler's army on the south 
bank of the James River. McClellan crossed the James also 
in considerable force, and had there been one-half as many 
Union troops then on the southern bank as Grant found there 
when he reached there, the heart of the Confederacy would 
have been inevitably perforated. 

But Burnside's Army of North Carolina was sent, not up the 
James, but up the Rappahannock to Pope ; and McClellan was 
ordered to trail along after Burnside and leave Lee free to 
move anywhere at will. 

If President Lincoln had had the nerve or experience to 
send to General McClellan, at Harrison's Landing, in July 
or August, 1862, the dispatch he sent to General Grant at 
City Point, just opposite, August 17, 1864 (see "War Rec- 
ords," Vol. xLii, Part 2, page 343), and which reads as fol- 
lows: "I have seen your dispatch [from Grant to Halleck, 
in reply], expressing your unwillingness to break your hold 
where you are. Neither am I willing. Hold on with a bull- 
dog grip and chew and choke as much as possible. A. Lin- 
coln.'' How different it would have been! In 1862 it was 
Pope and Halleck and Stanton who held on "with a bulldog 



NOTES 309 

grip," and chewed and choked, while Lincoln broke his hold, 
and made McClellan, also, break his. And then ! 

See the protest of Commodore Wilkes, "War Records," Vol. 
XI, Part 2, pp. 356-358; and see also General Upton, who, 
says, "Military Policy of the United States," page 371, "The 
fact should not be overlooked that the misguided advisers of 
the President and the Confederate Commander were aiming 
at the same object." See pp. 27, Z7, 43- 

MiCCLELLAN, — Manufactured the Army of the Potomac, and 
after its disruption under Pope, in August and September, 
1862, remanufactured anew, out of three disrupted armies, the 
new Army of the Potomac, never to be again remade until 
the war was over. Grant never made an army; they were 
made for him. Sherman, Thomas, Meade, Buell and Mc- 
Clellan made armies, and they learned it under McClellan, 
in whose army they were. Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gus- 
tavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, and, above all others, 
Napoleon made armies, which faculty, like that of all great 
architects, is a personal endowment ; and they who best made 
armies also best fought them, and had the qualities which 
Coppee attributes to McClellan, saying, page 303, "His per- 
sonal magnetism has no parallel in military history, except 
in that of the first Napoleon." See pp. 53-54; 284-286; 
303-305. 

Pope. — A curious commentary on the state of mind of 
General Pope is to be found in his letter in reply to General 
Halleck of October 20, 1862, "War Records," Vol xii. Part 3, 
page 822. Halleck, in reply to General Pope's previous let- 
ter says, page 820: "The feeling of many of his officers to- 
ward you was such that you could not have commanded them. 
No one can deny this. . . . The assignment of General 
McClellan to this command, or rather his retention in it, was 
not my act nor that of the War Department; it was the act of 
the President alone. I did not even know of his decision on 
the matter till he himself announced it to General McClellan." 

To this General Pope replied: "Your reason for retaining 
him in command, 'the feeling of many officers of the Poto- 
mac army,' is the very strongest reason, in my view, why he 
should not be retained." His view was that of the boarding- 
house keeper who said "she always tried to find out what the 
boarders didn't like, and then give them plenty of it." 

Halleck's letter, above quoted, is a direct and categoric 



3IO NOTES 

affirmation, which I have italicized, of what is stated in the 
text of this book, on pages 47, 48-52, 60-62. 

Steiner^ Dr. — Inspector of the Sanitary Commission, a resi- 
dent of Frederick, Maryland, where he owned a farm. After 
second Bull Run he had leave, and went to Frederick on the 
last train which reached that city, remaining there as an ob- 
server during the entire Confederate occupation, and accom- 
panied McClellan's army on its campaign to Antietam. His 
diary was made at the time. His important statements are 
those of an expert, an official inspector of troops. See pp. 
57, 77-78, 122-124, 133-134. 

Supplies. — By a doctored system in the Antietam cam- 
paign, after the battle the people of the North were made 
to believe that the Army of the Potomac was being lavishly 
supplied, while it was being actually starved and nearly naked ; 
while, in fact, these supplies went to the stay-at-homes in 
Washington under a fiction that McClellan's army was a part 
of "the defenses of the Capital," under the official order of 
September 2, and ignoring the unpublished direct and per- 
sonal order of the President for McClellan to take command 
of the army in the field. See pp. 173-177. 

War Records, United States Official, Supplemental Volume 
LI. Most of the actual material only is to be found in this 
supplemental volume, published eleven years after volume 
XIX, in which these thousands of most important papers should 
have appeared their suppression. See pp. 11, 12; also "War 
Records" in Index. 



INDEX 



Abolitionists, 22, 248. 
"A Few Acts and Actors in the 
Tragedy of the Civil War,'" 
147, 149. 
Aquia creek, 41, 42, 44. 
Alexander, General, quoted, 136. 
Ammunition, why McCIellan did 
not receive heavy artil- 
lery, 147-149. 
Antietam, Battle of. 19, 71, 86, 
87, 88, 100, 101, 102, 103, 
160. 
and Gettysburg compared, 117, 
151. 
losses at, compared, 141- 

142. 
forces at, compared, 120-129, 
130. 
"artillery hell," 136. 
belittled. 56. 
Burnside at, 105-109, 111-115, 

116. 
"Burnside's blundering sacri- 
fice of life at," 106. 
errors af, 105-106, 114, 115. 
comparison with forces en- 
gaged at Chancellorsville, 
127. 
Fredericljsburg, 126. 
Gettysburg, 120, 121, 127, 

128. 
Second Bull Run. 117. 118. 
Seven Days' battles, 117. 
Shiloh. 125, 126. 
Murfreesborough, 127. 
Confederate forces at, 117-120. 
line at, 101. 
forces engaged, 116-129. 
greatest battle of war, 88. 135. 
greatest day of battle, 152. 
grandest victory of war, 88. 
Lee force at, 101-102. 
Lee's report (quoted), 102. 
losses on each side, 137, 139, 

140, 142. 
prisoners, etc., 138-141. 
McClellan's plan at, 102. 
material to battle at, 133. 
plan at. 116: closely fol- 
lowed by Lee at Gettys- 
burg, 116 ; followed by 



Antietam — continued. 

Marshal Oyama at Muk- 
den, 116. 
reports of Confederate com- 
manders at, 106-107, 109, 
110, 111, 112. 
Union forces at, 117-120. 
weather conditions of eve of, 
100 ; see Note, p. 307. 
Appleton's Cyclopoedia of Ameri- 
can Biography, 227. 
Appomattox, 198. 

I^nion forces hold, 35. 
"Armies of Europe, The," 302. 
Armv becomes quiescent. 205. 
commanded by President and 

Secretary of War, 22. 
foreigners in Union, 259. 
"Around the World with Grant," 
198-199, 263, 264, 275, 
285, 304-305. 
Averell's cavalry, action of, 
south of James, 36. 

Baltimore's peril, 92. 

"Barbara Fritchie," 122, 131. 

Barnard, General, orders of Sec- 
retary of War to, 47. 
relinquishos command, 47. 

"Battl<'s and Leaders," 136, 212- 
213. 

"Battle of Culpeper," 206-208. 

Bayard's dving message to Mc- 
CIellan, 285. 

Benjamin, Secretary, excuses 
Cabinet interference in 
armv affairs, 218. 
report of, 146. 

Benningsen, 198. 

Bernadotte, 198. 

Beverly Ford, 168. 

Bolivar, Virginia Heights, 65, 68. 

Bounties, 259, 261. 

Bradford. Lieutenant. 147, 148. 

Bragg marches toward the Ohio, 
^ 63. 

Bristoe, campaign of 1863, 256. 

Brooke, Ma.jor-General, report of, 
138-139. 

Brown, John, raid, 69, 80. 

Buell, a pupil of McCIellan, 54. 



311 



312 



INDEX 



Bull Run, First, 51 ; see also 
Manasfias. 

second battle of, 43. 

second campaign, 24. 
Burnside, General. 50, 164. 

aids McClellan to retain com- 
mand, 190. 

assumes command, 190. 

driven back, 145. 

given command. 205, 293. 

Halleck's orders to, 45. 

Lee watching, 41. 

not a tactician. 105. 

not qualified as general, 113. 

protests against McClellan's 
rush, 182. 

retires to Fredericksburg. 20G. 
Burnside's failure to cut Lee 
off, 150. 

forces at Antietam, 109. 

force goes to Fredericksburg, 
42. 

mistakes, Longstreet on. 212. 

plan of campaign, 205-20G. 
President approves, 190. 

withdrawal permits Confeder- 
ate .i unction, 213. 
Butler at New Orleans, 144. 

trouble with fugitive slaves, 
244. 

Cabal, Chandler a member of, 
215. 
civilian, at Washington. 215. 
Lincoln not strong enough to 

force, 217. 
Stanton backed up by, 272. 
Cameron, Secretary, on fugitive 

slaves, 244-245. 
Campaign of 1862. Stanton's in- 
terference in, 21, 24, 30. 
Cartridges, blank. McClellan able 

to fire only, 88, 146. 
Cavalry, Lincoln's query to Mc- 
Clellan concerning, 166. 
Cedar Mountain, 44, 70. 
Chancellorsville, 24. 
Lee forces at, 203. 
Confederate forces at, 127. 
Union forces at, 127. 
Chandler, Biography of Senator, 
216, 217. 
Zachariah, 215, 216, 217. 
Chantilly, 58. 
Chickahominy divides army, 26. 

Union forces cross, 35. 
City Point, 36. 
"Coffee-boilers," 130, 131. 
Cold Harbor, Grant at, 239. 
"Comments on Bourbaki's Opera- 
tions," 199. 



Committee on Conduct of War, 

Civilian. 143, 144. 
Confederate Army, cabinet in- 
terference in, 217, 218,, 
219. 
leaves Pennsylvania, 58-59. 
commanders ignorant of topog- 
raphy of country, 28. 
concentrate at Frederick, 59. 
conscription, 29, 30, 31, 170, 

251. 
engineers' reports, 35. 
forces at Gaines Mill, 34-36. 
at Seven Days' battles, 30- 

34. 
minimized, 28. 
opposing Burnside at Antie- 
tam, 109-112. 
loss at South Mountain, 
Crampton's Gap, Antie- 
tam, etc., 136-140. 
official report, 84. 
States, regimental strength of, 
33. 
Congressional Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, 9, 
216, 236, 294 
"Conquest of Spain," 300. 
Conscription. See Confederate 
conscription, and note, p. 
307. 
Copped, Henry, 300, 301. 
Corinth, dispersal of army con- 
centrated at, 23. 
Pope's "victory" south of, 279. 
sipge of, 39. 
Corliss, Major, 161. 
Cornwallis, Lord, 228-229, 269- 

270. 
Couch, General, order to, 98, 154. 

division, 145. 
Crampton's Gap, battle of, 87, 

162. 
Crane, Colonel, report of, 140. 
Crawford. General (quoted), 70. 
Crimea. 227, 302. 
Crisis, The, 51. 

Crooks, Genpral (quoted), 113. 
Culpeper, 44, 45. 

Great movement on. 178-190. 
McClellan's disposition of units 
in movement on. 182-190. 
orders to Averell, 187 ; Bay- 
ard, 188-189 : Burnside, 
187. 188; Couch, 186,188; 
Franklin, 183-184, 188, 
189; Getty, 184; Ninth 
Corps, 189 ; Pleasonton, 
183, 186. 187, 188; Por- 
ter, Fitz-John, 184, 188; 
Reynolds, 184-185, 187- 



INDEX 



313 



Culpeper — continued. 

188, 189; Sickles, 188: 
Sigel, 188 ; Sixth corps 
18 7: Stoneman ,184 
Sturgis, 183, 184, 189 
Sumner, 189 ; Sykes, 185 
reports on advance to Alex 
ander, 192 ; Lee, 192, 193 
Pleasonton, 192 ; Sickles 
192: Willcox, 192, 193 
see Note, p. 307. 

Curtin, Governor, 146. 

Cyclopcedia of American Biogra- 
phy, 300. 

DAVIS, Colonel B. P., 101, 167; 
death of. 168. 
Jefferson, approves invasion of 

Pennsylvania, 56. 
concedes McClollan could have 

ended war, 253. 
"History of the Confederacy," 

29. 
Lee's report to, 56, 57. 
on the hopelessness of South- 
ern cause, 253-254. 
proclamation, 56-57. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Harbroner, 

161. 
Major Nelson H., report of, 
136. 
Desertions, 260, 261. 270. 
"Destruction and Reconstruction" 

(quoted), 28. 
"Detroit Post and Tribune Biog- 
raphy, The," 215-216. 
Drafting, 260, 261. 
DuPont, Colonel (quoted), 21-23. 

Emancipation Proclamation, 243- 
244, 250, 251. 
a war measure, 249-250. 
did not free slaves, 251. 
enforced South conscription, 

251. 
increased hostility of South, 

251. 
its political effect upon other 

nations, 252. 
prolonged war, 251. 
Emerson, Ralph Waldo (quoted), 

284. 
Equipment, damaged, 119. 
Exhaustion of North and South, 
269. 

Feerbro's report, 112. 
Financial depletion, 261-262, 270. 



Forrest a born general, 160. 
and Van Dorn at Holly Springs, 

160. 
rides around Grant, 160. 
Fortifications, Grant's respect 
for renewed, 224, 225, 
226. 
Grant's lack of respect for, 223- 

224. 
Humphrey's treatment of, 226. 
McClellan learns their value at 

Crimea, 227. 
Meade to Grant on. 226. 
value of, 223. 

Warren's faith in, 224, 225. 
Forty-eighth Pennsylvania, his- 
tory of (quoted), 259. 
Franklin, General, official report 
of. 97, 139. 
General McClellan's orders to, 
97. See Note, p. 308. 
Fredericksburg, 24. 
battle of. 202. 203. 
Burnside goes to, 42. 
(Confederates abandon, 72. 
Confederate forces at, 126. 
Union forces at, 126. 
Friedland (1807) campaign, 198. 
Fugitive slaves, 244, 245. 

GAINES' Mill, 28. 
i)attle of, 181. 
Confederate forces at. 34-36. 
Union forces at, 34-36. 
Garfield, James A., 22. 
Garrett, President, B. & O. R. R., 

146. 
Gettysburg, battle of, 52, 58, 89, 
96, 131. 134, 151, 211. 
and Antietam compared, 117, 
151. 
forces at, compared, 120-129, 

130. 
losses at, compared, 141-142. 
Lee's frontal attack at, 117. 
Meade's peril after, 215. 
Stuart destroys Lee's chances 

at. 159. 
campaign, Anderson, R. H., re- 
port of, 195. 
Meade and the, 143. 
Stonewall Jackson's route 
map for, 92. 
"God bless you. General McClel- 
lan," 285. 
Gordonsville, 41. 

Grant, General, 36 (quoted), 52- 
53, 64, 89, 242. 
and Sherman's friendship, ro- 
mance of, 280-281. 



314 



INDEX 



Grant — continued. 

commends McClellan. 135. 
compels Stanton to bend the 

knee, 272. 
given command, 217. 
never made an army, 53. 
on draft, 260, 261. 
vindicates Porter, 290. 
Grant's confidence in McClelllan, 
275. 
final campaign, 36. 
peril in pursuit of Lee, 264. 
tribute to McClellan. 285. 
"Great Campaigns," Adams, 198, 

199. 
Green, Lieutenant, 101, 
Grifl3n, General Charles, describes 
ford. 152. 
report of, 101. 
Guild, Medical Director, defec- 
tive report of, 136-137. 
Gwyn, Colonel, report of, 155, 
156. 



Hager, General, 220. 
Hagerstown, 72. 

Lee's army taken, 58. 
Halleck, General, 24, 40, 48, 



64, 



address against giving com- 
mand to McClellan, 46. 
alarmed at Pope's defeat. 48. 
carries Burnside's plan to 

Washington, 206. 
cause McClellan's dismissal to 

save himself, 297. 
directs that McClellan shall 

take charge of defenses of 

Washington, 174. 
equivocal message to Burnside, 

206. 
false dispatch, 39. See Halleck- 

Pope dispatches. 
letter to Grant (1862) as to 

payment of troops, etc., 

261-262. 
letter to Pope. 46. 
letter to McClellan after Pope's 

defeat, 47. 
letter to McClellan, 45. 
mutilates official records, 40, 

295-296. 
on Burnside, 190. 
on deserters, 260. 
order for removal of army from 

Peninsula, 42. 
order of September 2, 61. 
orders to Burnside, 44-45. 
-Pope dispatches, 40, 41. 46, 

90, 183, 278-286. 291-297. 
letter of July 5, 1865, to, 40. 



Ra Heck — con tin ued. 

position officially strong. 61. 
stakes reputation on ability of 
army to take Richmond, 
46. 
statement erroneous, 46-47. 
threatens General Humphreys 
with arrest, 71. 
Hancock, General, at Snicker's 
Gap, 187. 
letter of, 136. 

on McClellan's treatment, 235. 
report of, 140. 
Harper's Ferry, 59, 72, 76, 78, 
90. 91, 94, 95, 101, 103, 
130, 145, 182. 
cavalry expedition from, 160. 
Benning's report of, 163. 
Colonel Voss' report of, 160- 

161, 163, 164, 105, 166. 
fruits of, 166. 
Lee mentions, 163. 
Longstreet on, 167. 
McClellan's mention of, 167. 
Pendleton's report of, 164- 

165, 166. 
Walker, Gen. .John G., on, 167. 
disposition of Confederate 

forces about, 161-162. 
defense of. 64, 65-66. 
investment of. 78, 79, 80. 
McClellan's report on, 91. 
surrenders, 73, 162. 
topography of, 65-68, 82-83. 
Harrison's Landing described, 36 
McClellan's position at, 35. 
operations at, 36. 
Huntbleman, 50. 
Hill, A. P., 44. 

drives back Burnside, 145. 
D. H., on condition of Con- 
federate troops, 227. 
on the suffering of men in 

trenches, 234. 
report, 36. 
"History of the Confederacy," 29. 
Holly Sprines. Forrest and Van 
Dorn at; 160. 
Grant's report of raid at, 160. 
Hood's fatuous inactivity, 266- 
267, 268. 
opportunities, 267-269. 
the menace of, 267-269. 
Hooker, General, letter to Stan- 
ton on Burnside at Antie- 
tam, 106. 
Humphreys, General. 171. 

application for court of inquiry, 

70-71. 
gets new equipment, 145. 



INDEX 



315 



Humphreys — continued 

Halleck threatens, with arrest, 

71. 
inadequate equipment, 71, 79. 
ineflScient equipment, 119. 
on fortifications, 226. 

"I AM so borne upon," 215. 
"Important movement pending," 

189. 
Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster, re- 
port of delay in supplying 
McCIellan, 177. 
Colonel, on McClellan's celerity 

of movement, 181. 
General, 70. 

General, report to General 
Meigs, 44, 45. 

Jackson, Stonewall, 27, 44, 302. 

and Lee, junction of, 28. 

brilliant exploits over Union 
commanders, 180. 

bottled up. 180, 241. 

cut off from striking McClel- 
lan's communications, 184, 
185. 

offers his resignation from 
army. 218. 219. 

on cabinet interference in con- 
duct of army, 218. 

ordered to suppress Pope, 41- 
42. 

ordered to cut off McClellan's 
communications, 179. 

witlidraws resiscnation from 
army, 219-220. 

won no laurels from McCIellan, 
180, 181. 
James River, 41. 

correct military base, 26. 

Grant's change of base at, 27. 

McClellan's change of base at, 
27. 
Johnston, J. B., begs Jackson to 
reconsider his resignation, 
219. 

endorses Jackson's offer of 
resignation, 218. 

on cabinet interference of con- 
duct of war, 219. 
Jones, General, 88. 

report of, 121-137. 

Kentucky, declaration of Union 
men of, 242. 
excepted from Emancipation 

Proclamation, 243-244. 
necessary to hold, 243. 
Kimball, General, report of, 139. 



Lafayette, Marquis, 229. 
"Lectures on India," Max Miiller, 

10. 
Lee, General Robert E., 51, 53, 

145. 
abandons idea of invading 

Pennsylvania, 172. 
balked in campaign of 1863, 

256. 
bewildered, 203, 205. 
captures letter from Pope to 

Halleck, 45. 
charged with conduct of Con- 
federate forces. 29. 
military operations, 220. 
commends McCIellan, 135. 
complains of shortage of offi- 
cers, 32-33. 
crosses into Maryland, 63. 
declares McCIellan the ablest 

Union general, 277. 
greatest of Union generals, 

305. 
forces Pope, 47. 
General Orders No. 14. 29. 
had all artillery he wanted, 

145. 
letter of. of August 16, 29. 
letter of, to General Loring, 

172. 
"may attack," 150. 
on straggling, 132, 134. 
orders Jackson to suppress 

Pope, 41-42. 
pursuit of, was hazardous, 264. 
quoted on capture of Harper's 

Ferry, 96. 
retreats from Maryland, 88. 
sacrifices judgment to duty, 

265. 
starts for Rapidan, 43. 
to President Davis on needs of 

army, 172. 
writes to Jackson, 41. 
watches Burnside's movements, 

41. 
Lee's army, report of supplies to, 

176-177. 
army encamped at Frederick, 

72. 
flight to Virginia, 150-152, 154. 
force at Antietam, 101-102. 
incompatible orders. 203, 205. 
invasion of Maryland, 55. 
invasion of Pennsylvania, 56, 

152. 
losses at Second Manassas, 

125. 
lost opportunity, 264-266. 
lost order, 73, 75-86, 89. 



3i6 



INDEX 



Lee's lost orders, directions con- 
tained in, 76-77. 
McClellan anticipates their 

disclosures, 73-74. 
McClellan determines if, is 

genuine, 73. 
McClellan's knowledge of, 
too late to circumvent Con- 
federate movements, 78 et 
seg. 
success of directions contained 
therein, 78-79. 

order to move to Rappahan- 
nock, 45. 

projected turning movement, its 
menace to Washington, 95. 
possibilities of, 93-95. 

report to Jefiferson Davis, 56, 
57. 

reports, 88. 

surrender, 198, 199, 255. 265. 
not a military necessity, 265- 
266. 

turning movement not success- 
ful with McClellan, 95. 
used on Hooker, 95. 
used on Pope, 95. , 

"Life of Chase," 147. 
"Lincoln and Seward" (Welles), 

48. 
Lincoln, President, 22, 25, 48, 49 
(quoted), 71. 

assassination, 248. 

begs McClellan to take the 
army, 60. 

desires end of war, 263. 

directs McClellan to take 
charge of defenses of 
Washington, 174, 175. 

during war organized States, 
248. 

enforces personal orders. 24. 

excuses himself for appointing 
McClellan, 51. 

"has little influence with this 
administration," 215. 

ignorant of insufficient sup- 
plies, 174. 

ignorant of Pope-Halleck in- 
trigue, 298. 

letter vindicating McClellan, 
237-238. 

message to Halleck, 40. 

offers to resign Presidency, 
215. 

on slavery, 242-249. 

order to McClellan regarding 
McDowell corps, 222. 

places McClellan in command 
of Washington forces, 49, 
51, 58. 



Lincoln — continued. 
saves Meade, 215. 
Lincoln's sole object to save 
Union, 237. 
telegraphs McClellan, 62. 
to McClellan, 43. 
turns his back on War De- 
partment, 63, 175. 
vindicates McClellan, 236-238. 
Longstreet anticipated and neu- 
tralized, 189. 
battle order, 209. 
gives final order of battle, 203. 
halted, 58. 
isolated, 201. 
letter of, 31. 

on Burnside's mistakes at Cul- 
peper, 212. 
Longstreet's vain orders, 55. 
Loring, General, 57. 

General, letter of Lee to, 172. 
Loudon Heights, 65, 67, 68, 69, 

72, 76, 80, 93, 124, 161. 
Louisa Courthouse, 41. 44. 

Mageuder dispatches, 223. 
Malvern Hill. 28. 

General Sumner's report of cap- 
ture of, 36. 
Jackson at, 181. 
Lee's defeat at, 35. 
Manassas, Second, 50-54, 117-118, 
287-288; see Bull Run. 
Confederate forces at, 50, 51. 
Lee's losses at, 125. 
Pope's forces at, 50. 
losses at, 125. 
Marching distances of contending 
armies in Maryland and 
Virginia campaign com- 
pared, 131. 
Martinsburg, reconnaissance to, 
171. 
Lee's account of, 171. 
Pleasonton's report of, 171. 
Maryland campaign, comparison 
of forces at. 202-203. 
events which led up to, 19- 

21. 
opens, 55. 

view of final epoch of, 201. 
Heights, 65, 67, 68, 72, 76, 78, 
79, 80, 81. 83, 85, 92, 98, 
95. 98, 100. 
cavalry garrisons, 59. 
invasion of Lee, 55. 
McClellan, General George B.. 22, 
23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 41, 51. 
"a much abused man," 214. 
accused of slowness, 42, 43, 
44. 



INDEX 



317 



McClellan — continued. 
adds instructions, 42. 
and Lee move simultaneously, 

241. 
at Antietam awaits delayed am- 
munition, 88. 
baflBes Jackson at White Oak 

Swamp, 181. 
checkmates Lee, 55. 
clamors for heavy ammunition, 

146. 
commended for activity and 

valor by General Scott, 

274-275. 
could have ended war. 253. 
could Lincoln have saved? 61. 
created Army of Potomac, 235. 
crosses Lee's front by the 

flank, 178. 
crosses Potomac, 178-179. 
declared by Lee the ablest 

Union general, 277. 
greatest Union general, 305. 
determines if Lee's lost order 

is genuine, 73. 
"did not attack early enough," 

143. 
did not claim command, 47. 
did not protest against ad- 
vance of his force, 47. 
directed to pursue Lee, 64. 
fears cabal at Washington, 60. 
Fitz-John Porter's letter to, 

36. 
forces opposed to, minimized 

at Washington, 125. 
Governor of New Jersey, 304. 
Grant's confidence in, 275. 

tribute to, 285. 
had little ammunition, 145. 
had no artillery ammunition, 

145. 
had three disorganized armies 

in field, 64. 
Halleck advises against giving 

command to, 46. 
Halleck's letter to, after Pope's 

defeat, 47. 
idol of officers and men, 303. 
in actual command, 62. 
in charge of defenses of Wash- 
ington, 174. 
in Mexican War, 302. 
keeps Lee at Richmond, 43. 
leaves army, 213. 
letter of Halleck to, 45. 
letter of, to Halleck, 60; reply 

to, 60. 
life and personality, 300-305. 



McClellan — continued. 

Lincoln begs, to take the army, 
60. 
refutes charge of slowness 
of, 43. 

main purpose to save Union, 
246, 248-249. 

most successful of our com- 
manding officers, 275. 

moves into Pope's territory, 45. 

moves troops, 45. 

never lost conquered territory, 
144. 

not actuated by personal mo- 
tives, 46. 

not in command of defenses at 
Washington, 47. 

on slavery, 242. 

paralyzes Lee, 203. 

Pope pours his wrath on, 289. 
refutes charge of slowness 

of, 43. 
to relieve, 38. 

position of general-in-chief 
taken from, 25. 

President orders he be sent for, 
47. 

Presidential candidate, 304. 

prevents Lee's great turning 
movement, 82-86, 90-92. 

prepares to cross Potomac and 
attack Lee, 169. 

placed in command of Wash- 
ington forces, 49, 51. 

relieved of command, 190, 205, 
293. 

reorganizes army on the march, 
186. 

saving factor of a demoralized 
army, 133. 

saddle for cavalry, 302-303. 

starts for Fort Monroe, 43. 

stripped of authority, 235. 

studies Crimean War, 302. 

superior to Jackson, 181. 

to be sent forward, 53. 

to command all troops in Vir- 
ginia, 45-46. 

to coommand all forces, 42-43. 

to reorganize army, 51-53, 58. 

to take command of all forceg 
in field, 63. 

unable to save Harper's Ferry, 
65. 

understood artillery, 135-136. 

Upton vindicates, 42. 

uses fugitive slaves, 244-247. 

vindicated by Lincoln, 236-238. 

why he did not attack next 
morning, 144-145. 

why was he removed, 278, 297. 



3i8 



INDEX 



McClellan's alleged inactlTity, 75. 

appeal for ferryboats, 36. 

army, Lee on supplies of, 173. 
needs of, during campaign, 

172. 
robbed of supplies, 174, 
175. 

army's applause of, 213. 

average daily march greater 
than any otlier command- 
er, 199-200. 

caution to Franlslin, 91. 

celerity, 44. 

in Culpeper campaign, 181. 
or slowness, 191-200. 
compared with Meade, 194- 
195 ; Confederates, 195 ; 
Kershaw (General), 195; 
Lee, 196 ; Longstreet, 196 : 
Sherman's march, 197 ; 
Vicksburg campaign, 197 ; 
Freedland (1807) cam- 
paign, 198 ; Grant's pur- 
suit of Lee, 198-199 ; Bour- 
baki's operations, 199 ; 
Army of Potomac regiment 
itinerary, 199-200. 

circular on straggling, 132- 
183. 

command of artillery, 141. 

danger of court-martial, 61. 

detractors, 236. 

disposition of his units In move- 
ment on Culpeper, 182- 
190. 

force exaggerated, 28. 

•'inactivity," 96, 274. 

letter to Adjutant - General 
Townsend, 242-243. 
to Buell, 243, 248-249. 

movements bewilder Lee. 203. 
Lee's letters to Stuart con- 
cerning, 203-204 ; Jackson 
concerning, 203-204 ; to 
War Department, 205. 

odd correspondence with Sec- 
retary Cameron, 276. 

orders to Sykes, 185. 

plan, 27, 28, 104-115. 

a capital essay on principles 

of war, 255. 
for army movements through- 
out rebel States, 244. 
of frontal attack, 169. 
Washington interference in, 
170. 

personal qualities, 303-304. 

position at Harrison's Land- 
ing, 35. 

removal, the cause of, 242-252. 



McClellan's report on armies of 
Europe, 227. 
on Harper's Ferry, 91. 
to Halleck (September 8), 
62. 
success a menace to political 
ambitions of his enemies, 
273. 274. 
successful direction in the 

South and West, 144. 
tribute to Army of Potomac, 
299. 
to*" Lincoln, 298-299. See 
Note, p. 309. 
McDowell. 26, 27, 50. 

message to McClellan, 27. 
Meade, General, 54, 89, 151. 
and the Gettysburg campaign. 

143. 
a pupil of McClellan, 54. 
peril after battle of Gettys- 
burg, 215. 
"Medical and Surgical History of 

the War, The," 138. 
Meigs, Quartermaster-General, 98- 

99. 
Meigs, General, report of, on sup- 
plies to McClellan, 177. 
"Memoirs," Grant's. 52-53, 197, 
250-251, 271, 273, 280. 
of Lee," 276. 
Merrimac, 26, 222. 
Michie. General Peter S., 12-13, 

20 (quoted), 24-25, 214. 
Miles, Colonel, 59, 80, 93, 100, 
161. 
at Harper's Ferry. 85-86. 
defense of Harper's Ferry, 65- 

66. 
despatch of, 59. 
syndicate-sacrificed, 180. 
"Military Policy of the United 
States," 9, 15. 20, 36, 40, 
43, 62-63, 113. 124, 133. 
138, 142, 175, 282. 
Mine Run movement, 256. 
Monitor, 222. 
Monroe. Fort, McClellan starts 

for, 43, 
Monroe, Fortress, removal of 

troops to, 42. 
Moral exhaustion of the North, 

269-270. 
Morell's division, losses at Seven 
Days and in Pope's cam- 
paign, 155. 
Morris, Colonel, report of, 139. 
Murfreesboro, Confederate forces 
engaged at, 127. 
Union forces engaged at, 127. 



INDEX 



319 



NAPOLEON, 9, 16, 52, 53, 136, 174, 
198, 255-256, 269, 284, 
303. 
at Boulogne, 206. 
Ulm, campaign of, 185-186. 
Negro soldiers in Confederate 

army, 123. 
Nelson, Inspector, report of, 137. 
North American Review, 211, 

290. 
North Carolina, army of, 64. 
depleted of native recruits, 
259-260. 

"Odious, to make treason," 247. 
Official Orders (quoted), 28-29. 
Oyama, Marshal, 116. 

Parkman, Francis (quoted), 16. 
Peninsula, army withdrawn from, 
42. 
campaign. Confederate artil- 
lery, lack of ammunition 
for, 233. 
Confederate defenses, weak- 
ness of, 233. 234. 
condition of roads, 231. 
Magruder on, 227-228, 229- 

230. 
McClellan's plan for, 227, 

254-255, 256-257. 
relative positions of contend- 
ing forces, 231-234. 
strength of forces in, 232- 
233. 
movement begun, 222. 
of troops from, 45. 
unanimously recommended, 
222. 
Pleasonton's cavalry detained 

at, 47. 
Confederate army leaves, 58-59 
Pennsylvania, Confederate army 
leaves, 58-59. 
Lee abandons idea of invading, 

172. 
Lee's invasion of, 56, 152. 
One Hundred and Eighteenth, 
134-156. 
losses of, 156. 
Petersburg, 232. 
fall of, 255. 
Grant at, 255. 
"Personal Memoirs," Sherman's, 
282. 
Recollections of Distinguished 
Generals," 280. 
Pleasonton, General, 154. 

on winding up campaign, 209- 
210. 



Pleasonton's ability, General 
Sickles on, 211. 

cavalry detained at Peninsula, 
47. 
Pope, General, 21, 41, 44, 51, 

address to the Army of Vir- 
ginia, 38-39. 

appointed to command of Army 
of Virginia, 45. 

army's valuation of, 283. 

attack on McClellan, 292. 

at Corinth, 39. 

boastful address to army, 282. 

campaign, 256. 

campaign, Army of Potomac in, 
288, 289. 

defeat, 47. 

Halleck alarmed at, 48. 
Stanton alarmed at, 48. 
Secretary Welles on, 48. 

did not understand his own 
plan, 289. 

exiled In Minnesota, 46. 

force at Rappahannock, 45. 

given command of Army of 
Virginia, 38, 280. 

-Halleck dispatches, 278-281, 
294-295, 296. 
army not deceived by, 280. 
blames President and cabi- 
net, 292. 
"deep personal obligation" to 

Pope, 291. 
excuse for, 280. 
Stanton's Inquiry Into, 280. 

in the West, 39. 

letter of July 5, 1865, to Hal- 
leck, 40. 

losses at Second Manassas, 125. 

remarkable letters to Halleck, 
291-297. 

repudiates Halleck's dispatch, 
39. 

orders to, 38. 

sent to Minnesota, 291. 

testifies before Congressional 
Committee on Conduct of 
War, 40. 

threat to Halleck causes Mc- 
Clellan's removal, 216-217. 

to McClellan, 43. See Note, p. 
309. 
Poplar Spring Church, battle of, 

259. 
Porter, Fitz-John, 22, 50, 154. 

at Gaines' Mill, 181. 

court-martialed on crooked evi- 
dence, 290-297. 

letter to McClellan, 36. 

obtains transports, 42. 

Pope pours his wrath on, 289. 



320 



INDEX 



Porter, Fitz-John — continued. 
saved Pope and Washington, 

290. 
vindicated, 290. 
Potomac. Army of, 31, 41, 44, 45, 
49, 64. 
daily itinerary of a regiment 

of, 199. 
great work belittled, 56. 
tiigh on roll of historic armies, 

299. 
in front of Richmond. 26. 
McClellan created, 235. 
recall of, 48. 
marches off. 213. 
quartermaster's report of sup- 
plies to, 176 ; Meigs' re- 
port, 177. 
second base of operations for, 

254. 
sent to Pope, 288. 
supplies of, 186. 
starving for supplies, 171. 
to be withdrawn from the Pen- 
insula, 42. 
river. Captain Winslow reports 
fording, 97. 
fording the, 152-153. 
General Wool reports it as 

fordable, 97. 
road, 91. 

topography of, 92. 
Preface, 9-17. 

President has no power to dele- 
gate command, 25. 
is commander-in-chief, 24-25. 
Prevost, Colonel, shot, 155. 

Ramsey, Colonel, 148. 
Rapidan, Lee starts for, 43. 
Rebel commissioners, Lincoln's 
conference with, 250-251. 
demands concessions of, 251. 
Rebellion, divergent views as to 
suppression of. 247. 
Lincoln represented enlightened 
views in suppression of. 
248 
radicals did not represent 
people in suppression of, 
248. 
Secretary Chase's radical views 
as to suppression of, 247. 
Reconstruction, period of, 247, 

248. 
Recruiting offices closed, order 
rescinding, 118-119. 
service discontinued. 28-29, 31. 
Report of Committee on Con- 
duct of War, 133, 175. 



Report of .Joint Committee on 

the Conduct of the War, 

63. 

Reports, official, removal of, 183. 

Reorganization on the march, 64- 

74. 
Reynolds. 50. 
Richmond, 26, 27, 30. 

armies face each other below, 

41. 
abandoned, 255. 
fall of, 27. 
Ripley, General. 146, 147, 148. 
order of, from Secretary of 
War, 60. 
Rodgers. Commodore, McClellan's 

plan outlined to, 27. 
Roosevelt, Theodore (quoted), 
15-16. 

Sackett, General, 108, 112. 
Scott, General, commends Mc- 
Clellan for activity and 
valor, 274-275. 
Secretarv of War as strategist, 
144. 
but a clerk, 220. 
promises ammunition, 146. 
Seven Days' battles, 27, 50, 51, 
117, 124. 
forces at, 30-34. 
losses of Morell's division at, 
115. 
Seward, Secretary, 60. 

ignorant of insufficiency of sup- 
plies, 174. 
refuses to accede to recall of 
McClellan, 48. 
Shepherdstown, 154 

Confederate forces at, 157. 
i losses at, 157. 
i Early, report of, 157. 
I Hill, A. P., report of, 157. 
j Jackson, Stonewall, at, 157. 
i Union losses at, 157. 
Sherman, biography of, 196-197. 
"Sherman's Bummers," 197. 
j march to the sea, 266-267, 269. 
I Sheridan on desertion, 261. 
! Sheridan's army, 53. 
! ride, 285. 
Shiloh, battle of, strength of Con- 
federate forces at, 126. 
I Grant's army at, 126, 
I Sigel. General, 50. 
Sickles, General, on Pleasonton's 

ability, 211. 
Slavery, 22, 250 ; see Fugitive 

'Slaves 
Slaves freed by constitutional 
amendment, 251. 



INDEX 



321 



Slaves not frpcd by Emancipation 

Proclamation, 251. 
South, Consci-iption in, 251 ; see 

Confederate Conscription. 
South Mountain, 65, 76, 92, 93, 
130. 
battle of, 58, 71, 72. 76, 82, 87, 

162. 
topography of, 66. 
Stanton, Secretary. 21, 2.3, 2-!, 
25, 48. 64. 85. 
alarmed at Pope's defeat, 48. 
backed up by cabal, 272. 
"bluffer, a," 272. 
cause of continued war, 271. 
demands McClellan's dismissal. 

48. 
Grant's character study of, 271- 

273. 
interference of, 214, 217, 273. 
message to Halleck, 39-40. 
message to Pope. 39-40. 
on drafts and desertions, 260, 

261. 
on slavery, 242. 
order of Anril 3, 28. 
order of May 18, 26: of June 

8, 26. 
order to McClellan regarding 

Blenker's division, 222. 
suppresses McClellan tribute, 
274. 
"State suicide," 247, 249. 
Steiner, Lewis H., diary of (quot- 
ed), 57-58, 72, 77-78. 79, 
133-134, 250. See Note, p. 
310. 
"Stigma, an Undesowed," 200. 
Stragglers, 130, 131, 132, 133, 
134, 135, 138. 140-141. 
officers among, 134. 135. 
Straggling, Pope complains of, 

288-289. 
Stuart destroys Lee's chances at 

Gettysburg, 159. 
Stuart's "ride around Meade," 
159. 
McClellan," 159. 
useless cavalry i-aids. 159-160. 
Substitutes and bounties, 259. 
Supreme Court, 24. 
Supplies. ] 78-177. See also Hwm- 

phreys and Note. p. 310. 
Sykes' brigade, 155-156. 

Taylor. Lieutenant-General Dick, 
28. 50. 

Thomas. General, a pupil of Mc- 
Clellan. 54. 
welds an army, 267. 



Toombs, General. 107. 
Turner's Gap. 66, 72, 76. 83, 84, 
87, 93, 94. 

Union forces at Gaines' Mill, 34- 
36. 
Seven Days' battles, 30-34. 

losses at Antietam. South 
Mountain, C r a m p t o n's 
Gap, etc.. 140. 
Upton, General Emory, abilities 
as an army officer, 14. 

an Abolitionist, 214. 

biography of. 1 2, 13, 30 : see 
Micliie. 

misled, 140. 

on Pope, 40. 

on "War Department strategy." 
24. 

quoted, 9, 20. 36, 43, 44, 49, 
62-63, 75, 113, 124, 133, 
138, 142, 175, 213-214, 
217, 242, 253. 259, 271, 
273, 282, 286, 287-288, 
289 : see Military Policy. 

vindicates McClellan, 42, 214. 

Van Dorn rides around Grant, 

160. 
AMcksburg, 89. 
Virginia, Army of, 38, 64. 

Pope's address to, 38-39. 
Pope given command, 38, 4.''>. 
Governor of, I'equests Jackson 
to reconsider resignation. 
219. 
Military Institute, Jackson asks 
to 'be ordered to, 218. 

War, a perfectly conducted, 256. 
Congressional Committee on 
Conduct of. Pope testifies 
before, 40. 
critics, civilian, 143, 144. 
debt, 262. 

Department interference, 275 ; 
see tStanton. 
Lincoln turns his back on, 

63, 175. 
records suppressed and hid- 
den, 90. 
interference of the Secretary of, 
in the war, 217, 254 ; see 
Stanton 
strategists, 80, 89, 278, 288, 

289. 
"strategy." 24, 49, 64, 75, 
215. 258, 266-267, 268. 
most ci-itica! period of, 263. 



322 



INDEX 



War — Gontiniied. 

of the Rebellion : Official Rec- 
ords of the Union and 
Confederate Armies ; see 
Wa?- Records 

Order No. 3, 29. 

our gravest peril in the clos- 
ing years of, 253. 

"Records," 10. 27. 29, 30, 31, 
32, 83. 35. 36, 37, 43, 62, 
68, 73. 81. 82, 88, 90, 92, 
97, 101. 106. 118, 126, 128, 
132, 136, 142, 1.50, 152, 
158, 164, 165, 166, 172, 
183. 184. 199, 200, 202, 
209, 213, 222, 223, 231, 
240. 243, 251, 254, 267, 
290. 291. 294. See Note, 
p. 310. 

"Rules and Articles of" shall 
govern command, 45. 

Secretary of. duties are ad- 
ministrative, 24. 
not entitled to exercise com- 
mand, 24. 
orders of, to General Bar- 
nard, 47 ; see Stanton : 
see Secretary of War. 

why it lasted four years, 23. 
\Yashington, 47, 55. 58. 

at Lee's mercy, 91. 

force necessary to render se- 
cure. 222. 

further blundering at, 42. 

McClellan's bars all advance 
to, 98. 

peril of, 92. 

removal of army from Rich- 
mond to. Wilkes' protest 
against, 37. 

scare in, 240. 
Waterloo, 9, 16. 



Watson. Assistant Secretary of 

War, 146. 
Wavne. General. 229. 
Welles, Secretary, 51, 60. 

ignorant of insufficiency of 

supplies, 174. 
on recall of Army of Potomac. 

48. 
refuses to accede to recall of 

McClellan. 48. 
Commodore Wilkes' protest to, 

37. 
on Pope's defeat, 48. 
White, Colonel, 112-113. 
White Oak Swamp, McClellan 

baffles Jackson at, 181. 
Whittier, John G., 122, 131, 248. 
Wilderness, Grant at, 239, 255. 
Wilkes. Commodore, protest to 

Secretary Welles, 37. 
Wilson. Ma.ior-General James H., 
13, 14. 
William Bender, 147-149. 
on the Battle of Antietam. 140. 
Wolselpy, Lord (quoted), 284. 
Wool, General. 85. 

on fordability of Potomac. 97. 
on fugitive slaves, 245. 
order to Miles, 65. 
report of, 59. 
Worthless equipment, 154, 155 ; 
see Humphreys. 
i-eplaced, 145. 
Wright, Marcus J., 276. 

YouK River. 26. 
Yorktown, 227-230. 

"Campaign of 1781," 229. 

Goldsborough bombards, 233. 
Young, John Russell, 263, 264, 
275, 285, 304-305. 



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